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ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON
TREATY VERIFICATION IN
THE UNITED STATES
DAVID A. KOPLOW*
The United States and the Soviet Union recently signed a treaty that eliminates an
entire class of nuclear arms, and allows more intrusive verification procedures than
ever before. As technology improves and verification becomes even more central in
arms control negotiations, Professor Koplow warns that the United States Constitution
limits the types of verification procedures to which the United States can agree. After
reviewing existing United States-Soviet Union arms control treaties and agreements,
Professor Koplow examines potential verification procedures in light of the fourth
amendment's protection of United States citizens from government intrusion. He ar-
gues that although many contemplated verification procedures could be implemented
in this country, there are some that would not pass constitutional muster; some could
be implemented only with a warrant of some kind, others could not be implemented at
all. Professor Koplow concludes that the time is ripe for the United States to rethink its
attitude toward verification of arms control agreements and to use the fourth amend-
ment to guide and shape future negotiations and verification procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the nations of the world devoted $900 billion to their mili-
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tary budgets.1 Not surprisingly, the United States2 and the Soviet
Union 3 together spent the lion's share of this sum, roughly $500 billion,4
as the super powers allocate their respective treasure in pursuit of na-
tional power, global stability, and sheer survival.
Recently, a number of dramatic and celebrated attempts have been
made to regulate in unprecedented ways this military prowess and the
threat it implies. On December 8, 1987, United States President Ronald
Reagan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) General
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Treaty on the Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.5 This agreement,
popularly known as the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) Treaty,
entered into force with the exchange of instruments of ratification at the
Moscow summit meeting on June 1, 1988. It provides, for the first time,
for the elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear
arms worldwide.6
Although the military significance of the INF Treaty is marginal, 7
R. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1986, at 25 (1986). Total global
spending on defense since 1960 has been estimated at $14 trillion, including $3 to 4 trillion for
nuclear weapons. Id. at 6-8. World military spending has risen at an annual rate of approxi-
mately ten percent for the last five years. Id.
2 The 1985-1989 five-year defense plan for the United States calls for total expenditures of
$1,894.9 billion. Nat'l J., Feb. 27, 1988, at 246. The amount the United States spent in fiscal
year 1987 is estimated to have included $24 billion for the "intelligence community" as a
whole. See P. Pringle & W. Arkin, SIOP: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War 82-84 (1983);
Tyler, How the US Cloaks a $24 Billion Budget, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1986, at A18.
3 The Soviet Union publishes little authoritative data regarding its defense budget. West-
em estimates of Soviet military spending vary widely, depending on the methodologies and
assumptions used in deriving the figures. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agen, y
[hereinafter ACDA], World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977, at 13-15
(1979). Estimating Soviet military spending has proven to be a Lontentious exercise even in-
side the United States government. See Oberdorfer, US Arms Spending Has Outpaced that of
Soviets, CIA Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1985, at Al.
4 ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985, at 4 (985).
5 INF Treaty, Dec. 8, 1987, United States-USSR, reprinted in 23 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1459 (Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter INF Treaty].
6 The treaty applies to land-based ballistic and cruise missiles capable of ranges between
approximately 350 and 3000 miles. Id. The treaty bans flight testing and production of these
missiles, as well as production of related launchers, id. art. VI, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at
1461-62, and requires the dismantling and destruction of existing stockpile inventories of these
missiles, id. arts. IV-V, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1460-61.
7 Under the treaty, the Soviet Union will be required to scrap some 1752 missiles, while
the United States will be required to destroy 859 missiles. Id. Memorandum of Understand-
ing, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1469-74.
The dismantling contemplated under the treaty will result in the removal of some 2200
warheads from active inventories. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union will
retain substantially more than 10,000 nuclear weapons deployed on strategic-range (interconti-
nental) nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as several thousand more in undeployed stockpiles
and on very short-range systems not regulated by the treaty. Bull. Atom. Scientists, Jan.-Feb.
1988, at 56.
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several of the innovative aspects of the treaty may mean it is a harbinger
of other, more substantial agreements to come.8 Among the most strik-
ing aspects of the INF Treaty are its pathbreaking provisions regarding
verification, 9 the procedures through which each side is able to determine
to its own satisfaction that the other country is complying with the obli-
gations assumed under the Treaty. Always a focal point in arms control
negotiations, verification considerations assumed even greater impor-
tance for the INF Treaty, due to the far-reaching scope of its obligations
and the unprecedented array of compliance-related terms.
Among the intrusions tolerated by the two superpowers for the first
time in the INF Treaty are: (a) on-site inspections of missile operating
bases and support facilities within ninety days after the treaty enters into
force, to confirm the accuracy of reported inventories of weapons and
equipment;10 (b) observation of the destruction of missiles and the elimi-
nation of related facilities by witnesses from the other party;11 (c) up to
20 "short notice" inspections per year for 13 years;12 and (d) stationing
of permanent observers at the perimeter of selected production facilities,
to ensure that no contraband missiles exit.13
Traditionally, United States observers of the arms control process
have focused on only one side of the verification coin, asking what in-
spection rights the United States must have in order to ensure that the
Soviet Union is behaving lawfully. Analysts have regularly opined that
the "closed" nature of Soviet society, and its government's historic pas-
sion for secrecy have interfered with the process of fashioning adequate
inspection powers and methods.' 4
8 When they signed the INF Treaty, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
also agreed to instruct their arms control delegations to accelerate work on an accord that
would mandate deep reductions in both countries' arsenals of strategic offensive arms. Joint
United States-USSR Summit Statement, reprinted in Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1987, at A34. They
contemplated that a summit meeting could be held during the first half of 1988 to record
substantial agreement in that effort. Id. The Moscow summit, which took place between May
30 and June 2, 1988, did not, however, produce a new strategic arms agreement.
9 See INF Treaty, supra note 5, arts. IX-XIII, Protocol on Inspection, 23 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. at 1463-68, 1476-87; see also notes 141-71 and accompanying text infra (concerning
recent United States-USSR treaties regulating nuclear arsenals and their similar verification
provisions).
10 INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XI, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1466.
11 Id. art. XI, 7, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1467.
12 Id. art. XI, 5, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1466.
13 Id. art. XI, 6, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1466-67.
14 The verification debate-both in the negotiations and in the public-has traditionally
taken the form of United States representatives seeking provisions that guarantee effective in-
spection, and the Soviet representatives resisting, on grounds of privacy and state sovereignty.
Typical of the rhetoric from the United States perspective is a statement by then-Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger, commenting on arms reduction proposals discussed at the 1986
Reykjavik summit meeting:
We have simply got to have absolutely reliable verification, which in effect means that
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Only recently have observers inside and outside the United States
government paused to consider in detail the reciprocal responsibilities of
the United States as an inspected state, and to contemplate the difficulties
that such an elaborate inspection scheme might raise. Under the Consti-
tution, the lawful power of the government to intrude into the private
lives of its citizenry is sharply circumscribed, in ways that have not been
fully appreciated by arms control negotiators. 15
This article, therefore, considers the proposition that it might be the
United States-at least as much as the Soviet Union-that would not,
and lawfully could not, agree to verification mechanisms as elaborate and
instrusive as those sometimes contemplated for future arms accords. The
time is ripe, in view of the increased level of inspection realized in the
INF Treaty and under negotiation in other contexts, for the United
States to rethink its attitude toward verification of arms control agree-
ments, and to reshape its strategy toward negotiating and enforcing inter-
national treaties.
Historically, arms control efforts have involved several elements, in-
cluding unilateral national actions, 16 tacit reciprocal restraint, 17 and par-
we have to be free to go anywhere we want, at any time, on Soviet soil. They have never
granted that kind of thing before, and they have talked about "adequate" verification.
But when you make them spell it out, it turns out to be something like they'll control the
time and the place and the manner and the way in which you get to look at the Soviet
soil. And that's not good enough.
All Things Considered (National Public Radio Broadcast, Oct. 29, 1986) (interview with Cas-
par Weinberger) (tape on file at New York University Law Review).
15 In the wake of the surprisingly intrusive INF Treaty verification regime, some commen-
tators have noted with alarm the implications of inspection by agents of the Soviet Union
operating inside the United States. See Negotiating the Arms Treaty: Verification Issue
Proved Thorny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at A8; Krepon, The Risks and Benefits of Verifica-
tion, Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1987, at A15.
16 "Unilateral national actions" are acts taken by a country without any explicit or implicit
quid pro quo from another country. See Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Chal-
lenges for US National Security: Nuclear Strategy Issues of the 1980's 130 (1982). Arms de-
ployment, reorganization, training, and the like are all, in this sense, unilateral defense acts,
and it has been argued that most current United States defense problems are amenable to
correction via such unilateral activity which does not directly involve the Soviet Union. See id.
One type of unilateral act-the sort that deliberately reduces, rather than augments,
United States military capacity-has only rarely been used. One conspicuous example of uni-
lateral disarmament was President Nixon's November 25, 1969 order for the unilateral dispo-
sal of all existing United States stocks of offensive biological weapons, and the renunciation of
all methods of biological warfare. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agreements 121 (1982) [hereinafter ACDA Treaty Book].
Other suggestions for unilateral action by the United States have included a reduced reli-
ance on multiple warhead ICBMs, regardless of whether the Soviet Union follows suit. Inter-
view with Father Bryan Hehir, World Policy Forum 9 (1984); see also Long, Unilateral
Initiatives, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Jan. 1984, at 50. However, proposals for unilateral reduc-
tions of greater magnitude attract little support in the United States. See H. Brown, Thinking
About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World 184 (1983).
17 "Reciprocal restraint" refers to situations in which a nation determines its own poli-
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allel coordination of autonomous policies. 8 The key tools in arms
control however, are formal, negotiated agreements,' 9 implemented pur-
suant to internationally recognized legal procedures. 20  Moreover, de-
spite the increasing role of other nations in this process,21 the single most
important component of international regulation of arms continues to be
cies-independently of any detailed written or oral agreement-but is cognizant of the fact
that departure from a particular, expected pattern of behavior is likely to elicit adverse re-
sponses from other nations. See Scoville, Reciprocal National Restraint: An Alternative Path,
Arms Control Today, June 1985, at 1, 6. For example, both the Allies and the Axis refrained
from employing chemical weapons in the European theater in World War II, even though each
side had the capability and there was no explicit agreement prohibiting such weapons. See
Falk, Inhibiting Reliance on Biological Weaponry: The Role and Reliance of International
Law, 1 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 17, 22-23 (1986).
18 The coordination posture requires a greater degree of explicit quid pro quo than does
reciprocal restraint, but stops short of creating a legally binding agreement. This type of state-
ment of intent was utilized in connection with the unratified SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks) II Treaty. President Reagan stated: "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will
refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint."
President's Remarks at Arlington National Cemetery, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. 730 (May
31, 1982).
19 Some commentators conclude that negotiated arms control alone offers little hope of
ending or capping the arms race. See, e.g., E. Kennedy & M. Hatfield, Freeze! How You Can
Help Prevent Nuclear War 149 (1982) (advocating combination of unilateral actions and tem-
porary, bilateral "negotiators' pause," creating moratorium on additional nuclear arms pro-
grams pending conclusion of binding treaty).
For a discussion of the view that informal behavior alone may offer a stable route to
security, see Adelman, Arms Control with and without Agreements, 63 Foreign Af. 240, 259
(1984-85).
20 The basic contemporary law regarding international agreements is codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
The United States has signed, but not ratified the Vienna Convention.
International accords concerning arms control to which the United States is a party may
take one of two forms: a treaty, which enters into force upon the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, or an executive agreement, which enters into force
when approved by a majority of each house of Congress, see 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982).
Although the most important arms control accords are usually cast as treaties, the SALT I
Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, 23
U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 [hereinafter SALT I Treaty), was an executive agreement. In
this Article, the generic terms "treaties" and "agreements" are used interchangeably to refer
either to treaties or executive agreements. Cf. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30, 36 (1982)
(statutory use of term "treaty" embraces both article II agreements and executive agreements).
21 Forty nations currently participate in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament,
established by the United Nations as a multilateral disarmament negotiation forum. See Har-
denbergh, The Other Negotiations, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Jan. 1986, at 45. The Conference
has addressed numerous issues, including chemical weapons, radiological weapons, and outer
space arms control. Id.
Another example of multilateral participation in arms control is the Five Continent Peace
Initiative, involving the cooperative efforts of India, Argentina, Mexico, Sweden, Greece, and
Tanzania. In seeking to prevent an arms race in outer space, and create a comprehensive test
ban treaty, the leaders of these countries have tried to stimulate progress in negotiations be-
tween the United States and Soviet Union. See Tempest, Six Leaders Urge Halt in A-Tests,
Space Arms, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1985, at A15.
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agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.22
When dealing with a powerful and menacing potential adversary,
particularly on subjects as important as weapons control, adequate assur-
ance of the other side's compliance with agreed prohibitions is indispen-
sable. 23 No nation today would voluntarily agree to take steps to restrict
its military prowess, thereby weakening its defenses, unless it were confi-
dent that its negotiating partner and erstwhile opponent would adhere
fully to its reciprocal obligations.24 Verification of an adversary's compli-
22 Even when negotiations affect weapons systems deployed by other nations, agreement by
the two superpowers plays a compelling role. Bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations have
often provided the framework for arms control agreements that have also been adopted by
other nations. See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 39-40 (Limited Test Ban Treaty); id.
at 49 (Outer Space Treaty); id. at 85 (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty); id. at 100 (Seabed
Arms Control Treaty); id. at 120 (Biological Weapons Treaty); id. at 190-91 (Environmental
Modification Convention).
It has been suggested that the most important aspects of arms control may be pursued
most effectively in bilateral rather than multilateral form because the Soviets appear more
willing to accept intrusive verification provisions in confidential bilateral negotiations with the
United States. See Flowerree, Chemical Weapons: A Case Study in Verification, Arms Con-
trol Today, Apr. 1983, at 1, 3. Multilateral diplomacy is also cumbersome, and therefore "has
been singularly unproductive in recent years." Neidle, The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms
Control: Choices for the United States, in Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative 7 (E.
Luck ed. 1983). For the view that United States leadership is becoming less important (at least
regarding arms in Europe), see Blaker, Stockholm Carves out a New Path, Wall St. J., Oct. 9,
1986, at 34.
23 See 15 ACDA Ann. Rep. 51 (1976); see also ACDA, Pub. No. 85, Verification: The
Critical Element of Arms Control (1976).
Some have suggested that verification is far less important when the terms of the treaty
are such that a violation would be either obvious or militarily unimportant. See, e.g., R.
Shearer, On-Site Inspection for Arms Control 19 (1984). Nonetheless, others believe that vio-
lation of any treaty term is a serious matter, calling into question the violating party's commit-
ment to arms control in general. President Reagan said:
In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security
and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully com-
ply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fun-
damental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.
Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter.... It undermines the confidence essen-
tial to an effective arms control process in the future.
President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control
Agreements, Feb. 1, 1985 (on file at New York University Law Review).
24 Such sentiments were expressed regarding verification of the SALT II Treaty. See Mili-
tary Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol
Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 441 (1979) (statement of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State) ("Verifica-
tion has been a central concern in every aspect of these negotiations. At every stage we put the
treaty to this test: Can we have confidence in its verification-that is, can we determine for
ourselves that the Soviets are complying."); id. at 462 (statement of George Seignious, Direc-
tor, ACDA) ("In SALT we don't rely on trust. Trust is not a basis for national survival. We
verify Soviet compliance with the provisions of the agreement by using our diverse, powerful
and sophisticated intelligence capabilities.").
Similar views have been expressed in the Soviet Union. See Nuclear Weapons in Europe:
A Soviet View, 24 Survival 32, 36 (1982) (" 'We, too, wish to be confident that the United
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ance has therefore become a central question in treaty negotiation 25 and a
politically supercharged issue in treaty enforcement. 26
A broad consensus has emerged regarding the importance of treaty
verification-a consensus not only within the United States political
community, 27 but also expressed by leading Soviet negotiators. 28 Agree-
ment on this principle, however, has not muted the controversies over its
implementation: participants and observers within countries and across
national lines hotly debate questions regarding the requisite level of mon-
itoring capability for any particular agreement, the performance and in-
States is fulfilling its obligations. Therefore, we are interested in inspection no less, and maybe
more, than the United States.'" (quoting Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev)).
Of course, there can never be complete confidence that another nation is fully complying
with its treaty obligations. Cf. W. Rowell, Arms Control Verification: A Guide to Policy
Issues for the 1980's 2 (1986) (referring to President Truman's demand for "foolproof" verifi-
cation). Most modern commentators have acknowledged that there will always be some po-
tential for undetected violations. See Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living with Nuclear
Weapons 199 (1983). However, decisions regarding what level of subjective uncertainty to
tolerate are political judgments, not technological ones. Meyer, Verification and Risk in Arms
Control, Int'l Security, Spring 1984, at 111, 126.
In addition to providing a means for detecting significant violations with sufficient timeli-
ness to undertake an appropriate response, the goals of arms control treaty verification provi-
sions include deterring potential violations through fear of apprehension, increasing confidence
that the treaty is being observed, providing a mechanism through which a country suspected of
a violation can convincingly establish its innocence, and improving institutional and personal
relationships among parties. A. Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States
and Russia Run the Arms Race 300-02 (1976); Frank, Psychological Aspects of Disarmament
and International Relations, in Toward Nuclear Disarmament and Global Security: A Search
for Alternatives 324, 326-27 (B. Weston ed. 1984).
25 Ground Zero, What About the Russians-and Nuclear War? 189 (1983) ("It would not
be an exaggeration to say that of the seven years spent on SALT II, something like 80 to 85
percent of the effort was expended on negotiating appropriate verification limits-called 'col-
lateral constraints.' "); accord Earle, Verification Issues from the Point of View of the Negotia-
tor, in Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make it Possible 14 (1986).
26 United States political willingness, skill, and success in pursuing compliance issues with
the Soviet Union have caused much debate. For the view that compliance mechanisms have
worked in a largely satisfactory fashion, see Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Special Rep. No. 55, Compliance with SALT I Agreements (July 1979) [hereinafter SALT I
Compliance]; Caldwell, The Standing Consultative Commission: Past Performance and Future
Possibilities, in Verification and Arms Control 217-29 (W. Potter ed. 1985).
Others have taken the view that United States efforts to ensure Soviet compliance have
been largely unsuccessful. Humphrey, Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verifi-
cation, in Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception, 111-27 (W. Potter ed.
1980); see Off. of Pub. AfT. and the Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, ACDA, Pub. No.
120, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, President's Unclassified Report
to Congress (1986); Perle, What Is Adequate Verification?, in SALT II and American Security
58-59 (1980).
27 For an illustration of this consensus on the importance of the principle of verification-
despite profound differences regarding the application of that principle, see generally G.
Humphrey, W. Van Cleave, J. Pecord, W. Kincade & R. Perle, SALT II and American Secur-
ity (1980) [hereinafter G. Humphrey, SALT II]; Verification and SALT (W. Potter ed. 1980).
28 See Timberaev, A Soviet Official on Verification, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Jan.-Feb. 1987,
at 8.
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terpretation of existing or future verification devices and procedures, and
the range of possible responses to suspected noncompliance.29
Efforts to monitor compliance have resulted in the development, in
both the United States and the Soviet Union, of impressive arrays of ob-
servation techniques or "means of verification."' 30 These systems range
from sophisticated optical and infrared satellite photography, radar in-
terrogation, and other remote electronic sensors, 31 to traditional espio-
nage and overt diplomatic contacts with officials and citizenry in the
target country.32 Increasingly, however, interest has focused on supple-
menting the more distant or episodic verification methods with closer,
more rigorous inspection. Support has grown within the United States
for including provisions that guarantee firsthand observation of Soviet
compliance in future arms control treaties. This strategy appeals not
only to those who consider present verification capabilities insufficient, 33
but also to those who wish arms control to cover more sensitive (and
therefore more important) areas34 while recognizing that to do so, verifi-
cation provisions must become more exacting (and therefore more
intrusive).3 5
29 See G. Humphrey, SALT II, supra note 27. Verification and Arms Control, (W. Potter
ed. 1985).
30 Excellent surveys of United States verification systems and capabilities are contained in
Aspin, The Verification of the SALT II Agreement, Sci. Am., Feb. 1979, at 38; Hafemeister,
Romm & Tsipis, The Verification of Compliance with Arms-Control Agreements, Sci. Am.,
Mar. 1985, at 38; Peacekeeping by Technical Means, IEEE Spectrum, July 1986, at 42;
Daniloff, How We Spy on the Russians, Wash. Post Dec. 9, 1979, Magazine, at 25.
It has been suggested that verification capabilities are the driving force in shaping the
kinds of arms control limitations that might be negotiated, and that even mutually sought
treaty provisions have been avoided where adequate verification procedures did not yet exist.
"It was the revolution in verification technology in the 1960's that made the more ambitious
efforts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks possible. Of necessity the SALT process re-
flected the limitations of verification technology." Harvard Nuclear Study Group, supra note
24, at 198; see also A. Katz, Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the
State 3 (1979).
31 Aspin, supra note 30, at 38, 40; see also J. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community
107-70 (1985) (complete survey of imaging and signals intelligence).
32 See Aspin, supra note 30, at 38; see also J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 174-94.
33 See Grey, New Approaches in Nuclear Negotiations: Reassessing Arms Control Goals
in the US-Soviet Relations 79, 79-80 (A. Neidle ed. 1982); The Heritage Foundation, The
Hard Facts the Nuclear Freeze Ignores, Backgrounder, Nov. 3, 1982, at 1, 13-15.
34 Examples of these areas include: limiting warheads instead of missiles or limiting mis-
siles instead of launchers; limiting mobile systems instead of fixed systems; limiting small
weapons (cruise missiles) instead of large ones (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)).
These are sensitive areas because they require a great degree of intrusion in order to monitor.
35 See H. Brown, supra note 16, at 186. The INF Treaty negotiations provide illustrations
of both aspects of this movement toward more intrusive verification procedures. Treaty propo-
nents realized that reducing the number of ground-based missiles to zero would require un-
precedented verification measures, and after painstaking negotiations, the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed on many unusually intrusive compliance provisions. See text accom-
panying notes 10-13 supra. Even up to the last stages of the negotiations, however, some on
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Augmented United States rights to conduct arms control inspec-
tions inside the Soviet Union will not come easily. Negotiators need to
overcome a profound Soviet propensity toward secrecy, as well as the
technical complexities inherent in the weaponry and the verification ap-
paratus. An additional, largely unappreciated barrier toward increased
arms control verification, however, lies not within the Soviet bureaucracy
and society, but in the limitations imposed by the United States Constitu-
tion, particularly the fourth amendment's constraints upon government-
sponsored information-seeking activity. Because the United States would
have to reciprocate for inspection rights obtained inside the Soviet
Union, any significant barriers to implementation of intrusive arms con-
trol verification arrangements in this country deserve closer scrutiny.
This Article examines the prospects for arms control inspections in
the United States, in light of constitutional, statutory, and policy con-
straints. This Article contends that there are important constitutional
limitations upon the rights of access the United States could accord So-
viet arms control inspectors. It argues that because the United States
government is responsible for actions taken by verifying parties pursuant
to treaty provisions, the fourth amendment limits the kinds of inspection
provisions to which the United States can agree. The fourth amendment
is a remarkably flexible tool that balances the needs of the government
with the privacy of its citizenry. The fourth amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures is not, however, infinitely flex-
ible, even when the international control of weapons of mass destruction
is at issue, implicating grave public policy imperatives.
Part I surveys the history of inspection rights in existing arms con-
trol treaties. Part II assesses potential inspection technologies and proce-
dures, based upon current or projected arms control issues and interests.
Part III explains the constitutional context within which arms control
inspection would be conducted in this country. Part IV discusses consti-
tutional frameworks for assessing inspection activities. Part V considers
the various inspection provisions individually, scrutinizing each for con-
flict with existing United States law. The last part of the Article evalu-
ates the results of this survey and concludes with recommendations. 36
the United States side sought to upgrade the inspection provisions, jeopardizing the nascent
agreement by making fresh demands for additional verification rights. See Gordon, Negotiat-
ing the Arms Treaty: Verification Issue Proved Thorny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at A8.
36 This Article does not address the question of what level of verification is adequate for
any particular treaty provision. For such a discussion, see W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 73;
Buchan, The Verification Spectrum, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Nov. 1983, at 16. This Article also
does not discuss the legal remedies available should an inspection uncover evidence of a treaty
violation. For a discussion of some sanctions the United States could employ in response to
Soviet arms control treaty violations, see Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for
Violations of Arms Control Agreements: 'Star Wars' and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18
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Specifically, the Article concludes that an application of the constitu-
tional restraints on arms control inspections undertaken inside the
United States should prompt a thorough reassessment of the United
States negotiating strategy regarding verification, thereby making our
bargaining posture more realistic, perhaps more restrained, and certainly
more negotiable.
Some of the activities of possible interest to future arms control in-
spectors will not pass constitutional muster and thus could not lawfully
be implemented in this country. This Article attempts, therefore, to dis-
cern which inspection provisions are suspect, why they might be impor-
tant to a future treaty regime, and what might be done about that
conflict.
I
INSPECTION RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
This Part surveys the realm of inspection rights embodied in treaties
and other international agreements now in force, in treaties signed but
not yet ratified, 37 and in publicly disclosed proposals for future accords.38
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 73 (1985). Nor does the Article explore the even more fundamental
question of which types of arms control treaty provisions would best serve long-term United
States and global interests. See Rostow, The Russians' Nuclear Gambit, New Republic, Feb.
20, 1984, at 17 (stating that "[a]rms agreements at Geneva are the weapons on which the
Soviet leaders are relying to bring about this mutation [neutralization of Western Europe] in
world affairs").
These topics are critical, and intimately related to the matters under scrutiny here, but the
present purpose is more narrow: to focus attention upon the question of how international
arms control inspections might lawfully be conducted in the United States. The most compre-
hensive studies in the area are now somewhat dated. See D. Aronowitz, Legal Aspects of
Arms Control Verification in the United States (1965); L. Henkin, Arms Control and Inspec-
tion in American Law 25-46 (1958); Feld, Inspection Techniques of Arms Control, in Arms
Control, Disarmament and National Security 317, 317-32 (D. Brennan ed. 1961). A more
recent inquiry is Connolly, Does the Constitution Limit On-Site Inspection?, Arms Control
Today, June 1988, at 8. Regarding potential restrictions of Soviet law on verification provi-
sions, see H. Berman & P. Maggs, Disarmament Inspection Under Soviet Law (1967) (study of
how on-site or aerial inspections under disarmament treaties would be treated by Soviet law);
Z. Zile, R. Sharlet & J. Love, The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection: A Case Study in
Policy Implementation (1972) (hypothetical study of how arms control inspection policy
would be implemented in Soviet Union).
37 Under customary international law, and as codified in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, signatories to a treaty are obligated to refrain from actions which would
defeat its "object and purpose" prior to its entry into force. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 20, art. 28, 8 I.L.M. at 690.
38 Most arms control negotiations are shrouded in some degree of secrecy, and the details
of verification proposals and their negotiating history are generally classified. Frequently,
however, a considerable amount of information is leaked or otherwise made public. For a
general overview of arms control negotiations, see U.S. Dep't of State, Security and Arms
Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace (1983).
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For ease of comparison, I will examine the agreements by subject matter,
rather than chronologically.
A brief definition of terms is necessary. Verification techniques are
often divided into broad categories of "national" and "cooperative"
means. The former category denotes those systems that are primarily
within the control of the inspecting party, and that require only the pas-
sive acquiesence of the inspected party in order to function properly.
One important subset of national means is "national technical means"
(NTM), which refers to the array of equipment, such as photoreconnais-
sance satellites, long-distance seismic sensors, and air sampling equip-
ment, that collects data relatively far from the territory of the observed
nation.39 The other subset of national means is "human intelligence"
(HUMINT), which refers to that data collected from diplomatic ex-
changes, commercial contacts, espionage agents, defectors, and the like.40
The second broad category of verification techniques is "cooperative
means." These are systems that require the suffrance, or even the active
collaboration, of the inspected state. Examples include data exchanges,
manned on-site inspections, and the installation of automatic sensors in-
side the territory of the nation being inspected.41 Obviously, the distinc-
tion between national and cooperative means is a matter of degree,42 and,
39 "National technical means" is not defined in the texts or negotiating histories of any of
the arms control treaties that use the term, and official statements are careful to avoid the
restrictiveness that might accompany a precise definition. See W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 52.
40 Some commentators argue that the United States has relegated human abilities to a
secondary position in this age of tremendous technical capability. See, e.g., Scoville, The Tech-
nology of Surveillance, Society, Mar. 1975, at 58. This is partly because it has been difficult for
the United States to maintain HUMINT sources in the Soviet Union. See Menos, Arms Con-
trol Verification, Mil. Engineer, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 488, 489. Because HUMINT productivity
is often irregular and unpredictable, it is not considered a reliable method of arms control
verification. J. Prados, Soviet Estimate 26 (1982). Nevertheless, information developed by
HUMINT can play an important role in treaty verification, especially in reporting foreign
intentions as opposed to capabilities. See J. Prados, supra, at 276-77; Blair & Brewer, Verify-
ing SALT Agreements, in Verification and SALT: The Challenge of Strategic Deception 7, 37-
38 (W. Potter ed. 1980).
Soviet HUMINT, by contrast, continues at a high level, and is directed at numerous
targets in the United States and elsewhere, with appreciable success. The FBI estimates that
the Soviet Union obtains 90% of its intelligence information from open sources such as gov-
ernment publications. See J. Richelson, Sword and Shield: The Soviet Intelligence and Secur-
ity Apparatus 120 (1986).
41 See Krepon, Technology Won't Solve Verification Problems, Bull. Atom. Scientist, Feb.
1985, at 3-4; Schear, Cooperative Measures of Verification: How Necessary? How Effective?, in
Verification and Arms Control 7, 16-30 (W. Potter ed. 1985).
42 Even the most remote NTM rely, to some extent, upon the acquiescence of the target
country. Satellite sensors could be jammed, for example, or the items they seek to detect could
be kept under cover, frustrating verification attempts. See Stockholm Int'l Peace Res. Inst.,
Yearbook 1985: World Armaments and Disarmament 21-22 (1985) [hereinafter SIPRI].
SALT I, supra note 20, and subsequent agreements therefore prohibit "interference" with
NTM and "deliberate concealment" that impedes verification by NTM. See text accompany-
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as will be seen, both categories have been used by arms control negotia-
tors as circumstances-and politics-permit.
The earliest contemporary arms control treaties had no verification
provisions.43 Because of a more exacting definition of the prerogatives of
national sovereignty, or a sense that it was "ungentlemanly" to display
overt concern with the possibility of non-compliance,44 the drafters of
these treaties relied exclusively on implicit national monitoring capabil-
ity.45 An additional reason for the minimal emphasis upon verification in
these early arms control treaties is that most of the treaties regulated
large, nonconcealable weapons whose excess production would be obvi-
ous. 46 Moreover, these treaties tended to address the use of a particular
category of weapon-often the most obvious phase of the weapons cy-
cle-rather than its development or manufacture. 47
The earliest modem expression of the importance of verification
came at the 1932 Disarmament Conference, convened by the League of
Nations to discuss universal reduction of all types of armaments. 48 In
ing notes 152-53 infra.
The more intrusive forms of verification, such as on-site inspection, usually require a great
deal of active cooperation, support, and assistance from the host state. See Heckrotte, A So-
viet View of Verification, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Oct. 1986, at 14-15.
43 These agreements include the Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference on the Rules of
Military Warfare, Aug. 27, 1874, 148 Parry's T.S. 133 (prohibiting use of poisoned weapons),
the Conference Relating to the African Slave Trade, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886, T.S. No. 383,
Parry's T.S. 293 (regulating arms trade in Africa), the International Convention with Respect
to the Laws and Customs of War by Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 183, T.S. No. 539, 187
Parry's T.S. 429 (outlawing "dum dum" bullets and asphyxiating gases), and the Geneva Pro-
tocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 (prohibiting use of chemical and biological weapons) [hereinafter Geneva
Protocol].
44 Before the First World War, and even after, the 'politesse' of relations between nations
seemed to require at least the pretence that they, like gentlemen, could of course be
trusted to keep their agreements. Perhaps there were other reasons: perhaps animosities
and fears between principal nations were less acute; perhaps wars were still an extension
of international politics not an unspeakable threat of world destruction; perhaps an ille-
gal battleship or weapon was less terrifying, or more difficult to keep secret. Or, perhaps
nations were naive, trusting.
L. Henkin, supra note 36, at 47; see also Hawkins, Arms Control: Three Centuries of Failure,
Nat'l Rev., Aug. 9, 1985, at 26 (sketches of early experiences with arms control agreements);
Katz, The Fabric of Verification, in Verification and SALT 193, 197-98 (W. Potter ed. 1980)
(discussing misplaced British reliance upon "trust" to obtain German and Italian compliance
with interwar treaties limiting naval tonnage).
45 J. Goldblat, Agreement for Arms Control: A Critical Survey 10 (1982); F. Walters, A
History of the League of Nations 500-16 (1952).
46 See W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 2.
47 See notes 162-63 and accompanying text infra. In many cases, use in battle is the hard-
est phase of the weapons cycle to conceal, and it is one for which a response (retaliation in
kind) seems automatic.
48 See J. Goldblat, Arms Control Agreements: A Handbook 10 (1983); F. Walters, supra
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the debates, general agreement emerged on the establishment of a Perma-
nent Disarmament Commission to investigate allegations of infractions
of a general arms control treaty.49
In the post-World War II era, explicit consideration of verification
issues has occupied increasing amounts of the negotiators' time and
text.50 The first significant nuclear arms control initiative, the Baruch
Plan of 1946, was an American proposal for international control over all
nuclear weapons 51 It foundered on the Soviets' suspicion of Western
dominance of the control apparatus, and a reluctance to permit the pro-
posed intrusive verification. 52
The early proposals foreshadowed a sustained disagreement about
the relationship between inspections and disarmament. The United
States held the position that effective surveillance and control mecha-
nisms had to be negotiated and implemented prior to reductions. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, argued for the opposite sequence, as-
serting that only meaningful arms reductions would make intrusive in-
spections necessary and worthwhile. In short, the United States's view
was that disarmament without inspection was unsafe; the Soviet view
was that inspection without disarmament was espionage.5 3
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,54 disarmament plans stumbled
note 45, at 500-16.
49 See J. Goldblat, supra note 48, at 10; F. Walters, supra note 45, at 500-16.
50 See A. Krass, Verification: How Much Is Enough? 3 (1985). For a history of verification
provisions since World War I, see Congressional Research Service Report for the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Nuclear Arms Control 4 (Comm.
Print 1985); B. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control 12-14 (1961); Stanford
Arms Control Group, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (1984).
51 See United States Atomic Energy Proposals, reprinted in Congressional Research Serv-
ice, Nuclear Proliferation Fact Book 71 (Comm. Print 1985). Under the Baruch Plan, global
production of atomic weapons would have ceased, but the United States would have retained
its existing stockpile until the international control authority had been established and a sys-
tem of sanctions developed. Stanford Arms Control Group, supra note 50, at 70. However,
even after all stockpiles had been destroyed, the United States would have retained its then
unique knowledge about how to produce the weapons, a significant advantage over the Soviet
Union. See B. Bechhoefer, supra note 50, at 41-82; Stanford Arms Control Group, supra note
50, at 69-72. Frye, The Quest for Disarmament Since World War II, in Arms Control: Issues
for the Public 18, 20-21 (L. Henkin ed. 1961).
52 The Soviet counterproposal was, predictably, for the United States to destroy existing
atomic bomb stockpiles in advance of the implementation of the inspection apparatus, and for
international sanctions to be subject to the United Nations Security Council veto. Stanford
Arms Control Group, supra note 50, at 71-72.
53 See Barnet, Inspection: Shadow and Substance, in Security in Disarmament 18 (J. Bar-
net & R. Falk eds. 1965).
54 Prominent among the arms control proposals during the period were the 1953 Eisen-
hower "atoms for peace" plan, which suggested that the United States and Soviet Union divert
a certain amount of their fissile material for international peaceful uses of atomic power, and
correspondingly limit their military forces, see Stanford Arms Control Group, supra note 50,
at 82, and the Rapacki Plan, advanced by the Polish Foreign Minister in 1957, which called for
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principally over the issue of whether a program of "general and complete
disarmament" had to be agreed upon as an overarching framework
before specific arms control provisions could be implemented. 5 With
few exceptions, little progress was made throughout this period either in
the content56 or the verification5 7 of potential treaties. Ultimately, how-
ever, the concept of a comprehensive program of disarmament was
eroded,58 the technology of verification was improved,5 9 and a series of
limited arms control measures was negotiated. 6°
A. "Special Areas" Treaties
Three areas long considered "special" by mankind and worthy of
preservation as enclaves largely free from conventional military competi-
tion are the subjects of treaties designed to preserve their special status.
They are Antarctica, Outer Space, and the Seabed. 61 The Antarctic
a ban on the production, stockpiling, and deployment of equipment and facilities for nuclear
weapons, see D. Wainhouse, Arms Control Agreements: Designs for Verification and Organi-
zation 43 (1968).
55 See B. Bechhoefer, supra note 50. The concept of "general and complete disarmament"
(GCD) proceeded from the premise that meaningful progress was more feasible if undertaken
within an overall protocol of interlocked steps, with each step subject to strict and effective
international control, so that national security would not be jeopardized at any point. Devel-
oping a sequence of steps that insured that no nation was materially disadvantaged at any
point proved impossible. Both the United States and the Soviet Union vacillated throughout
the 1950s on their attitudes toward GCD, sometimes favoring it and sometimes preferring to
pursue more limited, immediate steps when incremental agreements seemed feasible.
56 See id. at 159-557 (reviewing proposals and counterproposals made by United States and
Soviet Union during 1950s).
57 The 1955 Eisenhower "open skies" proposal called for reciprocal United States-Soviet
Union aerial inspection and the exchange of blueprints of military bases. This arrangement
was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, since the information swap, while useful to the United
States military, would provide the Soviet Union only with data already available from other
sources. See Stanford Arms Control Group, supra note 50, at 77. Aerial inspections of more
limited geographic scope (covering 20,000 to 30,000 square miles in Central Europe) were
discussed in 1956, but did not come to fruition. See Frye, supra note 51, at 33-41.
18 By 1957, interest in GCD was wavering, as partial or incomplete arms control agree-
ments seemed to offer the promise of some amelioration of tensions, even without agreement
on a comprehensive plan. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 50, at 3; Stanford
Arms Control Group, supra note 50, at 81-86.
59 Modern satellite photoreconnaissance has provided an essential ingredient in the verifi-
cation arrangements for all modern arms control agreements. See SALT I, supra note 20, art.
V, 23 U.S.T. at 3465, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 4; SALT II, art. XV, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. at 1155
[hereinafter SALT II Treaty]; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Oct. 3, 1972, United States-Soviet
Union, art. XII, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 3443, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 9 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
60 By 1963, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference had generated a series of arms
control matters which were to be addressed sequentially, as each "ripened" for diplomatic
attention. Stanford Arms Control Group, supra note 50, at 86.
61 Even these "special areas" have not remained totally free from military activities. Some
military activities have been considered for Antarctica. These include long-range bomber ba-
ses, submarine or ship ports, missile warning and tracking stations, and satellite tracking.
Shapley, Pax Antarctica, Bull. Atom. Scientists, June-July 1984, at 30, 31-32. Similarly,
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Treaty of 1959,62 which demilitarized the continent,63 was the first arms
control agreement explicitly to provide for verification, and it was the
first agreement under which the United States conducted on-site inspec-
tions of facilities owned and operated by the Soviet Union. Article VII
provides, in sweeping language, that national inspectors "shall have com-
plete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica'
and that "[a]ll areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations
and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of
discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be
open at all times to inspection by any observers." 65 The treaty also au-
thorizes aerial observation "at any time over any or all areas of Antarc-
tica" 66 and requires advance notification of any expeditions to or within
Antarctica.67 For inspection purposes, the inspecting personnel are only
subject to the jurisdiction of their country of origin.68
In accordance with these verification procedures, the United States
has undertaken eight inspection tours of Antarctica, including visits to
Soviet facilities.69 Aerial overflights and stopovers by icebreaking trawl-
ers have occurred as well.70 The inspectors have received the full cooper-
ation of the target facilities, have conducted thorough probes, and have
uncovered no evidence of any behavior inconsistent with the treaty's
obligations. 71
Outer space is a second "special area." The principal document
governing military affairs there is the Outer Space Treaty.72 A logical
although the Outer Space Treaty prohibits stationing nuclear weapons in the Earth's orbit,
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, art.
IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 4, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 208 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty], outer space is currently used for a variety of military missions, including recon-
naissance, communications, and early warning. Garwin, Gottfried & Hafner, Antisatellite
Weapons, Sci. Am., June 1985, at 45.
62 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
63 The Antarctic Treaty provides that "Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes
only." Id. art. I, § 1, 12 U.S.T. at 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 2, 402 U.N.T.S. at 72. It prohib-
its establishing military bases, carrying out military maneuvers, and testing weapons, id., as
well as banning nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal on the continent. Id. art. V, § 1,
12 U.S.T. at 796, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 3, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76.
64 Id. art. VII, § 2, 12 U.S.T. at 797, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76.
65 Id. art. VII, § 3, 12 U.S.T. at 797, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76.
66 Id. art. VII, § 4, 12 U.S.T. at 797, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76.
67 Id. art. VII, § 5, 12 U.S.T. at 797, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76-78.
68 Id. art. VIII, § 1, 12 U.S.T. at 797-98, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, at 4-5, 402 U.N.T.S. at 78.
69 25 ACDA Ann. Rep. 65 (1986) [hereinafter 25 ACDA Ann. Rep.]. Argentina, Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have also exercised the right to conduct inspec-
tions. ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 20.
70 4 ACDA Ann. Rep. 16-17 (1965).
71 See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 20-21.
72 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 61.
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successor to the Antarctic Treaty, it applies similar non-armament provi-
sions to an emotionally, if not physically, similar sector.73 The inspec-
tion provisions are of comparable vigor, encouraging observation of other
nations' space flights,74 promoting information exchanges regarding "the
nature, conduct, locations and results" of space activities,75 and provid-
ing that
[a]Il stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon
and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other
States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representa-
tives shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order
that appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precau-
tions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with nor-
mal operations in the facility to be visited. 76
Of course, technology has not yet developed to the point where
manned inspections of foreign satellites in outer space are of immediate
practical significance. 77 Nonetheless, the United States does monitor the
space activities of the Soviet Union and other nations with remote moni-
toring techniques. 78 There have also been some limited information ex-
changes, as required by the treaty regarding outer space activities.79 No
legal issues regarding verification have arisen, however.
More recently, outer space arms control efforts have focused on the
possibility of negotiating a treaty limiting antisatellite (ASAT) weap-
onry.80 ASAT systems, based on the ground or in space, could jeopard-
73 Under the Outer Space Treaty, parties agree not to place nuclear weapons in orbit or on
celestial bodies, and to use the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses. Id. art. IV, 18 U.S.T. at 2413-14, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 4-5, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
Parties to the Treaty also agree that space shall be free for exploration and use by all nations,
id. art. I, 18 U.S.T. at 2412-13, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 3-4, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208-09, and not
subject to claims of national appropriation, id. art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at
4, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
74 Id. art. X, 18 U.S.T. at 2417, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 8, 610 U.N.T.S. at 210.
75 Id. art. XI, 18 U.S.T. at 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 9, 610 U.N.T.S. at 210.
76 Id. art. XII, 18 U.S.T. at 2418, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 9, 610 U.N.T.S. at 211. The Soviet
Union has proposed that an international space inspectorate be established and empowered to
conduct on-site inspections of all satellites and launchers in order to verify the nondeployment
of weapons in space. See United Nations News Dig., Press Release WS/1327, Mar. 20, 1987,
at 3.
77 There have been complaints that these inspection rights are meaningless to those nations
that lack the technical capabilities to take advantage of them. See Stockholm Int'l Peace Res.
Inst., Arms Control: A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements 29-30 (1978).
78 Durch, Verification of Limitations on Antisatellite Weapons, in Verification and Arms
Control 81, 88 (W. Potter ed. 1985).
79 The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for sig-
nature Jan. 14, 1975, art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 695, 699-700, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, at 4-5, 1023 U.N.T.S.
15, 17, provides that parties inform the United Nations of their activities in outer space by
registering the date and place of space launches and the basic orbital parameters and general
functions of satellites.
8o Negotiations on an ASAT treaty were held during the Carter Administration, and there
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ize stability by providing a nation with the ability to destroy or disrupt an
opponent's early-warning, reconnaissance, and communications space-
craft.8 ' Negotiating an ASAT treaty, especially its verification provi-
sions, is difficult, particularly because of the extremely sensitive nature of
the technology involved. 82 Little progress has been made to date.83
Finally, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 197184 pursues similar
demilitarization goals with respect to the coastal seabed and ocean
floor.85 Article III of that accord provides that each party shall have the
right to verify compliance with the Treaty through observation of the
activities of other parties on the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil,
provided that the observation does not interfere with lawful activities.
86
has been sustained public and international interest. The Soviet Union presented and publi-
cized draft ASAT treaties in the United Nations in 1981 and 1983. See Gromyko, Foreign
Minister of USSR Request for Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the 38th
Session: Conclusion of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and
from Space Against the Earth 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/38/194 (1983).
During the Reagan Administration, the ASAT treaty discussions have been part of the
"defense and space" segment of the tripartite Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks. See Adminis-
tration Resists Demands for ASAT Ban, 222 Science 394, 394-95 (1983).
81 The United States and the Soviet Union have pursued ASAT capability almost as long
as they have been developing satellites. See Wilson, Soviet Antisatellite Weapon Mirrors Ef-
fort the U.S. Scrapped, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 1984, at Al. For a discussion of the history and
strategic significance of ASAT systems, and associated arms control measures, see Report to
the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control, H.R. Doc. 197, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-
24 (1984) (Administration Report); Garwin, Gottfried & Hafher, supra note 61, at 45-55.
82 Although it is relatively easy for the United States to monitor tests of the current genera-
tion of Soviet satellite interceptors, because they operate from a highly observable rocket as-
cent, monitoring a ban on the possession or the deployment of ASAT weaponry might be
much harder because the interceptor is small and easily hidden. See Gordon, All or Nothing,
1984 Nat'l J. 730; Morrison, Year of Decision for ASAT Program, 236 Science 1512 (1987).
Monitoring possible future generations of directed energy ASAT weapons (high energy
lasers or particle beams) will pose far more difficult challenges, and the potential verification
technology is a sensitive intelligence secret. See R. Scribner, T. Ralston & W. Metz, The
Verification Challenge 147 (1985).
83 On August 20, 1985, President Reagan certified, pursuant to a congressional resolution
limiting ASAT test funds, that further testing of a United States ASAT weapon was in the
national security interest, despite good faith United States efforts to negotiate a strict ASAT
treaty with the Soviet Union. Determination No. 19, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,441, 34,441 (1985). In
December 1987, the Air Force proposed termination of the current ASAT system as a cost-
cutting measure. Halloran, Air Force Proposes Abandoning Anti-Satellite Weapon to Reduce
Budget, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1987, at A35.
84 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 10 I.L.M. 146.
85 See ACDA, Pub. No. 68, International Negotiations on the Seabed Arms Control
Treaty (1973). For a general discussion of verification issues relating to this treaty, see ACDA
Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 100.
The Treaty bans the installation of nuclear weapons and support facilities on the seabed
beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, supra note 84, arts. I-I, 23
U.S.T. at 704, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, at 4, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47.
86 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, supra note 84, art. III, §§ 1, 6, 23 U.S.T. at 704-05, 706,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337, at 4-5, 6, 10 I.L.M. at 147, 148. Early drafts of the Treaty were criticized by
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The Treaty also provides for consultation in the event that independent
observation does not resolve compliance questions, and for cooperation
on other verification issues.87 The limitations of current technology,
however, have rendered the inspection provisions largely theoretical.88
This "special areas" category of arms control treaties illustrates
some of the most robust, albeit rarely utilized, procedures for national
and cooperative verification. Notwithstanding their broad scope, these
provisions, when compared to the standards of later agreements, tend to
lack details regarding, for example, the number of inspectors, their func-
tions, and the scope of their responsibilities.8 9
B. Nuclear Test Ban Treaties
One of the oldest and most significant goals of international arms
control advocates is a prohibition on tests of nuclear explosive devices. 90
A major impediment to the achievement of such a prohibition has been
verification. 91 Two principal forms of inspection have been considered.
less technologically advanced countries, who would be unable to match the capability of the
United States and the Soviet Union for conducting undersea verification activities. C. Blacker
& G. Duffy, International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements 125 (1984). As finally writ-
ten, article III permits inspection activities to be undertaken by a state party alone or with the
assistance of other parties or the United Nations. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, supra note 84,
art. III, § 5, 23 U.S.T. at 706, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, at 6, 10 I.L.M. at 148.
87 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, supra note 84, art. III, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 705, T.I.A.S. No.
7337, at 5, 10 I.L.M. at 147-48. If consultation does not resolve a dispute, it may be referred to
the United Nations Security Council. Id. art. III, § 4, 23 U.S.T. at 706, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, at
6, 10 I.L.M. at 148.
88 Cf. Sugawara, Titanium Deposits Discovered off Virginia, Georgia Coasts, Wash. Post,
June 29, 1985, at Bi, B7 (technology for mining seabed just beginning).
89 The broad language of these treaties may be contrasted with the detailed provisions of
the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, United
States-USSR Protocol, 15 I.L.M. 893-900, reprinted in ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at
177-89 (signed but not ratified) [hereinafter PNET].
90 Numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly have called for prompt
conclusion of such a prohibition. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 38/72, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47)
at 63, U.N. Doe. A/38/47 (1984); G.A. Res. 32/78, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 46,
U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977); G.A. Res. 3466, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 20, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975); G.A. Res. 3078, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); G.A. Res. 2828, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 33, U.N. Doe. A/8429 (1971). In
1983 and 1984, six Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) resolutions were approved by huge majori-
ties in the United Nations General Assembly, despite United States opposition. See Report by
the President to the Congress for the Year 1984, United States Participation in the U.N. 60-62
(1985) (American Statistics Index Microfiche File No. 7004-5 (1986)). For a summary of
recent United Nations activity in support of a nuclear test ban, see Cessation of Nuclear-
Weapon Tests, [1984] 9 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 203, 203-30, U.N. Sales No. E.85.IX.4
(1985).
91 Commentators disagree about whether verification concerns are real or simply serve as
red herrings to mask the true obstacles to a CTB. Two have written that "the sharp intragov-
ernmental debate over a possible ban... hinged on this issue (verification) alone." H. York &
G. Greb, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 34 (California Seminar on Arms Control and
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One involves the installation of automated seismic observation stations
("black boxes") in the United States and Soviet Union. These are
designed to sense ground motion signals from any underground explo-
sion. 92 The other involves on-site inspection, in which designated per-
sonnel from one party examine a suspicious area of another party's
territory, probing for evidence of a clandestine nuclear event.
Progress toward a test ban agreement has been incremental and er-
ratic, as nations wrestle with monitoring capability and political consid-
erations. Throughout the 1950s, differences over verification proved
irreconcilable, 93 but in the early 1960s, some progress was made, leading
to agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963.94 This
accord prohibits testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwa-
ter,95 where national verification measures96 are deemed sufficient, 97 but
permits continued testing underground, where agreement concerning co-
operative measures could not be reached. 98 The LTBT has no provisions
Foreign Policy Discussion Paper No. 84 (1979)). Two noted seismologists have concluded
more recently that "the technical capabilities needed to police a comprehensive test ban down
to explosions of very small size unquestionably exist; the issues to be resolved are political."
Sykes & Evernden, The Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, Sci. Am., Nov.
1982, at 47.
92 Beginning in 1947, the United States deployed a global Atomic Energy Detection Sys-
tem, consisting of a network of seismometers and radioactive debris-collecting aircraft, to
monitor Soviet nuclear explosions. See Lowenthal & Wit, The Politics of Verification, in Ver-
ification and Arms Control 153, 155-56 (W. Potter ed. 1985). Today, more than 1000 seismo-
graphic stations operate worldwide. These stations are supplemented by space-based sensors
that detect and identify the characteristic x-ray, electromagnetic pulse, light flash, and other
phenomena associated with nuclear explosions. See Stopping Nuclear Weapons Explosions:
The Vital Next Step, 11 Defense Monitor, No. 8 at 1, 6 (1982). Recently, the United States
initiated a cooperative seismology program with China, in which instruments in Western
China monitor Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site only 600 miles away. See Gordon,
U.S. Uses Seismic Devices in China to Estimate Size of Soviet A-Tests, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4,
1987, at Al.
Under a CTB Treaty, these systems would be supplemented by state-of-the-art seismo-
graphic equipment located inside and around the Soviet Union. See Hannon, Seismic Verifica-
tion of a Comprehensive Test Ban, 227 Science 251, 252-56 (1985).
93 H. York & G. Greb, supra note 91, at 1-2. The nuclear powers observed a moratorium
on nuclear tests from 1958 to 1961, based on reciprocal-if uncertain-public statements of
intent, but this proved a fragile basis for a test ban regime. See Divine, Early Record on Test
Moratoriums, Bull. Atom. Scientists, May, 1986, at 24-26.
94 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter LTBT].
95 Id. art. I, § l(a), 14 U.S.T. at 1316, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, at 3, 480 U.N.T.S. at 45.
96 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
97 For a summary of verification considerations in connection with test bans for these three
environments, as well as underground, see Committee on International Security and Arms
Control, National Academy of Science, Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues 215-22
(1985).
98 The negotiating parties were unable to reach agreements as to either the number of on-
site inspections or the number, characteristics, and location of automated seismic observation
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regarding inspection; compliance has been verified by NTM.99
The next step in limiting nuclear testing was the conclusion of two
treaties restricting the size of underground explosions, the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 19740C and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty (PNET) of 1976.101 Together, these agreements provide some of
the most elaborately detailed, intrusive inspection provisions negotiated
to date.10 2 These include (a) the now-standard right to use national tech-
nical means of verification; 10 3 (b) an exchange of information regarding
the geology and the basic physical properties of the nations' nuclear test
sites; 104 (c) an exchange of specific data regarding yield, date, time, and
depth of two previous nuclear tests to facilitate calibration of detection
stations. See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 38. International verification experts
contemplated a network of up to 180 fixed control posts, 10 shipborne posts, and regular aerial
overflight. Id. at 37.
99 During the Senate debate over the LTBT, Senator John Tower introduced an amend-
ment calling for on-site inspections, but it was defeated. 109 Cong. Rec. 17,732-34 (1963).
Officials report that the United States has detected traces of radioactivity outside Soviet bor-
ders on almost 200 occasions since 1963, and has protested, via diplomatic channels, about 100
of those incidents, in which there were indications that the radioactive particles or gases were
produced by underground nuclear tests covered by the LTBT. See Pincus, U.S. Secretly Pro-
tested Radiation Leaks from Soviet Arms Tests, Perle Says, Wash. Post, May 9, 1986, at A23.
During the same period, approximately 100 United States underground tests resulted in radio-
activity being released at the surface, but only in about 30 of these tests did radioactivity drift
outside the Nevada test site. Id. Recently, the United States and the Soviet Union have esca-
lated the seriousness of their protests over each other's ventings. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State,
Special Rep. No. 136, President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements 8 (1985).
100 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, July 3, 1974, United States-USSR, 13 I.L.M. 907, reprinted
in ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 167 (signed but not ratified) [hereinafter TTBT].
This treaty limits the size of weapons tests to 150 kilotons (an explosive power equivalent to
150,000 tons of TNT). Id. art. I, § 1, 13 I.L.M. at 907.
101 PNET, supra note 89. This agreement places a corresponding limit on nuclear explo-
sions detonated for purposes other than weapons tests. Id. art. III, § 2, 15 I.L.M. at 892,
ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 174; see also Borg, Nuclear Explosions-The Peaceful
Side, New Scientist, Mar. 10, 1984, at 10 (discussing possible utility of nuclear explosions for
nonmilitary purposes).
102 The TTBT parties agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year of the 150
kiloton ceiling would not be considered a violation, but would be a cause for concern and
consultation. ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 166. At least two United States under-
ground nuclear tests have exceeded the 150 kiloton limit. Smith, Scientists Challenge Claims
of Soviet Treaty Violations, 220 Science 1254 (1983).
103 TTBT, supra note 100, art. II, 13 I.L.M. at 907, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at
167; PNET, supra note 89, art. IV, 15 I.L.M. at 892, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at
174.
104 TTBT, supra note 100, Protocol, 13 I.L.M. at 908-09, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note
16, at 169. Because the TTBT has not entered into force, this data exchange has not occurred.
In the absence of authoritative information about the geological characteristics of Soviet test
sites, it has been difficult for the United States to assess the size of Soviet nuclear explosions
near the 150 kiloton ceiling. See Gordon, CIA Changes Way that it Measures Soviet Atom
Tests, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at Al.
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sensors;10 5 (d) the establishment of a standing Joint Consultative Com-
mission to consider and resolve compliance questions and other mat-
ters;10 6 and (e) an extraordinarily detailed set of procedures governing
the precise rights and functions of personnel designated to conduct on-
site inspection in another country.10 7
Although neither the TTBT nor the PNET has yet entered into
force,10 8 both signatories have declared their intention to comply with
the limitations on the explosive yield of tests and other nuclear explo-
sions.109 They have not, however, implemented the verification
provisions. 1"0
The culmination of these efforts to control nuclear testing, a Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would prohibit all nuclear ex-
plosions in all environments, has been pursued haltingly since the end of
105 TTBT, supra note 100, Protocol, 13 I.L.M. at 908-09, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note
16, at 169.
106 PNET, supra note 89, art. V, 15 I.L.M. at 892, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at
174-75.
107 Id. Protocol, 15 I.L.M. at 893-900, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 177-88.
These procedures include provisions for the scale of maps to be provided to the inspectors, id.
Protocol art. II, § 4(c), 15 I.L.M. at 894, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 178, the types
of cameras that may be utilized and the procedures for photography, id. Protocol art. III, § 5,
15 I.L.M. at 895-96, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 181, and the formulae for calculat-
ing the number of inspectors present at the site of an explosion, id. Protocol art. V, § 6, 15
I.L.M. at 898, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 185.
108 After the PNET was negotiated in 1976, the two treaties were jointly submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Hearings were held, Threshold Test Ban and
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations and
the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), but no floor action was taken.
The Carter Administration did not pursue ratification of the TTBT and PNET, preferring
instead to initiate negotiations on a complete test ban, and fearing that extended congressional
action on the partial bans might compromise the effort to produce such a complete ban. See
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, supra note 97, at 199.
Citing verification considerations, the Reagan Administration originally declined to ask
for Senate approval of the I'rBT and PNET, and sought instead to renegotiate the treaties
with the Soviets to provide for additional on-site inspection rights and data exchanges. See
Pincus & Oberdorfer, Reagan's Nuclear-Testing Proposal Leaves Bureaucrats Sharply Di-
vided, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1984, at A26. The Soviets, however, have called for prompt entry
into force of the unamended treaties.
Later, the Reagan Administration proposed that the Senate give its advice and consent to
the TTBT and PNET, but require renegotiation and enhancement of the verification provisions
prior to the treaties entering into force. See Smith, Reagan Sets Conditions for Ratifying Arms
Treaties, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1987, at A8.
109 See ACDA, Pub. No. 120, Soviet Noncompliance 16 (1986). There has been contro-
versy over Soviet compliance with the TTBT. See Fialka, White House Claims of Soviet Test
Ban Cheating Are Challenged by New Bomb Detection System, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1986, at
62; Anderson, Arms Treaty Compliance Hard to Verify, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1984, at E7.
110 See Heckrotte, Verification of Test-Ban Treaties, in Verification and Arms Control 63
(W. Potter ed. 1985).
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World War IL1 1  Most recently, negotiations produced the outline of an
agreement, including many details of verification provisions.112 The ver-
ification provisions include "national seismic stations" to be located on
the territories of the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain. 113
The draft treaty also contains detailed authorization for on-site inspec-
tion, specifying the procedures for initiating an inspection, 114 and incor-
porating a list of the rights and functions of inspecting personnel and
their hosts. 15
C. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties
There are two important treaties designed to pursue another major
goal of arms control-stopping the spread of nuclear weapons capabil-
ityl 16-and each incorporates noteworthy verification provisions. The
more prominent accord, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), 117 has been called the cornerstone of the global effort to
contain the growth of the "nuclear club."118 It provides that non-nu-
III See Doty, A Nuclear Test Ban, 65 Foreign Afi. 750 (1987); Greb & Heckrotte, The
Long History: The Test Ban Debate, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Aug.-Sept. 1983 at 36; Koplow,
Comprehensive Test Ban, Law. Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, May 1983, at 1, 7. The
LTBT, supra note 94, Preamble, art. I, § l(b), 14 U.S.T. at 1316-17, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, at 3-4,
480 U.N.T.S. at 45, 47, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1,
1968, Preamble, 21 U.S.T. 483, 485-86, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 at 4, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 170-71, 173,
[hereinafter NPT, call for conclusion of a CTB.
In 1985, the Soviet Union inaugurated a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests as a vehi-
cle for stimulating new CTB negotiations. See Gorbachev, Statement on the Arms Race, (July
29, 1985), in A Time for Peace 189-92 (1985); Oberdorfer & Pincus, US Rebuffs Soviet Offer
on Halting Nuclear Tests, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1986, at A30. This moratorium was periodi-
cally renewed, and some form of on-site inspection was offered, despite the refusal of the
United States to reciprocate. See Lee, Gorbachev Extends Testing Moratorium, Wash. Post,
Jan. 16, 1986, at Al; Bohlen, Soviets Offering On-Site Checks if US Joins in Test Halt, Wash.
Post, Dec. 20, 1985, at A49.
112 See U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 2044, Report on CTB Negotiations 47 (1980) [herein-
after Report on CTB Negotiations].
113 Id. at 48. For a detailed account of the extended negotiations regarding seismic stations,
see H. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to
Geneva 282-323 (1987); Van Atta, Inside a U.S.-Soviet Arms Negotiation, 233 Nation 666
(1981).
114 See Report on CTB Negotiations, supra note 112, at 49.
115 Id. at 48.
116 To date, the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and India have
detonated nuclear devices. Several other nations are acknowledged to have the potential to do
so, or are considered to be moving in that direction. See L. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation
Today 5-6 (1984).
117 NPT, supra note 111. The NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970 and now has 130
parties. U.S. Dep't. of State, Bull. No. 2104, Background on the NPT, Third Review Confer-
ence Held for Nonproliferation Treaty, 35, 38 (1985) [hereinafter NPT Background].
118 25 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 69, at 68 (citing statement of President Reagan at 1985
NPT Review Conference); Epstein, A Critical Time for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Sci. Am.,
Aug. 1985, at 33; NPT Background, supra note 117, at 35, 38.
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clear-weapons states' 19 agree not to seek, manufacture, or receive nuclear
explosive devices. 120 Such states further agree to accept safeguards, ne-
gotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a
United Nations-sponsored organization, 121 to verify that nuclear materi-
als, facilities, and technology are not diverted from civilian power-pro-
duction uses to weapons applications. 122 These safeguards mandate
119 "Non-nuclear-weapons states" are countries that have not manufactured and exploded a
nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967. See NPT, supra note 111, art. IX, § 3, 21 U.S.T. at
492-93, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 10-11, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174.
120 Id. art. II, 21 U.S.T. at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6829, at 5, 729 U.N.T.S. at 174. Nuclear-
weapons states, in return, agree not to transfer nuclear weapons capability or assist or en-
courage the development of nuclear weapons by others. Id. art I, 21 U.S.T. at 487, T.I.A.S.
No. 6839, at 5, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
121 Id. art. III, § 4, 21 U.S.T. at 489, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 7, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. The
IAEA was established by the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. Agreements have been concluded
between the IAEA and ninety-two countries. L. Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the
International Atomic Energy Agency: A Critical Assessment 26 (1985). In approximately
one-third of these countries, however, the safeguards have not yet been applied, because the
country has no significant nuclear activities, see A. Florini, Nuclear Proliferation: A Citizen's
Guide to Policy Choices 35 (1983), covering nuclear materials located in 881 facilities. A.
Krass, supra note 50, at-94. The IAEA conducts inspections pursuant to these agreements on
a large scale. In 1986, close to 2000 inspections were scheduled, Fisher, The Challenge of
Nuclear Safeguards, Bull. Atom. Scientists, June-July 1986, at 30, at over 500 nuclear installa-
tions around the world. L. Spector, supra note 116, at 337-38. In 1984, the IAEA inspected
some 7000 container seals and analyzed 1000 samples. 25 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 69, at
80. Safeguards are currently being applied to 7000 kilograms of plutonium, 10,000 kilograms
of high-enriched uranium, and 50,000 tons of uranium. Id. Accounting and other safeguards
data totalling 800,000 computer entries were processed by IAEA computers in 1984. L.
Spector, supra note 116, at 338. The Agency's spending on safeguards activities totalled $35.5
million in 1984. Id. at 339. The IAEA has consistently (albeit slowly) increased its safeguards
budget and the number of inspectors employed. IAEA: Too Few Inspectors and Too Little
Money, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 25, 1983, at 13 [hereinafter Too Little Money].
122 NPT, supra note 111, art. III, § 11, 21 U.S.T. at 487-88, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, at 5-6, 729
U.N.T.S. at 172. The NPT does not mandate any IAEA safeguards on the nuclear activities of
nuclear weapons states. To help mitigate this discriminatory aspect of the treaty and to allay
concern that the imposition of IAEA safeguards would place non-nuclear weapons states at a
commercial disadvantage in exploiting nuclear energy for civilian use, most nuclear weapons
states have made "voluntary offers" to accept IAEA safeguards on their civilian nuclear facili-
ties that have no direct national security significance. See, e.g., Agreement for the Application
of Safeguards, Feb. 21, 1985, USSR-International Atomic Energy Association, 24 I.L.M. 1411
(entered into force June 10, 1985); Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, Nov. 18,
1977, United States-International Atomic Energy Association, 32 U.S.T. 3059, T.I.A.S. No.
9889 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1980) [hereinafter US-IAEA Treaty]; Agreement for the Ap-
plication of Safeguards, Sept. 6, 1976, Great Britain-European Atomic Energy Commission-
International Atomic Energy Association, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 90 (Cmd. 7388), 1111
U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force Aug. 14, 1978) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement]. China
has hinted at the possibility of making a similar arrangement. See China May Permit Atomic
Inspection, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A12.
United States policy strongly supports the NPT, and the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3201 (1982), requires that nations seeking United States assistance in interna-
tional development of nuclear power must accept IAEA safeguards. However, the controver-
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detailed record-keeping of the location, quantities, form, and movement
of nuclear materials, 123 and require periodic on-site inspections by IAEA
personnel. 124
The other significant non-proliferation treaty, the Latin America
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1967125 created the first non-nuclear en-
clave in a populated portion of the planet. The treaty, applicable to an
area of 7.5 million square miles and 200 million people, 126 prohibits test-
ing, manufacturing, or storing nuclear weapons anywhere in the re-
gion. 127 It reiterates the parties' NPT obligation to conclude IAEA
safeguards agreements; 128 establishes an "Agency for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,"' 129 empowered to supervise compli-
ance with the treaty;130 and authorizes a party suspicious of another's
sial United States-China agreement for nuclear cooperation, Agreement for Cooperation
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's
Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, July 23, 1985, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. at 1394, does not require IAEA safeguards. The agreement does provide for on-site
inspections by United States officials where United States-supplied material and equipment are
to be located. See Dunn, A Pact that Can Be Verified, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 1985, at A17.
There is considerable international debate regarding the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards
in detecting illicit diversions. The IAEA system is designed primarily as a bookkeeping appa-
ratus-to monitor nuclear activities and discover violations-not as a police force that could
physically prevent diversions, apprehend the culprits, or recover the material. See L. Schein-
man, supra note 121, at 26. Even within its limited mandate, there is controversy about the
IAEA system's ability to account properly for each item of nuclear material and to alert the
world community in a timely fashion about improper activities. See Too Little Money, supra
note 121, at 13. One commentator has concluded that the IAEA inspection system "is now
widely acknowledged to lack the technical means and the political power to detect and give
timely warning of diversions of explosive nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons pro-
grams." Leventhal, Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Sept. 1985,
at 13.
123 See 20 ACDA Ann. Rep. 14 (1980) [hereinafter 20 ACDA Ann. Rep.].
124 Id. Similar inspetions have long been conducted within Europe under the auspices of
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), involving the submission of voluminous
reports and on-site inspections to multinational teams. See Gorove, The First Multinational
Atomic Inspection and Control System at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 160-
36 (1965). Some of the harshest criticisms of the IAEA regime concern the limitations placed
on the powers of the inspectors, the difficulty of conducting "surprise" inspections, and the
inspected country's right to reject examination by particular inspectors. See Miller, How Iraq
Nearly Got the Bomb, Wash. Times, May 30, 1983, at C2.
125 Treaty of Tlatelolco, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281. The treaty entered into force in
1968 and now has 22 parties. 20 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 123, at 12-13. The Latin
American states with the greatest nuclear potential-Argentina, Brazil, and Chile-have
signed the treaty, but have not waived the key provision that delays entry into force until all
states in the region adhere. Cuba has not signed the treaty, and "full entry into force" has not
yet occurred. Id. at 14-15.
126 ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 59.
127 Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 125, art. 1, 634 U.N.T.S. at 330.
128 Id. art. 13, 634 U.N.T.S. at 340-42.
12" Id. art. 7, § 1, 634 U.N.T.S. at 334.
1310 Id.
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conduct to request a special inspection.131 Special inspectors are to be
granted "full and free access to all places and all information which may
be necessary for the performance of their duties." 132
Agreements to establish other legally binding nuclear-weapons-free
zones have been adopted or proposed for many parts of the globe, includ-
ing the South Pacific, 133 Africa, 34 the Middle East, 135 Scandinavia, 3 6
Central Europe,137 the Balkans, 138 and the Indian Ocean. 139 Most such
enterprises, however, have failed for lack of political consensus in the
region, even before thorny verification issues were confronted.t4°
D. United States-Soviet Union Nuclear Weapons Treaties
Over the past twenty years, the United States and the Soviet Union
have concluded, or negotiated toward, a sequence of treaties designed to
regulate their arsenals of nuclear weapons.141 These include: (a) the
131 Id. art. 16, 634 U.N.T.S. at 342-46.
132 Id. art. 16, § 4, 634 U.N.T.S. at 344.
133 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440 (adopted by
South Pacific Forum comprising 13 independent and self-governing states in region, including
Australia and New Zealand) (entered into force on Dec. 12, 1986).
134 See C. Blacker & G. Duffy, supra note 86, at 312.
135 Id.
136 Id. Sweden is already nuclear-weapons-free, and Norway and Denmark-although
members of NATO--do not permit nuclear weapons on their territories. Id.
137 See Schmemann, Soviet Union Shows Backing for a Zone Free of Atomic Arms, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 1983, at A7.
138 See C. Blacker & G. Duffy, supra note 86, at 312.
139 See Calhoun & Petersen, Changes in Soviet Naval Policy: Prospects for Arms Limita-
tions in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, in Naval Power in Soviet Policy 233 (P. Mur-
phy ed. 1978).
140 See United Nations Association of the USA, Nuclear Proliferation: Toward Global Re-
straint 14-16 (1984). The United States generally supports the establishment of nuclear free
zones, provided they incorporate adequate verification measures, do not disrupt security ar-
rangements, arise on the initiative of the states in the affected region, and do not derogate
international law rights affecting freedom of the seas. See 25 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 69,
at 72.
One non-proliferation agreement that was concluded recently reflects the agreement of
the United States and six other major industrial nations to limit the potential for nuclear war-
fare by prohibiting the sales to other countries of missiles and related technology that could be
used to launch nuclear attacks. While most non-proliferation efforts focus on the importance
of restricting the spread of nuclear materials or data, this agreement seeks to inhibit the spread
of delivery systems for the bombs. The agreement is structured as a tightening of each party's
existing controls on exports of weapons-related items; verification aspects were incidental.
Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and Technology Related to Missiles,
26 I.L.M. 599 (1987); Cushman, 7 Nations Agree to Limit Exports of Big Rockets, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 17, 1987, at Al; Goshko, 7 Nations Bar Sales of Missiles, Wash. Post, Apr. 17,
1987, at Al.
141 Efforts to open bilateral United States-Soviet Union nuclear arms control negotiations
began in 1967, but were quickly shelved upon the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August
20, 1968. Early in 1969 the project was revived and SALT I negotiations opened on November
17, 1969. Since then, the two countries have been in virtually constant negotiation on strategic
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Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972,142 which restricts the de-
velopment and deployment of defensive weapons systems; 143 (b) the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitations Talks Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive
Arms (SALT I),t44 which regulates the size of the superpowers' fleets of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles (SLBMs); 145 (c) the SALT II Treaty, 146 which was
designed to be a follow-up to SALT I;147 (e) the Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Talks (START), the Reagan Administration's successor to SALT
II;148 and (f) the INF Treaty, which bans the production and deploy-
ment of most nuclear weapons with ranges shorter than the systems ad-
arms: SALT I, November 1969-May 1972; SALT II, November 1972-June 1979; Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks (START), June, 1982-present (with a hiatus from November 1983 to
January 1985). See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 132-35. See generally, T. Wolfe,
The SALT Experience (1979) (history and analysis of SALT I and SALT II negotiations from
1969 to 1979).
Prominent among nuclear arms control proposals that have not found their way to the
United States-Soviet Union bargaining table is the "freeze," which would prohibit testing, pro-
duction, and deployment of all new nuclear weapons, in contemplation of subsequent reduc-
tions in existing weapons. See E. Kennedy & M. Hatfield, supra note 19, at 153-54. The freeze
would rely largely upon the same types of monitoring mechanisms provided in SALT or pro-
posed in START. The verification function might, however, be somewhat simplified, because it
is harder to skirt a flat ban than a treaty permitting some, but not all, weapons advances. Id.
142 ABM Treaty, supra note 59. In force since 1972, the treaty is of unlimited duration. Id.
art. XV, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3446, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 12.
143 The treaty limits each party to two ABM sites. Id. art. III, 23 U.S.T. at 3440, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503, at 6. This was later reduced to one site each. Protocol to the Treaty on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, United States-USSR, art. I, 27 U.S.T.
1645, 1648, T.I.A.S. No. 8276, at 4.
144 SALT I Treaty, supra note 20. In force since October 3, 1972, this agreement was to
lapse after five years. Id. art. VIII, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3467, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 6.
145 The United States was allowed 1054 ICBMs and up to 710 SLBMs. The Soviet Union
was allowed 1618 ICBMs and up to 950 SLBMs. Id. arts. I, II, III, Protocol, 23 U.S.T. at
3464, 3469-70, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 3, 8-9.
146 SALT II, supra note 59. The treaty was signed June 18, 1979, and transmitted to the
Senate by President Carter. In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President
Carter asked the Senate to defer action on the treaty, and the Reagan Administration subse-
quently declared that it would not pursue ratification. Nevertheless, both the United States
and Soviet Union expressed their intention to abide by the treaty's terms, so long as the other
party demonstrates similar restraint. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, No.
131, Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint 1, 1-2 (1985). In May 1986, the
Reagan Administration signalled its intent to abandon the SALT II limits, although the
United States did not exceed any SALT II limits until November 1986. See Wilson & Smith,
US to Break SALT II Limits Friday, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1986, at A9; Weinraub, Confusion
on Arms Treaty: Are the 1979 Limits Dead?, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at Al.
147 The treaty would have limited the number of intercontinental bombers, cruise missiles,
and other systems, as well as the weapons addressed in the SALT I Treaty. SALT II Treaty,
supra note 59, art. III, Protocol, 18 I.L.M. at 1144, 1159-60.
148 These negotiations are currently in progress. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, No. 1014, Hard Work Ahead in Arms Control 2 (1987) (address by Edward L. Rowny,
Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters) [here-
inafter Hard Work Ahead].
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dressed in SALT or START.149
These several enterprises address vastly different types of weapons.
They are analyzed together here because they present, or may be pro-
jected to present, four similar sets of provisions with respect to
verification.
1. National Technical Means
All four concluded treaties contain substantially identical provisions
regarding the parties' agreement (i) to use NTM 50 for treaty verification
"in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law," 151 (ii) not to interfere with the other party's lawful NTM, 152
and (iii) "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede
verification." 153
2. Special Compliance-Related Institutions
The ABM Treaty calls for the establishment of the Standing Con-
sultative Commission (SCC)154 to "consider questions concerning com-
149 INF Treaty, supra note 5.
150 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
151 SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XV, § 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1155; SALT I Treaty, supra
note 59, art. V, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3465, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 4; A!BM Treaty, supra note 59,
art. XII, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3443, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 9. The language of the INF Treaty is
slightly different. INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII, § 1, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. at
1467-68. The treaties do not define NTM, nor state which data collection methods are in-
cluded. It is now clear that satellite photoreconnaissance is included, but there is ambiguity
regarding ground-based radars (especially those located in countries other than the verifying
state), aircraft, and other methods. See Cohen, The Evolution of the Soviet Views on SALT
Verification: Implications for the Future, in Verification and SALT 49, 54-55 (W. Potter ed.
1980); see also A. Krass, supra note 50, at 45-49 (describing technology of ground-based
radars).
152 SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XV, § 2, 18 I.L.M. at 1155; SALT I Treaty, supra
note 20, art. V, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3465, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 4; ABM Treaty, supra note 59,
art. XII, § 2, 23 U.S.T, at 3443, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 9. Again, the INF Treaty uses a slightly
different formulation. INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII, § 2, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. at
1467. Concern arose in 1975 over the possible use by the Soviet Union of laser energy to
"blind" a United States satellite in violation of this provision. The United States government
stated that, upon analysis, the incident in question was due to large, accidental fires in a Soviet
natural gas pipeline, and therefore did not amount to a violation of SALT. See SALT I Com-
pliance, supra note 26, 5-6.
153 SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XV, § 3, 18 I.L.M. at 1156; SALT I Treaty, supra
note 20, art. V, § 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3465, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 4; ABM Treaty, supra note 59,
art. XII, § 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3444, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 10. The INF Treaty language is slightly
different. INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII, § 2, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. at 1467. In
general, "interference" refers to actions taken to disrupt the operation of any NTM, while
"concealment" refers to actions taken on the ground to hide a possible target, such as the
erection of large nets or other coverings over ICBM launchers and the encryption of missile
test telemetry. See SALT 1 Compliance, supra note 26, at 3-4.
154 ABM Treaty, supra note 59, art. XIII, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 3444-45, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at
10-11.
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pliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be
considered ambiguous,"1 55 and "provide on a voluntary basis such infor-
mation as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in com-
pliance with the obligations assumed."15 6 The SCC, which is also
charged with comparable responsibilities under SALT 1157 and SALT
11,158 meets at least twice a year to address these matters.1 59 It operates
in private, and is generally credited with having resolved numerous com-
pliance questions.16" The INF Treaty establishes a similar body, the Spe-
cial Verification Commission (SVC), with a parallel mandate for
resolving compliance controversies and negotiating implementation
procedures.1 61
3. Definitions and Counting Rules
Drafters of these treaties, particularly SALT II and the INF Treaty,
confronted a series of intricate and sensitive definitional issues, the reso-
lution of which turned, at least in part, on verification considerations.
For example, in the SALT II treaty a variety of "type rules" specifying
uniform treatment for all missiles, launchers, or aircraft of a specific
kind-regardless of whether they were armed alike-made the verifica-
tion task more manageable. Similar such type rules were established for
shorter-range systems in the INF Treaty.162
Moreover, to some extent, verification considerations dominated the
basic issue of which systems would be included within the treaties. For
example, the SALT I numerical limits addressed launchers of missiles,
rather than the missiles themselves, because it is easier to monitor limits
on launchers.1 63
155 Id. art. XIII, § l(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3444, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 10.
156 Id. art. XIII, § l(b), 23 U.S.T. at 3444, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 10.
157 SALT I Treaty, supra note 20, art. VI, 23 U.S.T. at 3466, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, at 5.
158 SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XVII, § 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1156-57.
1-19 See 23 ACDA Ann. Rep. 11 (1982).
160 See, e.g., SALT I Compliance, supra note 26, at 1-3. The Reagan Administration has
challenged this view, alleging consistent Soviet violations of numerous arms control agree-
ments, despite SCC and other efforts. The White House, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements, No. 136 (Dec. 1985) (President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncom-
pliance with Arms Control Agreements). Some outside commentators continue to endorse the
SCC's effectiveness. See, e.g., J. Goldblat, supra note 48, at 109-10. But see Humphrey, supra
note 26, at 124.
161 INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XIII, § 1, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1468.
162 Id. art. VII, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1462-63.
163 See SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues 1972-79, at 35 (R. Labrie ed. 1979)
[hereinafter SALT Handbook].
A similar constraint created out of verification considerations is the SALT II ban on the
Soviet SS-16 missile. If stockpiled, the first stage of this missile could have been added to the
SS-20, to give that otherwise intermediate-range missile an intercontinental capability, permit-
ting circumvention of the treaty's numerical ceiling on long-range weapons. SALT II Treaty,
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4. Data Exchange
The SALT II Treaty was the first nuclear arms accord to require the
parties to agree upon and provide information on specific numbers of
weapons. 164 The parties were to update this data base periodically under
the aegis of the SCC. 165 While the data exchange was not intended to be
used directly as a verification device, 166 it was to provide a common start-
ing point for future discussions, while also helping to ensure that the
parties interpreted their obligations and activities in the same way. The
INF Treaty extended this practice of data exchange, requiring disclosure
of the numbers, locations and characteristics of various types of missiles
and support facilities with inspections to confirm the information.1 67
5. Recent Innovations
In addition to these provisions common to all the United States-
Soviet Union nuclear weapons treaties, the recently concluded INF
Treaty includes inspection provisions which reflect a new degree of per-
mitted intrusiveness. Some of the provisions regarding on-site inspec-
tions to be conducted inside the United States and Soviet Union have
already been described; 168 these will provide for a multiplicity of types of
monitoring, some "short notice," 169 and some 24-hours-per-day.170 The
supra note 59, art. IV, § 8, 18 I.L.M. at 1146; U.S. Dep't of State, Selected Documents No.
12B, SALT II Agreement, Vienna, June 18, 1979, at 3-5.
164 See SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XVII, § 3, 18 I.L.M. at 1158; see also Memo-
randum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Data Base on the Numbers of
Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, United States-USSR, 18 I.L.M. 1161, reprinted in
SALT Handbook, supra note 163, at 654-55.
165 See SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. XVII, § 3, 18 I.L.M. at 1158.
166 See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 244. The United States independently deter-
mines the information necessary to verify compliance with arms control agreements. In any
event, the reliability of information supplied by the other party would be subject to confirma-
tion, and neither nation would forego independent operation of NTM and other verification
measures. Schear, supra note 41, at 13-15.
167 INF Treaty, supra note 5, Memorandum of Understanding, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. at 1469.
168 See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
169 Each party has the right to conduct "challenge" inspections of the declared facilities of
the other party. The inspected state must transport the inspectors to the selected site within
nine hours of the request. These inspections may occur within the territory of the United
States, the Soviet Union, or their allies. For the first three years after the treaty enters into
force, each side has the right to conduct up to 20 inspections annually. For the next 5 years,
the quota is 15 annually, decreasing to 10 per year for the next 5 years. INF Treaty, supra
note 5, art. XI, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1466-67.
170 The United States will have the right to station permanent observers at the exits and
around the perimeter of the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant for 13 years. This facility has
been used to produce both the SS-25 ICBM, which is not covered by the INF Treaty, and the
similar SS-20 intermediate-range missile, which the treaty bans. The inspectors will monitor
all vehicles and cargo which exit the facility, in order to ensure that only the SS-25, not the SS-
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treaty also gives each party the right to require the other to assist in
satellite verification by moving all missiles at a particular base into the
open, so they can be counted and identified from above, and at the same
time, opening all roofs of fixed structures that house missile launchers, so
satellites can verify that no additional missiles are hidden inside.171
E. Chemical Weapons Treaties
Although numerous early treaties imposed limitations on the use of
chemical weapons1 72 in hostilities,173 restrictions on the production and
deployment of such weapons have been more elusive. 174
The entire field of chemical weapons has received increased atten-
tion lately, for a variety of reasons. First, there is substantial-if equivo-
cal-evidence of Soviet or Soviet-supported chemical weapons use in
Southeast and Southwest Asia.175 Second, chemical weapons capability
appears to be spreading, 176 raising the specter of further proliferation of
20, continues to be produced. Arms Control Today, Jan.-Feb. 1988, INF Supp. 16.
Although the United States has no similar dual-function production facility, the Soviet
Union will have a parallel right to station round-the-clock perimeter inspectors at the Hercules
Plant at Magna, Utah, which formerly manufactured parts for the Pershing II missile (covered
by the treaty) and which now manufactures components for the MX and Trident missiles (not
covered by the INF agreement).
171 INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XII, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. at 1468. These cooper-
ative measures are to be undertaken within six hours of a request, and are to remain in effect
tbr twelve hours. Each party may make this type of request up to six times per year, but only
for one base at a time. Id.
172 Biological or bacteriological weapons thus are produced by living organisms and thus
are different from chemical weapons which are produced by laboratory reactions. Although
similar in many respects, biological weapons' agents are generally less controllable than chemi-
cal weapons, and therefore of less military value. Unlike chemical weapons, biological weap-
ons have never been used in large-scale combat.
173 See, e.g., Geneva Protocol, supra note 43. The United States did not ratify the Geneva
Protocol (prohibiting the use of chemical weapons), until 1975. ACDA Treaty Book, supra
note 16, at 13, 122. Chemical weapons were responsible for 100,000 fatalities in World War I,
but were not widely used in World War II. See id. at 9-13.
174 Despite apprehensions that a treaty limiting only biological weapons might encourage a
rechanneling of resources that would actually exacerbate the chemical weapons competition,
the United States and Soviet Union did negotiate the Biological Weapons Convention, opened
tbr signature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 11 I.L.M. 309, banning produc-
tion, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at
120-23.
175 The United States government assembled reports of these allegations in August, 1980,
and the United Nations sponsored a multinational inquiry in 1981-1982, which proved incom-
plete and inconclusive. See Flowerree, supra note 22, at 1; see also The White House, supra
note 160, at 3, 7; Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast
Asia and Afghanistan (1982) [hereinafter Chemical Warfare]; Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update (1982) [here-
inafter Chemical Warfare Update].
176 See, e.g., Syria Making Chemical Arms, U.S. Official Says, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1986,
at A6.
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"the poor man's atomic bomb." 177 Finally, there has been a continuing
political imbroglio 178 in the United States over proposals to begin the
manufacture of a new generation of "binary" chemical weapons. 179
Against this background, both bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions on the control of chemical weapons have proceeded. 80 Recent
United States proposals for a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty
have included numerous detailed verification provisions, including some
of unprecedented scope.18'
Speaking to the forty member Conference on Disarmament in Ge-
177 Gaffney, The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 1, 1988 at 8; see Congres-
sional Research Service, Report on Binary Weapons: Implications of the U.S. Chemical Stock-
pile Modernization Program for Chemical Weapons Proliferation 11, 12-13 (Comm. Print
1984); Pincus, Chemical Weapons May Hold Appeal for Third World, Wash. Post, Apr. 30,
1984, at A12.
178 See, e.g., Harden, The Gassing of Washington, Washingtonian, Feb. 1984 at 125 (Rea-
gan Administration request for nerve gas weapons faced congressional opposition based on the
particular horrors of use of nerve gas weapons).
179 A "binary" weapon is one for which two nonlethal chemicals are produced and stored
separately, combining to form a poison only when the shell is in flight. Binaries are said to be
safer to handle and more maneuverable than the current "unitary" chemical weapons which
are extremely hazardous at all times. See House Comm. on Foreign Affairs & Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Fiscal Year 1986 Arms Control Impact State-
ments 250-77 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter 1986 Impact Statements].
The United States produced no chemical weapons from 1969, when President Nixon de-
clared a moratorium, until 1987, when President Reagan overcame sustained congressional
opposition and won approval to resume production. See Ayres, Nerve Gas Arms Are Author-
ized in Senate Vote, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1983, at A1; Roberts, An Old War Against the New
Chemical Weapons, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1983, at A18.
180 Bilateral United States-Soviet Union chemical weapons negotiations proceeded through
eleven rounds from 1976 to 1979, but were suspended by the Reagan Administration. Since
then, chemical weapons deliberations have proceeded in the context of the multilateral Com-
mittee on Disarmament. S. Bowman, U.S. Chemical Warfare Preparedness Program 3 (Li-
brary of Congress, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief No. 1B82125, update, May 24,
1984).
181 The United States originally proposed an extensive draft chemical weapons convention
in February 1983 that provided for on-site inspection. See U.S. Outlines Chemical-Arms Pro-
posal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at A3. The Soviet Union agreed to accept the principle of
on-site inspection in a chemical weapons pact. See Soviets Shift on Chemical Arms, Wash.
Post, Feb. 22, 1984, at A15. More recently, the Soviet Union has allowed visitors from the
United States to conduct an on-site inspection of a chemical weapons facility. Bohlen, Soviets
Allow Experts to Tour Chemical Weapons Facility. Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987, at A17.
Verification of compliance with a chemical weapons agreement may be especially
problematic
[b]ecause there is a close relationship between a number of widely-known chemical war-
fare agents and a variety of commercially-produced chemical products, this category of
armaments can be manufactured in facilities that can be converted from purely indus-
trial purposes and that may have little in the way of external signatures to indicate
chemical weapons production.
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., Fiscal Year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statements 76-77 (Comm. Print 1986).
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neva on April 18, 1984, Vice President George Bush unveiled 182 an elab-
orate draft chemical weapons convention1 83 that "goes beyond anything
we've really proposed before"' 84 to ban the production, stockpiling, and
use of chemical weapons.18 5 The associated verification provisions would
be similarly broad, permitting any of five members of a fact-finding
panel' 86 to request an on-site inspection of any treaty party.187 Access to
the suspect site or facility must be provided within forty-eight hours,1 88
and the inspection may embrace any military or goverment-owned or
-controlled facility suspected of chemical weapons involvement. 18 9
These "anytime, anywhere" verification provisions have thus far proved
a stumbling block, but a general chemical weapons agreement may now
be in sight.190 Such an agreement would create a new international
agency, patterned after the IAEA, to inspect military and civilian chemi-
cal facilities, in order to verify the destruction of existing weapons stock-
piles and to ensure that replacements are not being manufactured. 191
182 Address by Vice President George Bush, Conference on Disarmament: Chemical Weap-
ons Convention (April 18, 1984), reprinted in 1984 Documents on Disarmament 269 (ACDA
ed. 1986).
183 U.S. Draft Convention Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, Apr. 18, 1984, reprinted in 1984 Documents on Disarmament 269
(ACDA ed. 1986) [hereinafter Draft Chemical Weapons Convention].
184 Quoted in Smith, A Novel Proposal on Chemical Weapons, 224 Science 474, 474 (1984).
185 Under the proposal, existing stockpiles of chemical weapons would be identified
promptly and destroyed within ten years, Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note
183, art. V, § l(e), and would be under continuous monitoring by on-site equipment and in-
spectors until their destruction. Id. art. VII. Similarly, chemical weapons production facilities
would be identified and destroyed. Id. art. VI. Each country would be permitted to operate a
single small-scale chemical weapons facility under international inspection for the purpose of
assisting in research on chemical weapons defensive equipment. Id. art. III, § 2(b).
186 Id. Annex I, § 2(c).
187 Id. art. X.
188 Id. art. X, § 2. The United States draft does not specify the rights and functions of
inspecting personnel with the precision of, for example, the PNET Protocol, supra note 89, but
it does generally permit broad access for inspectors and equipment, and prohibits interference
with verification activities. Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 183, Annex II.
189 Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 183, art. X, § l(b). The designation
"government-owned or -controlled facilities," was originally controversial because it was
thought to include virtually all chemical weapons installations in socialist countries, such as
the Soviet Union, but not to include privately held chemical industries in the United States.
Officials later explained that the United States proposal was designed to extend to government
contractors. See Pincus, U.S. Clarifies Stand on Chemical Pact, Wash. Post, May 1, 1984, at
A12.
190 See Netter, Chemical Arms Ban Sought in Geneva, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1986, at A3.
Initially, the Soviet Union refused to accept the 1984 United States draft as a basis for negotia-
tion because of its intrusive verification provisions. Now, however, the Soviet Union appears
to be more amenable. Id.
191 Id.
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F Limitations on Conventional Arms
Although two related sets of negotiations concerning conventional
weapons in Europe have not produced major arms reduction agreements,
they have held out the promise of tangible verification-related provisions.
Talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Cen-
tral Europe have been in progress in Vienna since 1973.192 Twelve
NATO states and seven Warsaw Pact nations have sought to improve
stability in Europe through conventional force reductions and a wide
range of "associated measures" designed to reduce the danger and the
fear of a surprise attack.193 Among the "confidence-building meas-
ures" 194 under discussion are: granting each side the right to send observ-
ers to monitor the other's out-of-garrison maneuvers; permitting an
annual quota of ground and aerial inspections of the other side's territory
within the reductions area of Central Europe; 195 and stationing perma-
nent observers at entry and exit points to monitor military movements
into and out of the area. 196
192 Dean, MBFR: Ten Years of Negotiating Security in Europe, Arms Control Today, Sept.
1982, at 1. It now appears likely that the MBFR negotiations will be transformed into a new
forum, the Conventional Stability Talks, under the aegis of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, to occur in 1988. Hirschfield, Arms Control in Europe... And Now
the Conventional Stability Talks, Arms Control Today, Mar., 1988, 13, 13-16.
193 See Committee on International Arms Control & Security Affairs, Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York, Achieving Effective Arms Control 91-96 (1985) [hereinafter Effective
Arms Control].
194 These arrangements, sometimes referred to as "confidence and security building meas-
ures," first appeared in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, held in Helsinki in 1975. See A. Krass, supra note 50, at 238.
195 See U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 2107, Western Proposal Tabled at MBFR Negotia-
tions 60, 64 (1986). The West has proposed a quota of thirty inspections annually. Gordon,
Nato-Warsaw Pact Troop Talks Stall, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1986, at A3. Under the Western
plan, inspections would not be comprehensive enough to count simultaneously all the troops in
the inspection area. Instead, they would be designed as random samplings, to verify the accu-
racy of information supplied by other means. Even in inspecting a particular garrison, the
observers would not physically count all the soldiers, but would attempt to assess numbers
indirectly, by observing the kitchen, the barracks, and other common areas. See Institute of
Defence and Disarmament Studies, Arms Control Rep. No. 401.B.111 (1986).
196 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, GIST, Oct., 1982, Arms Control: MBFR
Talks 2 (1983). Soviet willingness to consider on-site inspection and other intrusive verifica-
tion provisions for MBFR was said to be "important news, not least because of its great poten-
tial importance for the entire spectrum of arms control talks, conventional and nuclear."
Dean, Soviet Shift in Vienna, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at A15.
Nevertheless, the negotiating sides "remain far apart on the question of verification." Re-
view of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Pro-
curement and Military Nuclear Systems, Special Panel on Arms Control and Disarmament of
the House Armed Services Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1985) (statement of Ambassador
Blackwill).
Some have suggested that the associated measures-particularly those designed to in-
crease the warning time preceding possible hostilities-have become more important, and
more attainable, than the force reductions which stimulated the origins of MBFR. J. Keliher,
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Agreement on some similar measures has already been reached in
the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Dis-
armament in Europe (CDE).197 While CDE has attracted a larger par-
ticipation than MBFR, 198 and is considering measures applicable to a
wider geographic scope, 199 it is not directly addressing the more difficult
problem of negotiating reductions in troops or equipment.
The two negotiations are similar, however, in their shared emphasis
on cooperative techniques for reducing the capability for surprise attack.
CDE participants recently concluded work on a package of measures in-
cluding advance notification of, and invitation of observers to, major mil-
itary maneuvers; exchanges of information regarding size, composition,
and deployment of military forces; and on-site inspection.2°°
Although it is impossible to predict the future course of negotiations
on conventional forces, it is clear that verification-related concerns will
continue to play a major role in shaping, or frustrating, the negotiators'
efforts, and that any effective treaty will have to incorporate extensive
and robust inspection qualities.
G. Other Arms Control Treaties
Two other arms control agreements are noteworthy, principally be-
cause of their limited verification provisions: the Biological Weapons
The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in
Central Europe 138 (1980).
197 The CDE developed pursuant to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe. U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 211, CSCE Followup Meet-
ing Concludes in Madrid (1983); Goodby, The Stockholm Conference: Negotiations on
Reducing the Risk of War, Arms Control Today, Oct. 1985, at 2.
198 The CDE embraces the United States, Canada, and 33 European states, including East-
ern, Western, and non-aligned countries. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, GIST:
Disarmament in Europe (1986).
199 Although MBFR is confined, at least in its initial phase, to activities within a "reduc-
tions area" of Central Europe (i.e., West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, East Ger-
many, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), the geographic scope of CDE is all of Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals. Id. at 2.
200 See U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 2116, CDE Delegations Reach Accord on Military
Activities in Europe 20-25 (1986); Lynch, The CDE Agreement-Achievements and Prospects,
Arms Control Today, Nov., 1986, at 13; Blaker, Stockholm Carves Out a New Path, Wall St.
J., Oct. 9, 1986, at 34; DeYoung, East, West Settle European Security Pact, Wash. Post, Sept.
22, 1986, at A21.
The new CDE agreement calls for notification two years in advance for military exercises
involving over 75,000 troops, notification one year in advance for exercises of over 40,000
troops, and shorter warnings of maneuvers by over 13,000 soldiers or 300 tanks. There are no
notification requirements for maneuvers of less than 13,000 troops. In addition, each party is
obligated to accept up to three verification challenges each year, admitting an inspection team
within 36 hours of a request. See id. Inspections pursuant to this agreement have been con-
ducted sucessfully. See Gordon, U.S. Praises Soviet for War Games' Role, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 1987, at A3.
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Convention of 1972,201 prohibiting the development, production, and
possession of biological or toxin weapons, 202 and the Environmental
Modification Convention of 1977,203 prohibiting military or other hostile
uses of techniques to alter the climate, structure, or composition of the
earth. 20
4
Under both agreements, the parties undertake to consult and coop-
erate with each other regarding compliance questions; 20 5 complaints may
be taken to appropriate organs within the framework of the United Na-
tions.206 Each party further "undertakes to cooperate in carrying out
any investigation which the Security Council may initiate. ' 20 7 Under the
Environmental Modification Convention, a Consultative Committee of
Experts may be formed to investigate compliance issues and make find-
ings of fact. 20 8
Beyond these generalities, no verification measures were specified in
either agreement. Recently, two possible biological weapons compliance
issues have eluded adequate international investigation and resolution,20 9
201 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 174.
202 Id. art. I, 26 U.S.T. at 587, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, at 5, 11 LL.M. at 311.
203 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Technologies, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No.
9614, 16 I.L.M. 88 [hereinafter Environmental Modification Convention].
204 Id. art. I, 31 U.S.T. at 336, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 4, 16 I.L.M. at 491.
205 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 174, art. VI, 26 U.S.T. at 588, T.I.A.S. No.
8062, at 6, 11 I.L.M. at 312; Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 203, art. V,
§ 4, 31 U.S.T. at 337, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 5, 16 I.L.M. at 91.
206 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 174, art. VI, 26 U.S.T. at 588-89, T.I.A.S.
No. 8062, at 6-7, 11 LL.M. at 312; Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 203,
art. V, §§ 1, 3, 31 U.S.T. at 337-38, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 5-6, 16 I.L.M. at 91-92.
207 Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 174, art. VI, § 2, 26 U.S.T. at 588, T.I.A.S.
No. 8062, at 6-7, 11 LL.M. at 312; Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 203,
art. V, § 4, 31 U.S.T. at 338, T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 6, 16 I.L.M. at 92.
208 Environmental Modification Convention, supra note 203, art. V, Annex, 31 U.S.T. at
337-38, 342; T.I.A.S. No. 9614, at 5-6, 10, 16 I.L.M. at 91-92, 93-94.
209 In 1979, there was an outbreak of anthrax near the Soviet town of Sverdlovsk. Some
argue that this epidemic was triggered by an accident at a secret biological weapons facility
conducting activities prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention. The Soviets deny
these charges, stating that the disease was spread by the ingestion of contaminated black mar-
ket meat. United States requests for further elaboration or international inspection have
largely been rebuffed. Smith, Despite Soviet Account of Anthrax Outbreak, Questions Re-
main, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1988, at A26; see Medvedev, The Great Russian Germ War Fi-
asco, 87 New Scientist 360, 361 (1980); Zilinskas, Anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Bull. Atom.
Scientists, June-July, 1983, at 24, 25-26; Kucewicz, Accident Prone and Asking for Calamity,
Wall St. J., May 3, 1984, at 28.
The second issue involves the possible Soviet use of biological weapons in the form of
"yellow rain" in hostilities against rebels in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. The Reagan
Administration has alleged this action constitutes a Soviet treaty violation, The White House,
President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements 3
(1985), but others have disputed the evidence, arguing that the yellow rain may be nothing
more than pollen. See J. Norman & J. Purdon, Final Summary Report on the Investigation of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:229
ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION
and the failure to anticipate verification controversies is perceived as a
major shortcoming of the Biological Weapons treaty.2 10 Significantly, ef-
forts have been initiated to amend the Biological Weapons Convention to
strengthen its verification provisions. 2 "
H. Observations
This survey of the verification provisions of existing arms control
treaties suggests four lessons regarding United States-Soviet Union arms
control treaty verification. First, the verification mechanisms sought and
ultimately agreed on will vary enormously with the size, characteristics,
and military significance of the subjects regulated. Provisions that ade-
quately assure compliance with one set of arms limitations may be insuf-
ficient when addressing a more threatening category of weapon.212
Similarly, as the limitations imposed by treaty on a given category of
weaponry become more profound, the consequences of a violation-and
the value of adequate verification-rise accordingly. 213
Second, this history suggests that the unpredictable march of tech-
nological innovation plays a key role in the progress of arms control ver-
ification; scientific advances improve our ability to encroach on hitherto
concealed activity, and are quickly adapted to national security pur-
sUits.214 Today's arms accords would not have been possible with yester-
'Yellow Rain' Samples from Southeast Asia, Report No. 912 (Defense Research Establishment
Ottawa/Dep't. of Nat'l Defense, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 1986).
210 See J. Goldblat, supra note 48, at 101-02; A. Myrdal, supra note 24, at 272-75. Un-
resolved compliance issues are a major irritant and an impediment to future arms control
efforts. Whether one is confident or skeptical about the validity of any particular allegation of
illegality, any verification concern can be a significant problem. See id.
211 See U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 2117, Review Conference Held on Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention 40-46 (1986); Rosenberg, Updating the Biological Weapons Ban,
Bull. Atom. Scientists, Jan. 1987, at 40; Smith, Germ War Treaty Review to Open Amid
Suspicion, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1986, at A6.
212 See Woodworth, Theater Nuclear Force Restraints, in Arms Control in Transition 41,
47 (W. Heckrotte & G. Smith eds. 1983); Biden, Improbable Inference, Wash. Post, Sept. 14,
1979, at A16.
213 The strategic balance may be considered relatively immune to small violations of the
allowed number of weapons, as long as the total number of weapons permitted remains high.
As long as each side has 10,000 or more strategic nuclear warheads, for example, the strategic
significance of a few, or even a few hundred, illicit concealed extra weapons may not be very
great. If the allowed stockpile on each side were drastically lowered by treaty, however, the
value of, and the temptation to have a secret cache of extra reserves would increase. See R.
Shearer, supra note 23, at 21. Consequently, the importance of verification increases as the
total number of weapons is reduced. See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings Before the
Senate Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 202 (1979) (statement of David
C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
214 However, arms control verification remains the "junior partner of military intelligence"
when it comes to exploitation of new technology. A. Krass, supra note 50, at 15. Currently,
the Pentagon commands almost 70% of all federal research and development funding. Milita-
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day's limited means of remote inspection,215 and future NTM 216
enhancements may open the door to still greater arms control
possibilities.
Third, modem global politics require that any verification scheme be
fully reciprocal, at least between the United States and Soviet Union.
217
This is the case despite the fact that the United States, as an "open"
society, presents opportunities for easy and reliable remote monitoring 218
that are unavailable as a routine matter inside the Soviet Union, and de-
spite the fact that the two nations' military forces are in no way mirror
images of each other.219 Modem international politics and the experi-
rism in America, 15 Defense Monitor, No. 3, at 1, 3 (1986) (Pentagon stresses development of
improved spying techniques rather than improved verification methods).
215 See Tucker, Technical Innovation, Crisis Stability, and Arms Control, Intl. Rev., May-
June 1987, at 20. Surveillance technology has played a critical role in shaping arms control
agreements. For example, the choice of a Limited (rather than a Comprehensive) Test Ban
Treaty in 1963 was prompted in large measure by the inadequacy of then-existing means for
monitoring underground events. See Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control, Report for the
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs (June 19, 1985), Part IV-Treaty Compliance and Nuclear Arms Control, at 7.
Further advances in the technology of seismography may have opened the way for a Compre-
hensive Test Ban regime. See Science and Technology Brief: The Faltering Technologies of
Arms Verification, Economist, May 19, 1984, at 98-99.
216 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
217 The Soviet Union has insisted on "strict reciprocity" in arms control verification, Lewis,
Soviet Aide Sees Arms Pact by Summer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1987, at AS, and commentators
are not surprised by the importance given mutuality of inspection obligations. See, e.g., L.
Henkin, supra note 36, at 22.
In the context of bilateral United States-Soviet Union treaties, the quantitatively unequal
force levels permitted the two nations in SALT I, and the Soviet Union's right to "heavy"
ICBMs (the largest category of ICBM, of which the USSR has 300 and the US none) under
SALT II, for example, have proven contentious, even though there were offsetting qualitative
advantages in the United States arsenal. Ten Questions About SALT II, Commentary, Aug.,
1979, at 21, 23; see also SALT II Treaty, Hearings on the SALT II Treaty Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations on the SALT II Treaty, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 370-71 (1979)
(statement of General David C. Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff). The SALT agree-
ments were designed to produce rough overall equality, not identicality, and the sides exercised
their "freedom to mix"--to allocate strategic forces among different types of platforms-in
asymmetric ways. See T. Wolfe, supra note 141, 185-87, 194.
No bilateral treaties between the United States and Soviet Union have provided for une-
qual verification rights. Even though the superpowers differ in their technological capabilities
for gathering information and in their interest in utilizing the verification assets they do have,
see text accompanying notes 319-39 infra, given the strategic importance of verification, as well
as its position as a politically sensitive issue, there is no reason to believe that either country
would accept derogation from the precedents establishing strict equality in legal verification
authority.
218 As one commentator put it, "IT]he Russians have never been much concerned about
verification, since it is virtually impossible for the U.S. to keep a major weapons program
secret." Scoville, The SALT Negotiations, Sci. Am., Aug. 1977, at 24, 31.
219 The Soviet Union has generally made ICBMs the major portion of its strategic forces,
while the United States has maintained a more balanced triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomb-
ers. The forces vary also in their power, accuracy, and reliability. See C. Campbell, Nuclear
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ence of superpower negotiations, however, have shown that any inspec-
tion rights obtained by the United States inside the Soviet Union must
also be accorded to the Soviets inside this country.220
Fourth, the common perception that the Soviet Union unrelentingly
resists United States pressures for inspection rights must be substantially
refined.221 In fact, the Soviet Union has agreed to quite intrusive verifica-
tion provisions, including the right to conduct large-scale on-site inspec-
tion of Soviet territory. 222 Negotiating such provisions is undoubtedly
difficult and painstaking, but the past successes illustrate that the poten-
tial for future cooperative inspection regimes is substantially greater than
often appreciated.
II
POSSIBLE FUTURE INSPECTION PROVISIONS
Although the verification provisions discussed in Part I are impres-
Weapons Factbook (1984).
220 See Schear, supra note 41, at 16.
221 Many commentators have charged the Soviet Union with a paranoid concern for state
secrecy that has been a major impediment to the negotiation of adequate verification provi-
sions. See, e.g., A. Krass, supra note 50, at 212-13.
The Soviet-articulated approach to verification has many elements in common with the
United States view, but with different emphases. The Soviet perspective was presented by
Viktor Issraelyan, Soviet ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, as incorporating the
following basic principles:
1. The conduct of verification should in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of states
or permit interference in their internal affairs.
2. Verification cannot exist without disarmament but must stem from a precise and
clear agreement on measures for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament.
3. The scope and forms of verification should be commensurate with the character and
scope of the specific obligations established... .
4. The detailed elaboration of the verification provisions is possible only after an agree-
ment on the scope of the prohibition has been mapped out.
5. We proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a convention not in
order to violate it but in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed
under it, and therefore that verification should not be built upon the principle of
total distrust by States of one another....
6. International forms of verification should be limited.
7. ... [I]n the conditions of the present-day development of science and technology,
any serious violation of an agreement in the field of disarmament... has no chance
of remaining undetected for very long.
A. Krass, supra note 50, at 140-41; see also Heckrotte, supra note 42, at 12-13 (describing
Soviet approach).
222 INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XI, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe. at 1466-67; id. Protocol
Regarding Inspections, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1476-87. These agreements are the
most elaborately detailed examples, and may be harbingers of future accords. See J. Goldblat,
supra note 48, at 94; A. Neidle, Nuclear Negotiations: Reassessing Arms Control Goals in
U.S.-Soviet Relations 77-78 (1982); Utgoff, On-Site, Automated Monitoring: An Application
for Reducing the Probability of Accidental Nuclear War, in Preventing Nuclear War 126, 127
(B. Blechman ed. 1985).
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sive and diverse, the demands of future arms control accords are certain
to strain existing procedures and capabilities. Conventional wisdom sug-
gests advancing the arms control process incrementally, building upon
prior agreements with step-by-step modifications, 223 but, for three rea-
sons, future arms control efforts may have to be of a different character
than those already discussed.
First, future arms control efforts will concern systems that are mul-
tipurpose, mobile, and smaller than those covered by earlier treaties. 224
While SALT I, for example, required only the relatively easy task of
monitoring ICBM launchers, 225 the SALT II negotiations assumed the
additional burden of at least indirectly regulating the numbers of missiles
and warheads,226 and the START negotiations are addressing the chal-
lenge of direct limitations on warheads.227 Although fixed ICBM
launchers-conspicuous, permanent holes in the ground-are easy to
identify and monitor, the missiles they contain and the warheads atop the
missiles are less apparent. Similarly, future treaties will also have to deal
with dual-capable cruise missiles228 and other hard-to-detect systems.
Second, future arms control efforts will be increasingly concerned
with the "qualitative" arms race as well as the more familiar "quantita-
tive" competition. The traditional task of determining with precision
how many strategic weapons of each type are deployed by the Soviet
Union will give way to the far more demanding assignment of measuring
weapon performance characteristics, such as range, payload, accuracy,
reliability, and manueverability, for which existing NTM229 systems are
inadequate. 230
223 See Gelb, A Glass Half Full, Foreign Pol'y, Fall 1979 at 21, 22-32.
224 The most conspicuous example of a modern weapon possessing these characteristics and
thus posing a severe challenge for future arms control efforts is the cruise missile. Addition-
ally, anti-satellite, chemical, biological and miniature nuclear weapons are all possible future
weapons systems that share these features.
225 SALT I Treaty, supra note 20, arts. I-IV, Protocol, 23 U.S.T. 3464-65, 3469, T.I.A.S.
No. 7504, at 3-4, 8.
226 SALT II Treaty, supra note 59, art. IV, §§ 6-14, 18, 18 I.L.M. at 1145-49.
227 Hard Work Ahead, supra note 148, at 2.
228 Dual-capable cruise missiles are missiles which can be armed with either a nuclear or a
conventional warhead. W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 66-67 (1986); Tsipis, Cruise Missiles, Sci.
Am., Feb. 1977, 171, 171. Because there are few externally observable differences between
nuclear- and conventionally-armed cruise missiles, if the latter are permitted and become wide-
spread, restrictions on the former will be difficult to monitor. See W. Rowell, supra note 24, at
66; see also Tsipis, supra, at 27 (discussing cruise missiles generally).
229 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
230 In some instances, qualitative constraints, especially those taking the form of a flat ban
on an activity rather than allowing some regulated incremental growth, can be easier to moni-
tor. For example, a Comprehensive Test Ban, prohibiting all nuclear weapons explosions,
could probably be verified with greater confidence than could a treaty permitting tests up to a
specified yield, because questions would remain about tests close to the limit. See Scoville,
supra note 17, at 8. But see R. Fritzel, Nuclear Testing and National Security 27 (1981)
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Third, arms control efforts are likely to focus on the imposition of
treaty constraints at an earlier stage in a weapon system's life cycle. Cur-
rent treaty restrictions generally begin only after a new weapon has
passed through the basic research and laboratory development phases,
when a program reaches the stage of field testing and NTM observation
becomes feasible.231 Advocates of earlier constraints, seeking to apply
controls before a new weapon design proceeds far enough to accumulate
political and economic allies, will face severe verification difficulties.
This Part describes, in roughly ascending order of intrusiveness,
some types of inspection rights that might be sought in future arms con-
trol agreements.2 32 It is necessary to understand the methods and pur-
poses of these various inspection techniques in order to evaluate the
intrusiveness of verification procedures and, in turn, the constitutionality
of United States government sponsorship of such procedures when
American citizens are being inspected. This Part will also examine cur-
rent Soviet inspection capabilities, an important element in assessing the
potential for a constitutional violation.
A. Remote Sensing
Future treaties will almost certainly continue to rely upon remote
sensing, and this form of NTM will probably become more common,
(verification of a Comprehensive or Limited Test Ban would always be imperfect). As another
example, the INF Treaty, supra note 5, which bans intermediate ground-launched missiles,
will be easier to monitor than would be an agreement that permits each side to retain a number
of this kind of missile.
231 For example, in the ABM Treaty, parties undertake not to continue work on potential
weapons systems beyond the laboratory development phase. See ABM Treaty, supra note 59,
art. 5, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 3441, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, at 7. The SALT II Treaty, supra note 59,
contains the obligation "not to flight-test or deploy new types of ICBMs," id. art. IV, § 9, 18
I.L.M. at 1146, or additional re-entry vehicles on existing ICBMs, id. art. IV, § 10, 18 I.L.M.
at 1147, and "not to develop, test or deploy" ocean-bottom weapons and other exotic systems,
id. art. IX, 18 I.L.M. at 1153-54.
Occasional efforts to apply arms control limitations as far back as the research stage have
not yet been successful. The Reagan Administration, for example, has proposed an "open
laboratories" initiative in the area of defensive weapons systems. The proposal would allow
American and Soviet scientists to visit each others' facilities regularly and exchange briefings
on technological developments. The Soviet Union has thus far resisted this idea. Similarly,
recent Soviet proposals to limit laboratory research on strategic defenses have been resisted by
the United States. See, 25 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 69, at 65; Gordon, 'Star Wars' De-
bate, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at A8.
232 This survey does not consider some of the most intrusive types of inspection provisions
because of their political and practical remoteness. For example, because basic research in
high-technology areas that might ultimately find application in anti-submarine or anti-satellite
weapons, or in ICBM accuracy improvements, occurs initially in the laboratory, library, or
classroom, it is virtually impossible to monitor or regulate, even for the host country, let alone
for a foreign inspector. See Kincade, Verification and SALT II, in SALT II and American
Security 28, 49 (1980); SIPRI, supra note 42, at 83-84.
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sophisticated, and diverse. The United States currently maintains, and
progressively upgrades, a wide variety of sensors,2 33 based on numerous
types of platforms. Satellite-based systems are the most remote NTMs,
orbiting as far as 70,000 miles from earth.2 34 Satellites can perform a
number of verification-related functions, including imaging, signals intel-
ligence, and nuclear explosion detection.2 35
The term "imaging" embraces a number of reconnaissance activi-
ties. 236 The most familiar is visible-light photography, 37 which produces
either still photographs developed from film or electro-optical television-
type signals. Current generations of satellites are capable of recording
images of earthborne items as small as three or four inches across from a
rapidly moving platform one hundred miles in space.2 38 In addition to
visible-light photography, some satellites are equipped with infrared film,
thermal sensors, and radar capability. Infrared film can identify phe-
nomena that are invisible to ordinary film, such as the difference between
live and cut vegetation, a fact that might reveal the presence of camou-
flage.239 Although the resolving power of infrared film is less than that of
visible-light photography, infrared imagery has the advantage of being
collectable at night.24° Satellites equipped with thermal sensors can de-
tect heat gradients, perhaps indicative of activities being conducted un-
derground or inside shelters. Radar imaging satellites bounce radio
waves off a target and read the return pulses. Unlike visible-light or in-
frared photography, this technique permits one to "see" through cloud
cover, foliage, and even dry sand.241 As dazzling as these imaging tech-
niques may be, they do not reflect an exhaustive list of the remote sensing
233 New satellite components, for example, and entire new satellite systems are regularly
introduced. See Friel, New Directions for the U.S. Military and Civilian Space Programs, in
International Security Dimensions of Space 119 (1984).
234 Richelson, Technical Collection and Arms Control, in Verification and Arms Control
195 (W. Potter ed. 1985).
235 See id.; see also How Satellites May Help to Sell SALT, U.S. News and World Rep.,
May 21, 1979, at 25; Burt, Technology is Essential to Arms Verification, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1979, at Cl.
236 See Richelson, supra note 234, at 206 n.15.
237 For a detailed survey of civilian applications of satellite imagery, see D. Deudney, Space:
The High Frontier in Perspective, Worldwatch Paper #50 (1982).
238 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 18.
239 J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 108.
240 Id.
241 Id. All of these imaging sensors can be further enhanced by sophisticated data manipu-
lation techniques. "Multipsectral scanners" use a series of lenses to obtain several simultane-
ous pictures from different wavelengths, which are then integrated by computer. "Image
enhancement" techniques involve disassembling a picture into millions of tiny pulses, then
manipulating the contrast and intensity for reassembly, thus compensating for motion or other
distortions. "Optical subtraction" is a technique for comparing images taken on different
orbits, to emphasize the changes during the time lapse. R. Scribner, T. Ralston & W. Metz,
supra note 82, at 72-74; A. Krass, supra note 50, at 49-61; Richelson, supra note 234, at 207.
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capabilities of modem satellites.
The second major type of satellite NTM is signals intelligence
(SIGINT), commonly subdivided into communications intelligence
(COMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT).242 The former refers
to the interception of another nation's military, diplomatic, commercial,
or private communications, whether sent by radio, telephone, satellite, or
otherwise. The latter refers to the detection of other types of electromag-
netic emanations, such as those emitted by foreign radar installations or
produced by foreign missile tests.243 The United States deploys a variety
of satellites to pursue the SIGINT function, and they are regularly up-
graded as more sophisticated generations of interceptors become
available. 244
The third type of satellite NTM consists of nuclear explosion detec-
tors.2 45 These systems find their roots in the 1960s VELA satellites,
which were designed to detect X-rays, gamma rays, and neutrons gener-
ated by a nuclear event in space.24 6 Subsequent VELA satellites have
been equipped with electromagnetic pulse detectors, background radia-
tion detectors, and light sensors.2 47 As the VELAs are phased out, two
newer generations of satellites, the Defense Support Program and the
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System, will detect nuclear explosions
with increased effectiveness.248
Many of the functions performed by satellite platforms are also per-
formed by aircraft-based systems. Photoreconnaissance imagery, for ex-
ample, has long been collected by high-flying aircraft. 249 This practice
continues today.250 While aircraft are more vulnerable to interception
242 Some experts consider SIGINT to be the single most valuable intelligence tool. See, e.g.,
J. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency 378 (1982).
243 Regarding SIGINT activities generally, and the organization and history of United
States government efforts to intercept communications, see id. at 23-42.
244 Richelson, supra note 234, at 181-85. For example, a recently developed SIGINT satel-
lite with an antenna twice the size of a football field, affording it a sensitivity to low-powered
signals from earth, can "pick up broadcasts from radios the size of a wristwatch." Broad,
Experts Say Satellite Can Detect Soviet War Steps, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at A12.
245 A. Krass, supra note 50, at 75-79.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 United States reconnaissance aircraft began overflights of the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe in the 1940s. P. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces 10 (1983). In
the early post-war period, approximately 80% of all useful United States military intelligence
came from aerial photographs. Moser, The Time of the Angel: The U-2, Cuba, and the CIA,
Am. Heritage, Oct. 1977, at 6-7.
250 International law, while permitting satellite overflight, does not authorize aerial over-
flight. A few nations have protested such unauthorized overflights, and some have attempted
to shoot down aircraft violating their national airspace. P. Klass, Secret Sentries in Space 50-
52 (1971); J. Richelson, supra note 234, at 178; Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 9. For
example, from the 1940s through the 1960s, the Soviet Union destroyed an estimated 40
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than satellites are, they offer the advantages of more rapid maneuverabil-
ity and closer inspection.251 Currently, the most sophisticated United
States reconnaissance aircraft, the SR71, is capable of speeds of 2000
miles per hour at an altitude of 85,000 feet.252 At the present time, nine
of these planes are operational. Each can film 60,000 square miles of the
earth's surface in one hour, acquiring nighttime radar and infrared im-
agery, as well as daylight optical photographs. 253 In addition, each can
produce three-dimensional imagery precise enough to locate a mailbox
on a rural road.254 Further, recent technological innovations, such as
"side-looking" radars255 and "slant photography" equipment, have
greatly enhanced aerial photography, permitting the inspection of coastal
areas up to sixty miles inside the Soviet Union without intruding into its
airspace.256 Aircraft with these capabilities also patrol the periphery of
the Soviet Union to assist in the SIGINT operations, monitoring military
exercises, communications, and tests.257 Similarly, aircraft overflights
contribute to nuclear detection monitoring by collecting air and water
samples for radioactivity analysis. 258
Additional types of sensors, operating on different platforms, have
the potential to provide significant amounts of information about targets.
Since 1955, for example, a global network of radars and antennas has
contributed to the SIGINT function by monitoring Soviet missile tests
United States and Allied reconnaissance aircraft. As satellite and standoff aircraft-aircraft
that do not have to violate a nation's airspace to perform reconaissance of that nation-recon-
naissance capabilities have improved, the United States has generally refrained from provoca-
tive and dangerous aerial overflight of nations with substantial anti-aircraft capabilities. A
partial list of aerial clashes between United States reconnaissance aircraft and Soviet air de-
fenses is provided in Bamford, The Last Flight of KAL 007, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1984, (Maga-
zine), at 4, 5.
251 See R. Perry, The Faces of Verification: Strategic Arms Control for the 1980's, at 19-20
(1977).
252 The high altitude capabilities and speeds of reconnaissance aircraft mean that they do
not interfere with activities on the ground and that they are difficult to detect, even with the
most sophisticated equipment. Advanced "stealth" technology will further complicate
ground-based attempts to detect and track overflying aircraft. B. Sweetman, Stealth Aircraft 6
(1986). The United States is now developing a new reconnaissance aircraft with greater capa-
bility to replace the SR71. Halloran, US Is Developing Surveillance Jet that Eludes Radar,
N.Y. Times, Jan, 11, 1988, at Al.
253 J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 116.
254 Id.
255 See Jenson, Graham, Porcello & Leith, Side-Looking Airborne Radar, Sci. Am., Oct.
1977, at 84-95.
256 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 34.
257 J. Richelson, supra note 234, at 182-83.
258 Scoville, Verification of Soviet Strategic Missile Tests, in Verification and SALT 163 (W.
Potter ed. 1980). Bomb clouds can be sampled long distances from an explosion, thus permit-
ting the acquisition of data about another nation's nuclear capability without provocative over-
flights. Scoville, supra note 40, at 62.
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and communications. 259 The phased array COBRA DANE radar on
Shemya Island, Alaska, for example, is capable of detecting a basketball-
sized object at a range of two thousand miles.260
Naval platforms also contribute to SIGINT by intercepting Soviet
signals and by monitoring missile tests. 261 Surveillance ships have been
utilized in a number of militarily sensitive situations to collect radio and
radar intelligence. 262 Seismometers, useful for detecting ground move-
ments to distinguish earthquakes from nuclear explosions, have been dis-
tributed around the world and under the ocean.263 Networks designed to
monitor activities on the ocean floor link satellites, aircraft, radars, sur-
face ships, and fixed sea-bottom hydrophones through a central com-
puter system.264 A similar multisensor grid has been established for
space surveillance. 265
Future applications of these remote inspection technologies could
entail both incremental enhancement of the quality of existing sensors
and platforms, and their expansion to additional exotic devices. This
vast array of mechanisms-while far from rendering the Soviet Union
transparent-provide the United States with an increasingly broad spec-
trum of data about otherwise inaccessible activities.
259 See J. Prados, supra note 40, at 35-36; P. Pringle & W. Arkin, supra note 2, at 66-69;
Hafemeister, Romm & Tsipis, supra note 30, at 38.
260 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 30-33.
261 See, e.g., Hersh, Submarines of the U.S. Stage Missions Inside Soviet Waters, N.Y.
Times, May 25, 1975 at 1, 52 (U.S. submarines used to intercept radio and radar signals by
secretly entering Soviet waters).
262 Incidents reflecting the use of such SIGINT vessels include: (a) attacks on the Maddox
and the Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam in 1964; (b) the 1967 Israeli attack on
the Liberty in the Eastern Mediterranean; (c) seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea in 1968;
and (d) deployment of the Deyo and Caron in the Gulf of Fonseca to monitor traffic between
Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1982. Halloran, U.S. Destroyer Monitors Activity in Area of
Salvador and Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at A1, AI7.
263 The United States maintains seismic sensors in approximately 35 countries around the
world, and has negotiated toward the installation of advanced seismic array stations in other
nations along the Soviet periphery, including China and Finland. Pincus, U.S. Seeks A-Test
Monitoring Facility in China, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1986, at A8; Pincus, U.S. Detects Soviets'
Smallest Nuclear Tests, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1985, at A]5.
The United States also participates in cooperative seismology programs with other na-
tions. In these programs, data from numerous sensors are shared, providing wide-angle cover-
age of ambiguous events deep inside the Soviet Union and elsewhere. J. Goldblat, supra note
48, at 98-99; Smith, The Washington-Moscow Seismic Hot Line, 244 Science 669 (1984).
2M4 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 33-35: Richelson, supra note 234, at 186-90. No cur-
rent arms control treaties restrict United States and Soviet military activities on the seas except
the general rules contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov.
1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700, 14 I.L.M. 963, and the Convention of the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T7. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
2.,5 See Richelson, supra note 234, at 190-94.
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B. On-Site Mechanical Sensing
Future arms control accords might provide that verification be as-
sisted by automated, continuously operating "black boxes" installed in-
side the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union.26 6 These
boxes could be designed to monitor diverse, ongoing arms-related activi-
ties through the inclusion of a wide variety of sensors.267, Data from
these units could be fed via satellite links to the inspecting party, and
tamper-proof seals could be installed to help ensure authenticity of the
data.268
An experimental program of this sort was instituted in the nuclear
nonproliferation area, as the International Atomic Energy Agency and
eight nations participated in the RECOVER (Remote Continuous Verifi-
cation) project.269 The project was designed to develop, test, and evalu-
ate a secure surveillance and communications system for automatically
transmitting data from nuclear power plants and other facilities to the
Agency's headquarters. 270 Through this network, Agency experts are
able to monitor immediately activities of interest, to analyze the data
with care, and to preserve substantial evidence of suspected tampering or
diversion. 271 The results of this ongoing experiment are said to be
266 The negotiability of automated sensors is suggested by the belief that the Soviets prefer
automated inspection to inspection by foreigners. A. Dallin, The Soviet Union, Arms Control
and Disarmament 153 (1964).
Reliability and ease of equipment maintenance will be important to a successful system of
automatic sensors. If personnel from the inspecting state must frequently conduct on-site
maintenance, then the arrangement is more like a manned inspection. Fortunately, modem
technology is likely to permit the development of sufficiently stable equipment so that human
intervention would be rare and brief.
267 One of the principal reservations regarding "black boxes" is the fear that they might
secretly contain hidden espionage apparatus in addition to legitimate equipment. Such a cov-
ert sensory capacity could afford the inspecting country access to privileged information about
activities inside the host country beyond the scope authorized by the treaty. For example,
seismic detectors ostensibly designed to verify a CTB treaty might also be capable of covertly
detecting troop maneuvers inside the host country. The PNET dealt with this concern by
requiring that the inspecting party bring two complete sets of inspecting equipment, with the
host selecting one set for inspection and one for dismantling to ensure that no unauthorized
devices are being utilized. PNET, supra note 89, Protocol art. 5, § 6(b)-(d), 15 I.L.M. at 897,
ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 183. A 50% chance of detection is considered an
adequate deterrent to any attempt to insert espionage equipment under the guise of treaty
verification. See Heckrotte, supra note 42, at 68-70.
268 Security surrounding the transmitted data could be strengthened by transmitting it in
code (encryption), by inserting a coded key word into the otherwise clear data stream (authen-
tication) and by installing tamper-proof and tamper-detecting devices. 8 ACDA Ann. Rep. 33
(1969).
269 20 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 123, at 13-18; see Weinstock & Fainberg, Verifying a
Fissile-Material Production Freeze in Declared Facilities, with Special Emphasis on Remote
Sensing, in Arms Control Verification 309, 312-14 (1986).
270 20 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 123, at 17-18.
271 Id.
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encouraging.272
The national seismic stations formerly under negotiation in the
Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty talks illustrate another type of
contemporary sensing system.273 Emplacement of state-of-the-art, tam-
per-proof seismometers274 would greatly aid CTB verification as data are
quickly and reliably relayed to the United States for integration with the
output of sensors located elsewhere.275 The United States Departments
of Energy and Defense are in the process of developing equipment for
such a seismic network. 276
In the future, unmanned observation posts will have several uses if
adapted to the several stages of a typical weapon's life cycle. First, with
regard to weapons production, photographic sensors might be placed in-
side cruise missile assembly facilities, providing continuous assurance
that weapons manufacturing does not exceed permitted levels.277 Simi-
larly, mechanical detectors in chemical plants might be used to sense the
presence of any illegal chemical weapons, or to alert human inspectors to
272 Id.
273 U.S. Dep't of State, Bull. No. 48, Trilateral Progress Report on the CTB Negotiations
47-48 (1980).
274 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a private United States environmen-
tal group, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences are conducting a small-scale test of regional
seismometers. Under this program, each national organization installs three modem seismic
stations near the other nation's nuclear test site. Data from all stations are published. The
exchange is expected to enhance scientists' understanding of the geological properties of the
test areas. Smith, Soviet, U.S. Scientists Reach Seismic Agreement, 232 Science 1338, 1338
(1986).
Another seismic device called CORRTEX has also been discussed in the context of verifi-
cation of the TTBT and PNET. See Statements by the President, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doe.
364 (Mar. 14, 1986); Tower, News and Negotiations, Arms Control Today, Mar. 1986, at 13-
19; Gordon, Reagan Plan on Verifying Nuclear Tests Faulted: Intelligence Officials Propose
Far Broader Approach, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at Cl, C10.
275 A monitoring network consisting of 15 sensors inside the Soviet Union and 15 outside it
would largely eliminate the problem of differentiating coincident earthquake signals and would
enable detection of explosions with smaller yields. Sykes & Evemden, The Verification of a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, Sci. Am., Apr. 1982, at 53.
276 Stokes, Unattended In-Country Stations for Seismic Verification, in Arms Control Ver-
ification 264-74 (1986).
277 A typical cruise missile is only twenty feet long and two feet in diameter and does not
require an identifiable launch facility. As a result, it can easily elude satellite observation once
it leaves the production facility. Tsipis, supra note 228, at 20-29.
Under this type of production-control arrangement, either party could reliably monitor
the number of cruise missiles manufactured by the other, despite the fact that the small size of
the weapon precluded subsequent efforts to monitor continuously the place of deployment.
Similarly, submarine construction is easy to observe, but subsequent at-sea maneuvers are well
hidden. Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 15-16. But see Wilkening, Monitoring Bombers and
Cruise Missiles, in Verification and Arms Control 107, 118 (W. Potter ed. 1985) (small size of
cruise missiles and possibility of covert manufacturing and assembly of components undercut
feasibility of verification via production monitoring).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1988]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the presense of suspicious raw materials or chemical processes.278 Like-
wise, automated sensors might prove especially useful in verifying com-
pliance with a negotiated freeze on the production of fissile materials for
weapons.279 Secure automated technologies could be designed to moni-
tor the few fissile material production facilities in both the United States
and the Soviet Union.280
On-site black boxes may also play a role in monitoring the deploy-
ment of a weapon. For example, if mobile ICBMs were arrayed in a
formation comparable to the multiple protective shelters or "racetrack"
scheme sponsored by the Carter Administration,281 sensors could be de-
veloped that would satisfy the inspecting nation that only one missile was
present in each formation without revealing its location. 282 Similarly,
sensors might be designed for installation on submarines or aircraft to
detect the on-board presence of nuclear materials. These devices would
provide continuous or periodic reports on the movements of weapons or
weapons-related materials. 283
Finally, regarding the use, or test use, of a weapon, automated sen-
sors could be placed near each nation's ICBM fields, thus providing a
nonintrusive warning about hostile or practice launches. Such sensors
would serve the additional function of identifying as specious the false
alarms that might be generated by other components of a warning sys-
tem. 284 Mechanical sensors also might assist in the monitoring of con-
ventional forces by verifying compliance with an agreement limiting the
numbers and movements of tanks, troops, and other items through desig-
nated check points.285
278 1986 Impact Statements, supra note 179, at 250-77 (detailed monitoring of chemical
production facilities is required because of diverse types of civilian and military, lethal and
non-lethal chemicals that can be produced in same facility).
279 Weinstock & Fainberg, supra note 269, at 310-22.
280 D. Wainhouse, Arms Control Agreements: Designs for Verification and Organization
310-14 (1968).
281 The "racetrack" plan was a proposed method of deploying the MX missiles in a pattern
where each missile would shuttle among twenty or more protected shelters strung along an
enclosed loop road several miles long. The theory was that since Soviet targeters could not
know precisely where the missile was at any given time, they would have to waste a great many
ICBM warheads in an attempt to attack a single missile. At the same time, the interests of
arms control could be served if methods could be devised for ensuring that all MX missiles
were confined to such loops and that there was only one missile per loop. Blair & Brewer,
supra note 40, at 15; Davis, "Land-Mobile ICBM's: Verification and Breakfast," in 7erifica-
tion and SALT, 129, 143 (W. Potter ed. 1980).
282 Utgoff, supra note 222, at 142-43.
283 Lin, Technology for Cooperative Verification of Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control To-
day, Apr. 1986, at 10, 11.
284 Utgoff, supra note 222, at 128-33.
285 See notes 192-200 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Data Exchange and Inspection of Records
Agreements requiring the exchange of specified data or the examina-
tion of records and accounts maintained by the host country, provide
another category of promising verification techniques. 286 Elaborate data
exchanges are provided for in a few current arms control treaties,287 as
well as in nonproliferation safeguard agreements that grant International
Atomic Energy Agency personnel the right to examine detailed logs
maintained at civilian nuclear power plants. 288 Those rights could be
strengthened by requiring the transmittal of a broader field of informa-
tion289 or by affording inspectors greater powers to review the input, con-
sumption, and output of nuclear fuel, to obtain more independent
measurements, and generally to undertake more thorough inspections. 290
Although records inspection cannot physically prevent the diversion
of regulated material, it may deter misuse through the threat of prompt
after-the-fact detection. This principle of deterrence could be applied in
other areas, such as weapons manufacture or dismantling.291 A treaty
could demand that facilities constructing nuclear warheads keep copious
logs open for inspection. If aware of the amount of weapons-grade mate-
rial entering the plant, and the amount used in each bomb, inspectors
could detect whether additional, unauthorized explosive devices were be-
ing produced. Monitoring all the components of the nuclear weapons
production sequence, and cross-checking the records from each, might
raise the level of confidence in compliance. 292
286 The inspection of required records is an arms control technique that has come under
close scrutiny in the past. 25 ACDA Ann. Rep., supra note 69, at 24; Feld, supra note 36, at
323.
287 The TTBT calls for an exchange of information about the seismic properties of United
States and Soviet nuclear test sites. TTBT, supra note 100, Protocol, 13 I.L.M. at 908-09
ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 169-70. The unratified SALT II Treaty provides for
elaborate data exchange regarding nuclear weapons stockpiles. SALT II Treaty, supra note
59, Memorandum of Understanding, 18 I.L.M. at 1161. Similarly, the INF Treaty provides
for the comprehensive exchange of data regarding stockpiles of intermediate-range missiles
and the actions taken to dismantle them. INF Treaty, supra note 5, art. XIII, 2, 23 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doe. 1968.
288 See, e.g., Safeguards Agreement, supra note 122, arts. 32, 49-56, 69-82, 32 U.S.T. 3059,
3071, 3077-78, 3081-86, T.I.A.S. No. 9889, at 13, 19-20; Weinstock & Fainberg, supra note
269, at 309-22.
289 In 1981, the Reagan Administration advised the Soviet Union that any future arms con-
trol agreements would have to include an exchange of data. Gelb, U.S. Tells Soviet any Arms
Pacts Must Include On-Site Verification, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1981, at Al, A12.
290 See Nuclear Plant Inspector Recalls Fears, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 1985, at All.
291 See Drozdiak, Soviets Allow Some A-Plant Inspections, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1985, at
A1, A24.
292 A related possibility for obviating disputes over the correct numbers in a weapons data
base is to physically attach or etch indelible serial numbers onto each device. Thus, a treaty
that limited each side to 1000 weapons would require that sequential numbers between 1 and
1000 be permanently affixed to each unit. If the inspecting party ever located a weapon with-
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Bookkeeping inspection arrangements could also aid inspectors in
chemical plants. Knowledge of shipments of chemicals and their compo-
nents to and from the factory could provide insight into covert activity.
This type of "paper trail" inspection at strategic facilities is probably in-
sufficient by itself to guarantee treaty compliance, 293 but it is useful in
complicating the task of a potential violator and raising the risk of
detection.
D. Examination of Personnel
Inspectors could discover what chemicals, warheads, or other
materials are produced or stored in a facility by interviewing people in a
position of knowledge. 294 A formal interrogation or cross-examination
might be authorized and a compulsory oath, lie detector test,295 or even a
"truth serum" drug296 might be used.
There might also be occasions when medical examination of specific
individuals would be productive. The United States has attempted, for
example, to administer blood tests, autopsies, and other medical evalua-
tions to the alleged victims of "yellow rain" chemical or biological weap-
ons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. 297 The United States has
also unsuccessfully sought the right to conduct the same sort of inquiries
among the residents of the Sverdlovsk region of the Soviet Union in order
to determine whether a local outbreak of anthrax in 1979 was due to
ingestion of diseased black market beef or to an accident in an illicit bio-
logical weapons production facility. 298
out such a number (or found two with the same number) additional verification rights could be
triggered.
293 Phelps, Some Problems of Missile Production Inspection, in Arms Reduction Program
and Issues 107-09 (D. Frisch ed. 1961).
294 Over 114,000 people had nuclear weapons duties for the United States military in 1980.
These included 111,637 military personnel, 2,331 United States government civilians, and 60
contractor staff. 1 T. Cochran, W. Arkin & M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: U.S.
Nuclear Forces and Capabilities 84 (1984).
For a discussion of verification measures that focus on obtaining information from the
people who have knowledge of a violation, see Bohn, Non-Physical Inspection Techniques, in
Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security 347-64 (D. Brennan ed. 1961).
295 But cf. Wilson, Pentagon Aide Warns Lie Detector Use Could Aid Soviet "Mole,"
Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1983, at A22 (Pentagon official argues that Soviet agents are trained to
"beat" polygraph tests).
296 The reliability of such drugs in producing "truth" has not been established, and state-
ments made while under their influence have been held inadmissible in court. Lindsey v.
United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956). But see United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522,
1524-25 (9th Cir. 1985) (lower court correctly admitted testimony obtained under narcanal-
ysis after balancing reliability against prejudice).
297 Chemical Warfare, supra note 175, at 4-32; Chemical Warfare Update, supra note 175,
at 3-12.
298 Zilinskas, supra note 209, at 24-27.
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E. Electronic Surveillance
Generally, electronic surveillance refers to the operation of devices
capable of providing covert audio and visual monitoring of activities.
Electronic surveillance devices differ from those discussed above in that
they operate without the knowledge of the target. As a result, they pose
a greater potential for abuse, such as eavesdropping on entire categories
of activity that are of no legitimate interest to the inspector.299 Thus, an
arms control inspector might conduct wiretap "fishing expeditions," with
the hope that some development might lead him to focus verification ac-
tivities on a particular illicit operation.
Well-known examples of electronic surveillance procedures include
telephone eavesdropping and the installation of remote or miniaturized
listening "bugs. ' 300 Technology now also permits the interception of tel-
egraph and telex signals, 30 1 as well as the acquisition and interpretation
of distinctive electronic emanations from typewriters, word processors,
and computers. 30 2 Such advanced electronic capabilities render vulnera-
ble virtually any electronic system operating without elaborate
shielding.303
The United States already maintains a vigorous interception pro-
gram, encompassing a wide range of Soviet communications.3°4 Even
when these messages are encrypted and undecipherable, 30 5 the fact of
transmission may permit compliance-related inferences based upon per-
ceived changes in the volume of traffic, the activation or deactivation of
particular communications channels, and the apparent results.30 6 Thus,
for example, the arbitrary monitoring of telephone conversations from a
chemical plant may reveal information leading to the conclusion that the
required records were not being accurately maintained, and that the ille-
gal diversion of chemicals was occurring. Similarly, useful information
299 See J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 120.
300 Wiretaps on Soviet targets in the 1950s were so productive they were known as "tele-
phone sluices." J. Prados, supra note 40, at 27-28.
301 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Federal Government Information
Technology: Electronic Surveillance & Civil Liberties 45-52 (1985).
302 Meyer, Hey Ivan, Say 'Cheese,' Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1983, Magazine, at 22, 40.
303 An expensive and cumbersome protection system known as "tempest shielding," which
secures terminals and printers within an all-metal room, is required to guarantee the integrity
of electronic word processing. Id.
304 J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 118. Similarly, the Soviet Union has intercepted United
States telephone communications at least as far back as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. P.
Bracken, supra note 249, at 46.
305 A great deal of useful information is routinely transmitted without such protective safe-
guards. Even when the participants would prefer secrecy, the unavailability of proper equip-
ment-or simple error-may result in the transmission of unencrypted communications. See
Scoville, supra note 40, at 59.
306 See Kincade, supra note 232, at 40-41.
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may be gleaned by "bugging" a production line or locker room, or by
intercepting telegrams and other electronic communications.307
F. On-Site Inspections
On-site inspection (OSI) is the most promising and often dis-
cussed 30 8 cooperative verification method. OSI can help ensure compli-
ance with a wide variety of treaty obligations.
Most frequently, OSI has been considered an effective tool for ensur-
ing compliance with nuclear test ban treaties. 30 9 In the typical scenario,
when the inspecting party suspects an illegal explosion,3 10 a cadre of des-
ignated personnel is dispatched to the site with appropriate tools and
307 Wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance have become extraordinarily so-
phisticated and frequent as technology has developed. A 1985 study by the congressional
Office of Technology Assessment found increasing reliance upon electronic surveillance by law
enforcement officers, especially at the federal level, and reported plans by several agencies to
exploit the technology still further. The study also found major gaps in the coverage of ex-
isting law governing such interceptions. Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 301, at
49-52.
308 Pieragostini, Cooperative Verification, Arms Control Today, June 1983, at 1. On the
conduct of on-site inspectors generally, see Bloomfield & Henkin, Inspection and the Problem
of Access, in Security in Disarmament 107-22 (1965).
The popular enthusiasm for, and the occasional practical value of OSI should not obscure
the very real limitations on the effectiveness of the technique. Questions about these limita-
tions are numerous. For example, would the mere request for OSI at a particular place com-
promise the sources and methods of intelligence gathering that led to a focus on that particular
incident? Would an OSI that failed to produce evidence of a violation prove politically embar-
rassing to the inspecting state? Would the host party ever permit an inspection-whatever the
treaty provisions-if it were guilty of a violation? See Scoville, Intelligence and Arms Con-
trol-A Valuable Partnership, in Intelligence: Policy & Processes 318, 319 (1985). For a
summary of the pros and cons of arms control OSIs, see R. Scribner, T. Ralston & W. Metz,
supra note 82.
309 The PNET, supra note 89, Protocol, 15 I.L.M. at 893-900, ACDA Treaty Book, supra
note 16, at 177-89, and the 1978-1981 CTB negotiations addressed these matters in detail. See
Scoville, supra note 308, at 321. Some have concluded that test ban monitoring is the only
application in which OSIs have much promise. See, e.g., A. Krass, supra note 50, at 219.
310 This Article does not deal with the complex and sensitive issue of OSI initiation-the
legal rights and procedural steps to be pursued under a treaty by a suspicious party in order to
gain access to the host's territory for inspection purposes. One framework for analyzing vari-
ous categories of OSI suggests that inspections could be conducted:
(i) 'on an immediate basis,' i.e., involving the presence of inspectors as soon as feasible,
(ii) 'on a continuous basis,' i.e., involving the presence of inspectors at all times during
an operation,
(iii) 'on a periodic basis,' i.e., involving regular visits to an operation at fixed intervals,
(iv) 'on a quota basis,' i.e., involving an agreed number of regular visits... on the basis
of agreed criteria and data communicated by States,
(v) 'on a random basis,' i.e., involving an agreed number of visits which follow an irreg-
ular pattern with limited advanced warning,
(vi) on any other agreed basis.
A. Krass, supra note 50, at 213 (quoting Committee on Disarmament, Report of the Ad Hoe
Working Group on Chemical Weapons (1983)).
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equipment, to search for evidence. 3'1 Samples of soil, flora, fauna, water,
and air may be taken and tests performed. 312 The inspected area may be
small or large, and there might be ten to thirty inspectors. 313 The inspec-
tion may take as long as a month.314 This type of inspection is believed
to have a very high probability of detecting evidence of a treaty violation
if any illegal explosion occurred within or near the search area.315
OSI has also been recognized as a valuable tool in monitoring com-
pliance with other arms control agreements, as evidenced by the elabo-
rate structure of different types of on-site monitoring specified in the INF
Treaty. As noted above, the treaty authorizes inspections inside the ter-
ritories of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies, over a
thirteen-year period, in order: (a) to confirm the accuracy of the sides'
initial inventories of regulated weaponry; (b) to observe the destruction
of launchers and missiles; (c) to verify that a missile facility has been
dismantled or converted; (d) to monitor the outputs of a specified pro-
duction facility; and (e) to conduct short notice "challenge" inspections
of suspect sites.
OSI provisions may also be written into future arms control agree-
ments. These might cover a variety of different types of weapons and
processes for which remote sensing may be insufficient. For example, to
determine how many warheads a particular ICBM carries or whether a
specific cruise missile is armed with a nuclear or conventional warhead,
one must ordinarily remove the top of the missile and examine the sepa-
rate units.316 This task necessitates an OSI. Further, the only dispositive
way to discover whether a suspicious building is in fact a biological
weapons factory, or whether a massive radar station in Siberia is being
used for prohibited ABM purposes or for lawful space-tracking purposes,
is for experts to go there and take appropriate measurements. In addi-
tion, if illegal ICBMs are concealed under a grain silo, or if excess com-
ponents are hidden in a warehouse, they can be discovered only if on-site
311 See, e.g., PNET, supra note 89, Protocol, 15 I.L.M. at 893-900, ACDA Treaty Book,
supra note 16, at 177-89; see also Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Energy and Tech-
nology Review (1983) (describing research regarding conduct of test OSI).
312 PNET, supra note 89, Protocol, art. III, 15 I.L.M. at 894-96, ACDA Treaty Book,
supra note 16, at 179-81.
313 Id. Protocol, art. V, § 3, 15 I.L.M. at 898, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 180.
314 Id.
315 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, supra note 97, at 221. But see
A. Krass, supra note 50, at 222 (demand on-site inspections pose insurmountable political,
technical, and cost obstacles that limit their utility as verification mechanisms).
316 See Tsipis, supra note 228, at 20-29. But cf. Arms Control Reporter, Chronology 1985,
at 611. B. 246 (noting work on experimental device which would permit MIRV inspectors to
count warheads without opening missiles through use of X-rays and gamma rays; device cur-
rently effective at close range only).
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inspectors conduct searches. 317
OSI also offers the best, if not the only way to ensure compliance
with treaty restrictions on the international transfer of sensitive technol-
ogy. By inspecting factories, and opening shipping crates and the like,
inspectors can ascertain possible circumvention of controls on advanced
weapons or on other items incorporating sophisticated technology. Fu-
ture OSI technology may offer methodologies for verifying compliance
with present or imaginable treaties governing activities in now largely
inaccessible areas. A treaty banning antisatellite weaponry from space,
for example, might be implemented with OSI provisions applicable to
launch facilities, or even in space. 318
G. Soviet Inspection Capabilities and Assets
The preceding discussion assumed that the talked-about verification
techniques and equipment were reasonably accessible to both the United
States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the two nations differ in their desire
and current capability to produce and operate the most sophisticated
monitoring devices. 319 This asymmetry is greatest in the most advanced
technological areas, where the overall capabilities of the Soviets lag be-
hind those of the United States. However, there is no appreciable gap
regarding the most intrusive, nontechnological techniques, such as OSI.
Therefore, even if the Soviets do not yet possess the sophisticated equi-
ment that the United States might employ on a field inspection in the
Soviet Union, their ability to inspect in detail, and therefore to stimulate
the corresponding constitutional questions, is unimpaired. This Section
describes the current state of Soviet verification technology. Although
Soviet technology is shrouded in secrecy, certain conclusions are
possible.
Much Soviet technology is associated with their large and vigorous
space program. Total annual expenditures in the Soviet space program
routinely exceed those of the United States program.3 20 The Soviets have
317 Some have argued that the Soviet Union has secretly stockpiled a large number of
ICBMs, unregulated by the SALT agreements, which limit launchers rather than missiles.
See, e.g., Senator James McClure, Covert Strategic Reserve ICBM Force: Another Soviet
SALT II Violation (unpublished manuscript on file at New York University Law Review).
318 Durch, supra note 78, at 98-100.
319 The Soviets have greater success than the United States in obtaining arms control re-
lated data about United States activities from public sources or from spies. See R. Scribner, T.
Ralston & W. Metz, supra note 82, at 53. They may therefore feel less need for remote techni-
cal monitoring.
320 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 17. One set of quoted figures put the 1983 relative
expenditures at $17-18 billion for the Soviet Union and $14 billion for the United States.
Smernoff, A Bold Two-Track Strategy for Space: Entering the Second Quarter Century, in
International Security Dimensions of Space 17, 19 (1984).
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recorded many "firsts" in the application of space technology, beginning
with their 1957 launching of Sputnik. Although Soviet satellite photore-
connaissance activities apparently originated about the same time as did
those of the United States, 321 the Soviet Union launches more photore-
connaissance satellites than does the United States.322 On the other
hand, the United States enjoys a substantial lead in satellite longevity,323
and has launched more SIGINT satellites than the Soviet Union.324
Soviet satellite longevity has, however, been increasing. 325 Further,
the Soviets have demonstrated a significant launch surge capability, en-
abling them to increase rapidly the number of photoreconnaissance satel-
lites in orbit.326 The Soviet Union relies heavily upon satellite-generated
data in verifying United States compliance with SALT and other arms
control agreements.3 27 Moreover, the Soviets have established a techno-
logical lead over the United States in certain satellite observation capabil-
ities. In particular, Soviet ocean surveillance satellites have no United
States counterparts for monitoring the location and activities of multiple
naval forces. 328
Like the United States, the Soviet Union is continually upgrading its
reconnaissance and SIGINT capabilities. 329 Overall, however, United
States officials report a substantial United States superiority in space
technology.3 30 The Soviets lag especially in the development of advanced
321 See P. Klass, supra note 250, at 150-61.
322 The Soviet Union launched 395 photoreconnaisance satellites compared to the United
States's 227 during the period from 1960 to 1977, with the disparity increasing at the end of
that time. During 1976 and 1977, the United States launched four and three photographic
satellites, and the Soviet Union thirty-five and thirty-three, respectively. Blair & Brewer, supra
note 40, at 18. Alternative figures, compiled by a Library of Congress study of space activities
from 1957 through 1982, show 455 United States military space payloads (including 236 pho-
toreconnaissance satellites) and 1252 Soviet payloads (including 558 photographic satellites).
See Wilson, Shuttle Flight Continues Space Contest, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 1984, at Al, A6.
323 United States photographic satellites remain aloft and operational for several months,
compared to an average lifespan of approximately two weeks for Soviet craft. Wilson, Air
Force Chief Denies Soviets Ahead in Space, Wash. Post, June 18, 1986, at Al [hereinafter Air
Force Denies].
324 The United States put 81 electronic intelligence satellites into orbit between 1957 and
1982, compared to 74 for the Soviets. Id. at Al, A6.
325 U.S. Dep't of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985, at 59 (1985).
326 Id.
327 For example, information gleaned from photoreconnaissance satellites provided a basis
for Soviet complaints regarding the modification of "environmental shelters" obscuring United
States ICBM silos. Krass, The Soviet View of Verification, in Verification and Arms Control
37, 52 (W. Potter ed. 1985).
328 R. Jastrow, How to Make Nuclear Weapons Obsolete 59 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Defense,
supra note 325, at 58.
329 J. Bamford, supra note 242, at 93; J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 90-92, 97-99.
330 Smemoff, A Bold Two-Track Strategy for Space: Entering the Second Quarter Century,
in International Dimensions of Space 18-19 (1984); Wilson, Air Force Denies, supra note 323,
at A30. But see Jane's Analyst Says Soviets Have Lead in Space Program, Wash. Post, June
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sensors and miniaturized electronics necessary for advanced surveillance
satellites. 33'
In addition to satellites, the Soviet Union relies upon aerial recon-
naissance and naval platforms to collect data.332 Through the use of aer-
ial reconnaissance, the Soviets gather a wide variety of intelligence
information. 333 Soviet naval aviation has been particularly strong in as-
sisting in ocean surveillance. 334 Soviet naval platforms are dispatched to
monitor United States missile tests, to observe military maneuvers, and
to eavesdrop on conversations. 335 Although the Soviet Union has made
relatively little investment in ground-based radars or other intelligence
stations outside its own territory,336 there are a few impressive installa-
tions at Soviet embassies and missions in the District of Columbia, New
York, and elsewhere.337
Regarding nuclear test ban treaty monitoring, the Soviet Union has
mirrored the United States in constructing an elaborate array of sophisti-
cated seismic sensors. 338 These provided the evidentiary data supporting
Soviet allegations that the United States had exceeded the TTBT's 150
kiloton yield ceiling on underground tests.339
In general, the distance between United States and Soviet inspection
capabilities is temporal, rather than absolute. Even if, at present, Soviet
treaty verification analysts do not have access to some inspection appara-
tus available to the United States, history suggests that eventually they
will follow the Western lead. Whether by purchasing or stealing United
States technology, mimicking it on their own, or developing an indige-
nous capability, it is quite likely that the Soviets will one day be able to
intrude into United States privacy to the same extent that American
probers can now invade Soviet privacy.
27, 1986, at A13 (Soviets take ten-year lead over United States after shuttle disaster).
331 Blair & Brewer, supra note 40, at 29.
332 J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 95-97; U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 325, at 115.
333 U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 325, at 115.
334 Murphy, Morskaya Aviatsiya (Soviet Naval Aviation): Its Development, Capabilities,
and Limitations, in Naval Power in Soviet Policy 179-201 (P. Murphy ed. 1978).
335 E. Bates, National Technical Means of Verification 64, 69 (1978). Soviet submarines
play an especially important covert SIGINT role. See J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 99-100.
336 J. Richelson, supra note 31, at 90.
337 See id. at 100-03. At each major SIGINT installation inside the United States, the Sovi-
ets record hundreds of thousands of telephone conversations transmitted by microwave, as
well as police and FBI transmissions, and government limousine communications. In the early
1970s, for example, the Soviets reportedly monitored all telephone calls to the United States
Department of Agriculture to study United States farm markets prior to their massive 1974
grain purchase. Id. at 102.
338 Krass, supra note 327, at 52.
339 See News and Views from the Soviet Union, Jan. 30, 1984, at 4-5 (Soviet embassy
publication).
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H. Observations
This panoply of future verification capabilities prompts a number of
important interim conclusions. First, time is of the essence if many of
these inspection techniques are to prove successful. Illegal warheads
could be replaced, contraband chemicals could be denatured, and fraudu-
lent log books could be prepared if the operators of an illegal facility had
sufficient warning that inspectors were en route.34 A continuous inspec-
tion presence, or at least surprise inspection tours by inspectors may be
essential in many contexts. 3a"
Second, a vexing challenge to the success of future inspections is
presented by the relatively small size of certain weapons. While the pro-
duction facilities for most arms are large, conspicuous,342 and well
known,343 the sites used for deployment and storage could be much more
diverse, small, and ordinary looking. For example, although a large
ICBM is very cumbersome-the MX is seventy-one feet long and weighs
almost 200,000 pounds 344-other weapons are much more difficult to de-
tect by NTM.345 For example, a modem cruise missile is essentially only
a cylinder, approximately twenty feet long and two feet in diameter.3 46
340 A major criticism of the inspections of nuclear power facilties currently undertaken by
the International Atomic Energy Agency is that the IAEA inspectors must announce their
visits some weeks in advance, thus foregoing the advantages of surprise. Miller, How Iraq
Nearly Got the Bomb, Wash. Times, May 30, 1983, at C2. The IAEA, however, does have the
authority to conduct surprise inspections in a limited category of cases. Fischer, The Chal-
lenge of Nuclear Safeguards, Bull. Atom. Scientists, June-July 1986, at 29-30.
341 The INF Treaty, for example, provides illustrations of both "short notice" and "contin-
uous" inspections. Each party has the right to demand that the inspected state provide trans-
portation to the inspection site for the visiting personnel within nine hours of the inspectors'
specification of the place they wish to observe. INF Treaty, supra note 5, Protocol Regarding
Inspections, art. VII, § 2, 23 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1481. Moreover, each party has the
right to station portal inspectors outside the gates of a particular production facility, 24 hours
a day for 13 years, to monitor vehicles and cargo exiting the plant. Id. art. XI, § 76, 23
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1466-67.
342 See Sharp, Verifying a Warhead Freeze, Arms Control Today, June 1983, at 1, 5.
343 See Aspin, supra note 30, at 38 (locations of submarine shipyards, bomber production
lines, and ICBM silos are all known and easy to monitor). The United States maintains 36
nuclear weapons facilities, including three design laboratories, seven plants producing fissile
materials, and seven weapons fabrication plants. Soviet facilities are similarly concentrated.
W. Arkin & R. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields 67-68 (1985).
344 See Snow, Arms Control and the Alternatives to MS-MPS, Arms Control Today, Dec.
1980, at 1, 7. Even the smaller "Midgetman" missile is conspicuous because the typical
Midgetman force requires as many as 47,000 support personnel. Getler, Small Missile Carries
Problems of its Own, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1983, at A16.
345 The antisatellite weapon formerly under development in the United States, for example,
is a relatively small interceptor rocket that would be deployed under the wings of selected F-15
fighter jets. Once so deployed, it would be very difficult to detect by Soviet NTM. Durch,
supra note 78, at 93.
346 Tsipis, supra note 228, at 20, 21. Deployed cruise missiles would be easier to observe
because the airplane, truck, or ship upon which they are transported will be conspicuous. See
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Even more easily hidden are modem nuclear explosives and lethal doses
of chemical and biological weapons, any of which might fit into a suit-
case.347 Virtually any building, and many tree-shrouded backyards could
become clandestine storage depots for illegal weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Future inspection regimes, therefore, must be unusually robust.
Third, some treaty inspections will require state-of-the-art technol-
ogy and detailed post-inspection analysis, not simply on-site inspectors.
If permitted to utilize only their ordinary human senses, on-site inspec-
tors may not be competent to detect evidence of illegal chemicals or nu-
clear radiation. 348 Although for some purposes it will suffice to identify
and count obvious weapons or components, in other instances, more so-
phisticated and powerful sensors will be required, and even then the re-
suits may remain ambiguous. 349
Fourth, it is inevitable that inspection rights associated with future
arms control treaties will enable inspectors, in pursuit of verification-re-
lated information, to collect significant amounts of information having
no colorable connection to the treaty.350 It may be that no inspection
can be so narrowly focused as to avoid all extraneous data, but the over-
lap worsens as the collection apparatus becomes more powerful. 351 Gen-
erally, such excess information is useless to the inspectors, and simply
clouds their ability to focus upon the inspection's true objectives. The
inspected party may feel threatened, however, when additional military
information is gathered despite its lack of connection with treaty con-
straints.352 In a similar vein, inspectors looking at private chemical or
munitions factories may in fact be searching only for treaty compliance
data, but their inquiries may also uncover trade secrets. 353 Similarly, in-
Wilkening, supra note 277, at 115-20.
347 The smallest nuclear weapon in the United States stockpile, the "Special Atomic Demo-
lition Munition," weighs only 58 pounds and can be transported by one person with a
backpack. T. Cochran, W. Arkin & M. Hoenig, supra note 294, at 311. The Soviet Union
may have similar nuclear microweapons. See P. Bracken, supra note 249, at 141-42.
348 Scoville, supra note 40, at 58 ("Even if a spy succeeds in getting a look at a new weapon,
he might not be able to acquire important information obtainable only with a scientific instru-
ment."). The need for technical measurements, in addition to human observation, may help
explain the relative diminution of the role played by standard espionage techniques in the arms
verification field, as compared to NTM.
349 See Heckrotte, supra note 42, at 76, 78-79.
350 Even non-intrusive inspection methodologies, such as low-resolution satellites employed
for meteorological purposes or earth resources identification, may be "overbroad" in collecting
collateral military data. See J. Lay & F. Taubenfeld, The Law Relating to Activities of Man in
Space 29 (1970).
351 See, e.g., A. Dallin, supra note 266, at 41.
352 See Heckrotte, supra note 42, at 64, 67.
353 For example, implementation of IAEA safeguards was delayed at the Urenco centrifuge
enrichment plant at Almelo, the Netherlands, because the owners were concerned that admis-
sion of inspectors into the plant's "cascade halls" (large processing chambers inside the facil-
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spectors legitimately inquiring into administrative matters may be able to
acquire personal information beyond the scope of their concerns, thus,
again, raising apprehensions about the inherent overbreadth of the
inspection.354
Fifth, inspectors may seek to exercise certain rights inconsistent
with contemporary norms of individualized, focused suspicion. In an en-
vironment where there are so many possible hiding places for contra-
band, and not nearly enough inspectors to explore them all, "fishing
expeditions" may be a rational strategy.355 Inspectors may deliberately
seek an "in terroram" effect, deterring treaty violations by creating un-
certainty about detection strategies and capabilities in the minds of all
potential violators.
Sixth, inspectors will be concerned about protecting the secrecy of
their verification routines. Preservation of the integrity of intelligence
sources and methods-a necessity in order to ensure their continued via-
bility for future application-might be considered more important than
exposing a particular treaty violation.356 In some instances, the mere as-
sertion that the United States has obtained a specific piece of information
regarding Soviet behavior may be enough to jeopardize the security of a
secret agent or reveal otherwise unavailable information about United
States intelligence capabilities. Presentation of NTM-generated evidence
in a public forum increases the risk that the exact capabilities of the sys-
tem will be exposed.
Seventh, it is important to remember that arms control treaty verifi-
cation tools are deliberately multiple and redundant. No single device is
powerful or reliable enough to serve all functions, but when functioning
ity) would result in the loss of proprietary information. Von Hippel & Levi, Controlling
Nuclear Weapons at the Source: Verification of a Cutoff in the Production of Plutonium and
Highly Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons, in Arms Control Verification 338, 364
(1986).
354 Concern has been expressed that the SIGINT radars operated by the National Security
Agency (NSA) have become powerful enough to intercept the millions of telephone, telegraph,
and telex messages flowing in and out of the United States. Further, if messages are stored in
computer files prior to analysis, there is a danger that personal or commercial information
unrelated to national security could be disseminated. See S. Rep. No. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1984); Shapley, Who's Listening?, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1977, at Cl.
355 Some commentators have stressed that OSI rights should be unlimited in number and
require no prior notice, thus affording inspectors "unlimited access to every nook and cranny
in each country." Beilenson & Cohen, Arms Limit: From Open Skies to Open Spies, Wall St.
J., June 29, 1983, at 34.
356 Zealous protection of the secrecy of intelligence-gathering sources and methods is a fun-
damental feature of United States arms control policy. In particular, maintaining the security
surrounding collection sources-both HUMINT and technical-and the techniques of data
analysis is a primary concern. See, e.g., W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 26-29; Verification and
Arms Control, 235 Science 406, 408 (1987).
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in concert they create a mutually reinforcing network.35 7 Data gathered
by one sensor are not analyzed in isolation,35 8 but are used to trigger
other devices, prompting closer attention to routine looking events and
facilitating the construction of a web of related information to support
overall inferences. 359 Therefore, no individual inspection tool or incident
can be singled out as decisive, and the separate contribution of any par-
ticular device is difficult to predict.360
III
THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Under the United States Constitution, treaties and other interna-
tional agreements 361 are the supreme law of the land.3 62 In the arms
control area, however, most treaties are not self-executing;3 63 subsequent
congressional enactment is generally required to effectuate them and
their inspection provisions.
A treaty has constitutional status equal to that of a statute, and if
conflicts between the two cannot be harmonized, the more recent docu-
ment will prevail. 364 Existing statutory provisions, therefore, could not
357 W. Rowell, supra note 24, at 22.
358 The task of integrating the yield of diverse sources is a challenging one, and some com-
mentators have identified analysis, rather than collection, as the weak link in United States
intelligence. See P. Bracken, supra note 249, at 30 (stating that "coordination of all this data
collection has become a monumental management task, one which has not kept up with the
pace of development of sensor technology or the rate at which information is churned out").
359 Reliance upon multiple sources means that the loss of any one asset is less cataclysmic,
and that a potential evader's task is more complex. Ten Questions About SALT II, supra note
217, at 21, 29.
360 See Wilson, Soviet Ships Shadowed U.S. Vessels' Transit, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1986, at
A33.
361 International law does not differentiate treaties from other international agreements, see
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 20, art. 2, § 1, 8 I.L.M. at 680-81.
Under United States law, however, there is an important procedural distinction: treaties are
made or entered into by the executive, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate by a two-
thirds vote prior to ratification. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. By contrast, executive agree-
ments are made by the executive; in some cases, no congressional action is required prior to
entry into force, in other instances, a simple majority of each House is required. See Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 303 (1986) [hereinafter Restatement]. Under United
States law, any executive agreement that would "obligate the United States to disarm or to
reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States" may be effectuated
only pursuant to the treaty power or majority votes in each House. 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1982).
With the possible exception of executive agreements made upon the sole authority of the
President, all international agreements are of equivalent status under United States law. Re-
statement, supra, § 303 comment j.
362 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
363 A self-executing treaty is one that requires no congressional action in order to become
domestic law. See Restatement, supra note 361, § 111.
364 Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581, 606-08 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). One commentator
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bar the use of any inspection mechanisms included in a future arms con-
trol treaty. Treaties, however, are inferior to the Constitution, and thus
any international agreement containing inspection provisions repugnant
to the Constitution will fall.365
The range of permissible subject matter for international agreement
is broad,366 and no treaty has ever been held to be ultra vires the Presi-
dent's treaty making power.367 The President, as chief executive 368 and
commander-in-chief, 369 is ordinarily accorded extreme deference in the
conduct of foreign policy and the formulation of treaties.370 Courts re-
viewing foreign affairs or national security issues traditionally uphold
presidential exercises of power371 or rely upon the political question doc-
trine to avoid judgment on the merits, 372 especially when the two polit-
ical branches are working in concert, as in the creation and implemention
of an arms control agreement. 373 Conventional doctrine, however,
teaches that a treaty must address legitimate foreign policy interests, 374
lest a conflict arise with the powers reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment. 375
It is important to note at this point, however, that private individu-
has advocated a constitutional amendment to confer a special status on disarmament agree-
ments, to immunize them from subsequent modification. See Partan, International Responsi-
bility Under a Disarmament Agreement in American Law, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 889, 952 (1965).
365 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). A ruling that a treaty is unconstitutional
means that it has no force of law within the United States; it continues, however, to be valid
international law which the United States is forced, by internal obligations, to breach. Restate-
ment, supra note 361, § 111 comment b. In the past, however, courts have been reluctant to
invalidate an international agreement on constitutional grounds. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796) ("If the court possess a power to declare treaties void, I shall never
exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed.").
366 See Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890).
367 Restatement, supra note 361, §§ 302-303.
368 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
369 See id. § 2.
370 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
371 See, e.g., Ex parte Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111-12 (1948); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942).
372 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); cf. D. Aronowitz, supra note 36, at 19 (arguing that treaty provisions should get pre-
sumption of validity, regardless of justiciability). The conventional view of the political ques-
tion doctrine is that there are "certain constitutional questions which are inherently non-
justiciable. These 'political questions,' it is said, concern matters as to which departments of
government other than the courts, or perhaps the electorate as a whole, must have the final
say." L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-13 (1988).
373 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (President
was within executive authority when, acting on congressional authorization, he proclaimed
sale of arms to countries in conflict illegal).
374 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 141-43 (1972); see D. Aronowitz, supra
note 36, at 15-16.
375 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
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als may have some capacity to frustrate the goals of an otherwise valid
treaty. In the arms control arena, for example, private citizens might
interfere with the implementation of a treaty inspection provision.376 By
physically disrupting the activities of inspection personnel or by interfer-
ing with the operation of necessary equipment, citizens could undermine
the effectiveness of a treaty verification regime.377 The United States
government would be responsible in the international arena for these
misdeeds, and could be considered in breach of its treaty obligations be-
cause of its failure to prevent violations, even by private citizens, occur-
ring within the the United States's jurisdiction and control.378 Criminal
penalties may thus be enlisted to help ensure the integrity of the govern-
ment's adherence to treaties. 379
Many of the inspection techmiques available for arms control pur-
poses raise fourth amendment concerns. Two fundamental issues-who
is inspected and who is inspecting-must be addressed before the specific
constitutional ramifications of these techniques can be pursued.
In most arms control inspections, the only plausible target of inves-
tigation is the United States government-its facilities, its records, and
its employees in their official capacities. The Soviet Union might wish to
apply the full panoply of potential inspection activities against the United
States government, exercising its rights as permitted by a future treaty:
(a) to install seismic instruments at United States nuclear testing facilities
376 In all countries, dissident elements may have at least some ability to disrupt government
policy, but that potential is probably greatest in the liberal democracies. See Zile, Sharlet &
Love, supra note 36, at 3.
377 For example, an implacable private opponent of a treaty might construct a facility that
was, to Soviet satellite NTM, indistinguishable from a Minuteman ICBM silo. Even if such a
facade were never armed with a missile, it would be a matter of concern to thq Soviet Union,
and the United States government could not escape responsibility merely by asserting that this
was a private act. The SALT II Treaty explicitly prohibits circumvention of its provisions,
"through any other state or states, or in any other manner." SALT II Treaty, supra note 59,
art. XII, 18 I.L.M. at 1155; see S. Rep. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). While this
provision was addressed principally to other concerns, it would be relevant to government
violations effectuated under the guise of private activities.
378 Governmental responsibility for treaty violations by its subjects is a well-established
principle. "For in vain would nations in their collective capacity observe these universal rules,
if private subjects were at liberty to break them at their own discretion .... 4 Blackstone,
Commentaries * 68 (1775).
The Outer Space Treaty expressly contemplates activities in space by nongovernmental
entities, and levies upon governments the responsibility for ensuring compliance by their citi-
zens. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 61, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 6,
610 U.N.T.S. at 120. Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention directs each party, in
accordance with its constitutional processes, to "take any necessary measures to prohibit and
prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention" of controlled
weapons. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 174, art. IV, 26 U.S.T. at 588, T.I.A.S.
No. 8062, at 6, 11 I.L.M. at 312.
379 Sohn, Responses to Violations: A General Survey, in Security in Disarmament 180
(1965).
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in order to estimate test yields more accurately;380 (b) to plant "black
box" sensors inside a federal nuclear enrichment facility in order to mon-
itor the output and status of special radioactive materials; 381 (c) to in-
spect logs and accounts at federal facilities involved in fabricating
nuclear weapons in order to guard against excess production;382 (d) to
interrogate or medically examine military personnel involved in chemical
weapons handling in order to investigate possible leaks or accidents; 383
(e) to install electronic surveillance devices in areas of major military
maneuvers in order to verify limits on the size or purpose of activities; 384
and (f) to send designated personnel to conduct on-site inspections of
United States mobile ICBM deployment areas in order to ensure that
only permitted numbers and types of missiles are deployed. 385
No constitutional issues are raised by any of these verification activi-
ties. 386 The national government itself has no constitutional rights, and
it may agree to grant foreign inspectors access to government facilities,
records, and weapons. 387
However, there are numerous circumstances under which Soviet
arms control inspectors might legitimately seek access to private United
States persons and property. 388 These verification activities could be as
broad and as variegated as those directed against the government, includ-
ing exercising the right: (a) to focus satellite NTM on a citizen's back-
yard, revealing all activities, including those conducted after dark and
behind ground-level obstructions, in order to check for the presence of
illegal missiles;389 (b) to place sensors inside privately owned chemical
380 See notes 90-115 and accompanying text supra.
381 See notes 269-72 and accompanying text supra.
382 See notes 286-93 and accompanying text supra.
383 See notes 294-98 and accompanying text supra.
384 See notes 299-307 and accompanying text supra.
385 See note 316 and accompanying text supra. Such an extensive inspection regime has
been contemplated by top United States government officials. For example, as then-Secretary
of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr., noted: "The Navy stands ready to accept whatever intrusive
means of arms control inspection, including allowing Soviet inspection teams aboard our ships
. " U.S. Navy Said Ready to Aid Arms Control, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1985, at A28.
386 Numerous statutory and regulatory provisions of current United States law would, how-
ever, have to be modified to permit these activities. Laws regarding classification, visas, and
access to records, for example, would require detailed review prior to the implementation of
Soviet inspections. See D. Aronowitz, supra note 36, at 102-14.
3W7 L. Henkin. supra note 374, at 190.
-188 The problem of inspectors' access to private facilities is not identical in the United States
and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, privately held premises (buildings or land associ-
ated with the relics of private enterprise in microfarming, artisans' trades, and crafts) are too
few and too small to be of substantial interest to American inspectors. H. Berman & P.
Maggs, supra note 36, at 37; Zile, Sharlet & Love, supra note 36, at 275-76.
-89 United States law enforcement officials are already engaged in practices analogous to
these hypothetical arms control inspection measures. Such practices may provide useful prece-
dents for Soviet inspectors under a future treaty. The Department of Energy, for example,
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research laboratories or factories to monitor processes therein;390 (C) to
review corporate records and accounts at private munitions factories in
order to ensure that the declared inputs and outputs are accurate; 391 (d)
to examine workers at uranium mines or processing plants to assay expo-
sure levels;392 (e) to install wiretaps or listening devices at private com-
munications installations to determine that their ostensible purposes are
the true ones; and (f) to conduct on-site inspections of privately owned
space vehicles and launchers to ensure that they do not represent covert
circumventions of restrictions on the government space program.393
Inspection rights may be sought in these specific situations for a va-
riety of reasons. First, the individual or corporation under scrutiny may
be directly involved, as a government employee or contractor, in a con-
trolled governmental weapons program. 394 Second, the target may be
currently oversees the activities of a Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST); its function is
the covert detection of nuclear-armed terrorists. In responding to threats or warnings, NEST
experts have attempted to identify and locate nuclear materials without alerting the public to
the danger. They have walked and driven through crowds of tourists in the District of Colum-
bia, for example, in casual attire and in unmarked vans laden with radiation detectors. Simi-
larly, they have searched six major corporate installations in Los Angeles while disguised as
ordinary businesspeople, with sophisticated sensors concealed inside conventional briefcases.
Valentine, Nuclear Threat, Wash. Post, June 21, 1983, at C7.
390 See note 181 and accompanying text supra. Some private chemical manufacturers are
capable of producing chemical weapons. See Drozdiak, Bonn Denies Iraq Using W. German-
Made Plant for Poison Gas, Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1984, at A15.
391 See notes 286-93 and accompanying text supra. Clandestine weapons factories have pro-
duced billions of dollars worth of illegal arms before interdiction by the FBI. See, e.g., Horn-
blower, 8 Held in Plots to Sell Weapons to Iran, IRA, Wash. Post, July 28, 1983, at Al.
392 See note 297 and accompanying text supra. Medical examination of workers and envi-
ronmental examination of surrounding air, soil, and water have been utilized in the uranium
industry to assess the significance of accidents. See Plant in Ohio Leaks the Gas that Killed
Worker Last Week, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1986, at A13.
393 See note 318 and accompanying text supra. Private industry's role in the space market
is increasing with private companies building or purchasing launchers and satellites to lease on
a commercial basis. See J. Fawcett, Outer Space: New Challenges to Law and Policy 38-39
(1984); Martin Marietta Forms Unit to Sell Commercial Rockets, Wash. Post, May 4, 1987,
Wash. Bus. at 25. The sale of LANDSAT, and its enhanced operation by commercial enter-
prises, together with anticipated tax concessions for other space activities will further heighten
private interests in space. See Carroll, New Satellite Technology Committee Proposed, Nat.
Resources L. Newsl., Winter-Spring 1985, at 1. But see Tucker, U.S. May Restrict Satellite
Photos, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1987, at F1 (government seeks national security restrictions on
private use of remote sensing); Tucker, Fund Battle Imperils U.S. Space Photos, Wash. Post,
Feb. 23, 1987, Wash. Bus. at 1 (funding cutbacks threaten economic viability of private
LANDSAT operation).
394 Most nuclear weapons work in the United States is performed by private corporations or
universities under contracts with the Departments of Defense or Energy, typically in facilities
that are government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO). These contractors employ an esti-
mated 52,000 to 68,000 people in the nuclear weapons industry, with installations in 13 states.
Hearings on H.R. 6151 Before the House Armed Services Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1982) (statement of Herman Rosen, Assistant Secretary For Defense Programs, Dep't of En-
ergy); America's 50th Biggest Business, Discover, Aug. 1985, at 24, 28; Morrison, Energy
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engaging in an activity that is sequentially related to weapons, such as
developing raw materials with numerous applications. 395 Third, despite
the fact that there may be only a superficial similarity between the tar-
get's activities and the government's activities, the foreign inspectors may
feel the need to explore all possibilities.396
Virtually all private United States persons may be subject to some
form of inspection if the Soviets suspect that benign appearances may be
camouflaging deliberate United States treaty violations. Thus, Soviet in-
spectors might suspect that excess missiles were being illegally stored in a
private citizen's backyard;397 that almost any moderate-sized office build-
ing or warehouse could be converted into a modest chemical weapons
facility; and that almost any plot of land, body of water, or the atmos-
phere could be utilized as a covert testing ground for small nuclear de-
vices. Even if such elaborate, costly, and hazardous deceptions appear
unlikely, they will have to be considered in a worst-case analysis by in-
spectors. Thus, future arms control inspectors may express interest in
frequent and extended inspections of private United States enterprises,
homes, and people.3 98
The second key variable in this general analysis is the nature of the
inspectorate, specifically the degree of involvement by the United States
government. 399 Three paradigms apply.
Department's Weapons Conglomerate, Bull. Atom. Scientists, Apr. 1985, at 32.
395 A prosaic example of a situation in which inspection of civilian industry would shed
light on military plans was given by retired Admiral Noel Gaylor: "[I]f we could monitor the
communications of laundry facilities at Soviet ports, we could probably get excellent strategic
warning of when the surface and submarine forces were about to put to sea or had returned to
port." P. Bracken, supra note 249, at 41.
396 Some arms control proposals differentiate between declared facilities (those sites known
to be associated with the weapons under control) and undeclared facilities (all other sites) with
greater inspection rights accompanying the former category. Bloomfield & Henkin, supra note
308, at 115.
397 There have been instances of private laboratories in residential neighborhoods engaging
in experiments with highly toxic substances without the knowledge of local residents. See, e.g.,
Zibart, Nerve Gas Testing Unleashes Cloud of Controversy in Montgomery, Wash. Post, May
2, 1985, at Cl.
398 As early as 1951, Soviet United Nations representative Andrei Vishinsky attempted to
ridicule a United States proposal for broad inspection rights, posing the question: "Do you
want to inspect button factories?" Western interlocutors responded that they did. Those in-
spections were necessary to help confirm that the factory was making only buttons. Frye,
supra note 51, at 24.
399 In general, a nation has no jurisdiction to undertake law enforcement investigations or
other official inspections inside the territory of another state, absent permission from the host
government. Restatement supra note 361, §§ 431-432 (1986).
This Article proceeds on the assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union will
reciprocally inspect each other. There have been, however, numerous proposals to internation-
alize the inspection regime by having third parties, groups of nations, or permanent United
Nations-type civil servants, designated as inspectors. See A. Krass, supra note 50, at 376-77;
A. Myrdal, supra note 24, at 304-13. But see Effective Arms Control, supra note 193, at 126
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In some instances, the inspection might be conducted exclusively by
the Soviet Union, without any official United States association. This
would be true, for example, of certain Soviet NTM activities which do
not depend on United States participation for their success. Where there
is no United States government involvement in the Soviet inspection,
there may be no legal recourse available to an aggrieved United States
party.4o° The constitutional protections against unreasonable govern-
ment searches and seizures do not run against a foreign government.401
Further, it is probable that either the act of state doctrine402 or the
doctrine of sovereign immunity4 3 would preclude any other type of
suit that might otherwise be valid between two private litigants, such
as an alleged invasion of privacy4°4 or appropriation of trade se-
(verification by third parties highly unlikely).
There have also been proposals to create an International Satellite Monitoring Agency,
with a supranational organization operating its own remote sensors. W. Rowell, supra note
24, at 68. Moreover, other nations-notably China and France-reportedly are pursuing an
independent satellite photoreconnaissance capability. See Woods, Satellites: Communications,
Navigation, Military Reconnaissance, Mil. Tech., Apr.-May 1980, at 9.
400 The fourth amendment applies only to searches conducted with the active participation
of government officers. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
401 Searches and seizures conducted by foreign officials outside the United States are not
subject to constitutional review. Evidence resulting from foreign searches ordinarily may be
admissible in United States court proceedings despite inconsistency with United States norms,
unless United States officials were deeply involved in the search or the conduct of the foreign
police was egregious. United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982); Bruley v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 986 (1967); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 963 (1965).
402 The act of state doctrine precludes United States courts from ruling on the validity of
governmental acts of a recognized foreign country undertaken on its own territory. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); Restatement, supra note 361,
§§ 442-443.
403 The doctrine of sovereign immunity holds that a recognized foreign government or in-
strumentality may not be sued in United States courts, without its consent, on matters relating
to the conduct of its official duties. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abas-
teeimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965);
Restatement, supra note 361, §§ 451-463; see also National City Bank v. Republic of China,
348 U.S. 356 (1955) (foreign sovereign gives implied consent by instigating litigation). Actions
of Soviet arms control inspectors conducting official inquiries inside the United States would
ordinarily be covered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, with the possible exception of
disputes arising over the commercial purchase of food, transportation, or other goods and
services inside the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982).
Diplomatic immunity also might be extended to Soviet inspectors. See Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
404 The tort of unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another is now well recognized.
It provides a damages remedy for nongovernmental infringements upon the privacy of an-
other, regardless of whether any use is made of the information tortiously acquired. See Pear-
son v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
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crets.4° 5 However, it is important to note that without United States
government sponsorship, Soviet inspectors would lack the element of
compulsion, and would not be authorized to require disclosures of pri-
vate information or to demand access to private property.
In the second category of possible inspectorate arrangements, the
United States government is fully and officially involved in the inspection
conducted inside the United States by Soviet personnel.40 6 This would be
the case, for example, with potential on-site inspections of private United
States chemical factories in connection with a future chemical weapons
treaty. In such a case, United States government host personnel would
likely accompany the Soviet inspectors, assisting them in their duties,
perhaps independently replicating their measurements, 4° 7 and enlisting
the power of domestic law to ensure citizen compliance with the inspec-
tion mechanisms. 40 8 In that event, Soviet inspectors would stand pre-
cisely in the shoes of United States officials;40 9 the Soviets would have the
same rights, and, because of United States cooperation, would be subject
to the same limitations that would govern an inspection by United States
officials alone.
Finally, in the third inspectorate category, the relationship between
the United States government and the Soviet inspectors is more ambigu-
ous, and the applicability of domestic United States law is more problem-
4o5 A copyright action may be brought against a foreign sovereign pursuant only to a spe-
cific international agreement, such as those affording protection to intellectual property. See,
e.g., World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28
U.S.T. 7645, T.I.A.S. No. 8733.
406 This situation is analogous to the activities of private security forces when they are oper-
ating under the licensure of, or in close cooperation with, local police. Under those circum-
stances, and others in which private individuals perform governmental operations, the fourth
amendment's protections apply under the so-called public function doctrine. See Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
407 Under the PNET, for example, host party personnel accompany inspecting personnel
throughout the entire inspection. PNET, supra note 89, Protocol, art. V, § 7, 15 I.L.M. at 898,
ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 185.
United States and Soviet negotiators have recognized the necessarily cooperative nature of
an OSI. Although the inspectors would need to conduct the inquiries themselves, without
interference from the host, they would more conveniently rely upon the host for numerous
support services, such as food, transportation, and, if necessary, the operation of certain equip-
ment. Heckrotte, Negotiating with the Soviets, Energy & Tech. Rev., May 1983, at 10, 14.
408 One peculiarity unique to arms control inspections arises from the difficulty in, and the
importance of, convincing a foreign sovereign-in addition to the domestic audience-that the
relationship between the United States government and suspected violators is an adversarial
one, not collusive. See L. Henkin, supra note 36, at 21-22.
409 Nonetheless, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see note 403 supra, as well as by
a treaty's direct conferral of diplomatic privileges and immunities, the Soviet inspectors and
their government would be immune from lawsuits in United States courts unless they had
waived immunity. An aggrieved plaintiff might then seek relief from the United States
government.
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atic. 410  If the United States government authorized, but did not
participate in, a Soviet inspection, it is not clear whether United States
citizens targeted for inspection would have a right to sue the federal
government.411
This Article assumes the second model: Soviet arms control inspec-
tors perform detailed examination procedures inside the United States at
their own initiative, pace, and direction, but with guidance and support
from United States officials. Where necessary, United States officials pro-
vide lawful force to compel inspection to the maximum constitutional
limits.
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF INSPECTIONS
A. Three Types of Investigations
Official United States government attempts to gather information
about the activities of persons within its jurisdiction412 are subject to con-
stitutional scrutiny under a variety of standards. This section identifies
410 Although the courts have not fashioned an exact standard for determining when the
government is sufficiently involved in security operations conducted by private persons to man-
date application of constitutional guarantees, factors for judicial consideration have been sug-
gested. See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[T]wo critical factors
.. are whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and...
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to fur-
ther his own ends." (citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1981)));
see also Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1968) (fourth amendment
applies to raids by foreign officials "only if federal agents so substantially participated in the
raids so as to convert them into joint ventures between the United States and the foreign
officials"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969).
411 Litigation with regard to such an inspection might arise in several ways. First, a private
plaintiff could seek relief through declaratory judgment or injunction. Second, the plaintiff
could claim that the search was a constitutional violation, such as a taking of property requir-
ing compensation. Third, the person could allege a violation of the common law tort of inva-
sion of privacy. Fourth, a citizen could resist the inspection, and then challenge its
constitutionality in defending a subsequent criminal prosecution. Fifth, a person could sue for
the constitutional tort of governmental invasion of privacy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982), or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (fourth amendment violations by federal
agents give rise to action for damages). Cf. Carlson v. Green, 466 U.S. 14 (1980) (action could
be under Bivens or FTCA for violation of eighth amendment rights).
An issue arising under all of these paradigms is the legality of the United States govern-
ment's delegation of inspection powers to foreign personnel not subject to the Constitution and
not sworn to uphold it. See L. Henkin, supra note 36, at 55-58. However, the government has
delegated analogous powers to state officials and private individuals without serious challenge.
See D. Aronowitz, supra note 36, at 74-75.
412 The fourth amendment protects all "persons" located within United States borders, in-
cluding citizens, aliens, see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973),
illegal immigrants, see United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975), and corpora-
tions, see G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
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three types of investigation: (1) activities that are not considered searches
under the Constitution; (2) administrative searches subject to an interme-
diate level of constitutional scrutiny; and (3) searches subject to the full
scope of the fourth amendment's protections. Although these three cate-
gories do not encompass every type of criminal and administrative
search,413 they help demonstrate certain general principles. These princi-
ples, in turn, point to the appropriate standards which may be developed
to limit the scope of potential arms control verification measures.
1. Non-Searches
Certain types of government investigations are not considered
searches in the constitutional sense, and are therefore essentially left un-
regulated. The most obvious non-searches are those that fall within the
plain view doctrine. Under this doctrine, a government agent, even with-
out a warrant or other special authorization, while located in a place he
or she has a right to be, may lawfully observe anything accessible by
ordinary human senses.
The landmark decision of Katz v. United States414 focused attention
upon the fourth amendment's protection of a "justifiable expectation of
privacy":
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection....
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.415
Thus, courts have determined that law enforcement officers are not con-
413 For a general discussion of limitations upon compulsory fact gathering, see W. LaFave
& J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 76-213 (1985); W. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and
Confessions (2d ed. 1987).
414 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court determined that the constitutional protections
of the fourth amendment applied to a police wiretap of defendant's telephone conversation
conducted from a public telephone booth. Id. at 353. Although the walls of the booth were
partially constructed of glass, and anyone could see the defendant making the call, the Court
ruled that he retained an expectation that no one would hear the conversation. Id. at 352.
415 Id. at 351. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, which has been cited as the leading
exposition of the Court's ruling, elaborated a two-part test for fourth amendment protection:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is
what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that ques-
tion requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that has emerged
from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhib-
ited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements
that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention
to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 351 (majority opinion)).
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ducting searches when they (a) look, while standing on a public walkway,
through an open window or doorway into a building;416 (b) listen, while
in a public hallway or an adjoining room in which they are lawfully pres-
ent, to a conversation occurring too loudly behind closed doors;417 and
(e) smell, when near a motor vehicle or dwelling, the odors emanating
from inside.418
Courts have also held that certain enhancements of an investigator's
ordinary senses do not create a search of constitutional dimensions. Ar-
tificial illumination, for example, such as that provided by a flashlight,
does not jeopardize the lawfulness of a warrantless sighting.419 Similarly,
an investigator's reliance upon binoculars does not constitute a search, 420
when the object under scrutiny was visible by unaided eyesight ad the
binoculars were used to provide a clearer image.421 In addition, courts
have held that investigators may use dogs trained to detect the scent of
narcotics without triggering fourth amendment concerns.4 22 Where arti-
ficial aids greatly enhance the ordinary powers of human perception,
however, the government conduct may be deemed a search subject to
fourth amendment standards because, according to some courts, the tar-
get is not exposed to plain view.423
In addition to the method of observation, the plain view cases also
416 See United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1979); United States v. Conner, 478 F.2d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hana-
han, 442 F.2d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1971).
417 See United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941
(1979); United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032
(1969).
418 See United States v. Martinez-Miramontes, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 897 (1974).
419 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927); United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d
360, 366 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Cheatwood, 575 F.2d 821, 824-25 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 853 (1978); United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972).
But see State v. Schmidt, 359 So. 2d 133, 135-36 (La. 1978) (police use of flashlights not
covered by the plain view exception).
420 United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
833 (1981).
421 See United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
939 (1982); People v. Arno, 90 Cal. App. 3d 505, 509, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (1979).
422 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d
1289, 1289 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); United States v. Viera, 644
F.2d 509, 510-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d
880, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1976).
423 See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Kim,
415 F. Supp. 1252, 1252-56 (D. Haw. 1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496, 500,
531 A.2d 964, 966 (1981). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-39
(1986) (use of photos taken by aerial camera not prohibited under fourth amendment);
Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1966) (use of scintillation detector to sense
radiation emitted by large quantity of wristwatches was not search where device was operated
in public hallway outside defendant's apartment).
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often turn on the law enforcement officer's legal right to be present in the
place from which the observations were made.424 Officers have a right to
stand on public lands, on business premises, and in public establish-
ments.425 A cooperating neighbor's premises also may provide a valid
vantage point.426 When police must climb fences or utilize remote obser-
vation posts because the target of their observations is otherwise shielded
from scrutiny, courts have ruled that the object was deliberately with-
drawn from plain view and was therefore embraced by the Katz "expec-
tation of privacy" protection.427
An important branch of these investigator location cases concerns
aerial overflight which permits observation that would be impossible
from the ground.428 The operation of remote sensors in overflight has an
international law dimension,429 but for purposes of United States consti-
424 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 466 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 246 (1968) (per curiam).
425 See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (not search for police to look inside automo-
bile for vehicle identification number; handgun found during process admissible evidence);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (when home "is converted into a commercial
center to which outsiders are invited" it does not deserve full range of fourth amendment
protections normally accorded home); United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350, 1360-61 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973) (customs search of contents of car, while in hold
of ship on pier and while later parked on street permissible as border search; conversations
heard through hotel wall and observations made with naked eye through keyhole within plain
view); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1012
(1970) (observation of motel room bathroom from parking lot within plain view); State v.
Lund, 409 So. 2d 569, 570 (La. 1982) (alleged buyer and seller of narcotics had no reasonable
expectation of privacy on premises of bar where police observed them.)
426 See United States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D.D.C. 1972); Wheeler v. State,
659 S.W.2d 381, 386 (rex. Crim. App. 1982).
427 See, e.g., State v. Kender, 60 Haw. 301, 305-06, 588 P.2d 447, 450 (1978). A higher
degree of care might be required to demonstrate the intention to remove from public scrutiny
objects or activities in open fields. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
428 The public's right to use navigable airspace is well established. United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). Unless the inspectors' aerial overflights were so frequent, low, and
noisy as to seriously disrupt activities on the ground, thus constituting a fifth amendment
taking, the landowner would have no legal basis for complaint or compensation. See Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962).
The United States is empowered under international law to exclude, permit, or regulate
domestic air traffic in any way it sees fit. See M. Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to Interna-
tional Law 286-88 (5th ed. 1984). This power could be exercised to permit and control the
aircraft reconnaissance activities of Soviet inspectors.
The international regime for outer space, however, is very different. The Outer Space
Treaty denies claims of national sovereignty over space. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 61,
art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, at 4, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
429 The Soviet Union was an early opponent of satellite observation, labelling it espionage
and a violation of Soviet airspace. However, in 1963, as the Soviet Union developed its own
satellite reconnaissance capability, it abruptly reversed its position and endorsed remote sens-
ing. See G. Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role of Informal Bargaining 19-90
(1983).
In 1986, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space approved 15
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tutional law, the recent Supreme Court decisions in Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States430 and California v. Ciraolo431 provide substantial
guidance.
In Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an
aerial observation, without a search warrant or other judicial authoriza-
tion,432 of a two thousand acre Dow Chemical Company manufacturing
facility.433 The inspection, an adjunct to the EPA's ongoing investigation
of the Dow plant's air pollution emissions, 434 evaded the company's se-
curity system which had effectively barred ground-level observation of
the facility.435 Overflight permitted the EPA to photograph "a great deal
more than the human eye could ever see,"'436 including objects as small as
one-half inch in diameter.437 The Dow plant was near a local airport,
and innocent overflights were common,438 but the Dow security force
monitored local aircraft, identifying any that made repeat or otherwise
suspicious passes.439 Dow wanted to deter its industrial competitors
from acquiring valuable trade secrets through observation of the details
draft principles governing remote sensing. These principles reject the notion that an observed
nation's permission is required prior to remote sensing or to the dissemination of the derived
information. See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, United Nations, Draft Prin-
ciples on Remote Sensing, 25 I.L.M. 1331, 1331 (1986); Bunn, Open Skies for Missile Killers,
Arms Control Today, May 1987, at 14.
430 476 U.S. 277 (1986).
431 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
432 The overflights were conducted by a private company via low-flying aircraft equipped
with a precision aerial mapping camera, pursuant to specific EPA instructions. Dow Chem.
Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
433 The facility consists of separate buildings, some connected by above ground piping con-
duits. Equipment, motors, storage facilities, and transfer lines are located in the spaces be-
tween buildings, but are not visible at ground level from outside the security perimeter. Dow,
476 U.S. at 229.
434 In September 1977, with Dow's consent, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of the
power houses. The EPA subsequently began preparations for a civil enforcement action. In
December 1977, the EPA requested a follow-up, on-site visit to include the taking of photo-
graphs. Dow objected to the proposed photography and denied EPA officials entry to the
plant. Instead of initiating judicial enforcement mechanisms, the EPA then arranged the over-
flights, which occurred on February 7, 1978. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307,
309-10 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
435 Dow's security system featured an eight-foot high fence, guarded gates, closed-circuit
television surveillance, motion detectors, an alarm system, roving patrols, and an annual secur-
ity budget of $3.25 million. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
436 Id. at 1367.
437 Id. at 1357.
438 Dow, 749 F.2d at 312-13.
439 Dow security personnel worked with the local police and airport officials to locate the
pilot, and examine any photographs that might reveal trade secrets. If the pilot/photographer
did not cooperate, Dow would commence litigation. 476 U.S. at 242 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Despite these precautions, Dow was not aware of the EPA's activity until several weeks after
the overflights. Id. at 243 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of the plant's physical layout.440 Placing an opaque cover over the entire
complex, which would have effectively prevented commercial espionage
activities, was prohibitively expensive.441 When Dow learned of the
EPA's overflights, the company brought suit, alleging a fourth amend-
ment violation.442
In the companion case, California v. Ciraolo,443 Santa Clara police
officials, acting on an anonymous telephone tip and without a warrant,
flew over the defendant's home, observing and photographing numerous
marijuana plants.444 These had been shielded from public view by two
high fences and the configuration of Ciraolo's house and yard.445 Based
on these observations, the police subsequently obtained and executed a
search warrant 446 to enter the property and seize the contraband, leading
to criminal prosecution of Ciraolo.447
The Supreme Court upheld both the Dow and Ciraolo investigations,
concluding that neither was a search under the plain view theory. In
each case, the Court implicitly acknowledged that the target had satisfied
the first part of the Katz test by manifesting an actual, subjective expecta-
tion of privacy.448 But in each case, the Court effectively held that the
second prong of the Katz test had not been satisfied because the ease and
frequency of aerial overflights in the two locales, and the conspicuous-
440 See id. at 232 n.10.
441 Id. at 229 n.1.
442 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled in favor of
Dow on the fourth amendment argument. The court determined that the overflight was an
administrative search and that the "pervasively regulated business" exception was inapplica-
ble, so a warrant was required. 536 F. Supp. at 1361; see text accompanying notes 489-502
infra. As alternative grounds, the court applied the Katz test, finding that Dow satisfied both
parts of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis. 536 F. Supp. at 1369. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that there was no search because Dow failed to
establish an expectation of privacy in the exposed plant area. 749 F.2d at 315.
443 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
444 The flight was not part of any routine area patrol, but was focused on the Ciraolo prop-
erty. Two police officers, flying at an altitude of one thousand feet, readily identified, without
artificial aids, marijuana plants growing in a 15 by 25 foot plot in the backyard. They then
photographed the area with an ordinary 35 millimeter camera. Id. at 209.
445 Additional protection against aerial observation, the construction of a roof, for example,
obviously would have reduced the yard's utility as an outdoor area. See id. at 224 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
446 Id. at 209-10.
447 The trial court denied Ciraolo's motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search,
and Ciraolo pled guilty to a charge of marijuana cultivation. See People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 1081, 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). The California
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the overflight was a warrantless search in violation of
the fourth amendment. Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The appeals court focused on the fact that
the overflight was directed at the curtilage, an intimate part of the defendant's dwelling, and
that the overflight had been undertaken for the specific purpose of observing this target. Id. at
1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
448 Dow, 476 U.S. at 236; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
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ness of the objects of the sightings, implied that the targets' privacy ex-
pectations were not reasonable." 9 The Court further held that if Dow or
Ciraolo valued their privacy, they must not only guard against earth-
bound observers, but they must also protect themselves against technol-
ogy that has made overhead observation commonplace.4 50 By failing to
anticipate observation, the targets-whether in a domestic backyard or in
an "industrial curtilage"45 1 -had unwittingly remained exposed to plain
view, and thus were beyond the scope of the fourth amendment's protec-
tion. The Dow and Ciraolo decisions will therefore entrench the recent
trend endorsing warrantless aerial observation of activities within plain
veiw.4 52 The legitimacy of aerial plain view inspections is now well
established.
Although objects and activities knowingly exposed to plain view are
not protected by the constitutional limits on searches, they may nonethe-
less benefit from constraints against warrantless seizures. Even where
visual observation of an item does not violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy, forcible entry and seizure of the item may violate such an expec-
tation.4 53 Ordinarily, a search warrant will be required to enter the pro-
449 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214-15; Dow, 476 U.S. at 239; see Note, Dow Chemical and Ciraolo:
For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 667 (1987). The
Court's articulation of this chain of logic is clearest in Ciraolo. Compare Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
211-15 with Dow, 476 U.S. at 236-39.
450 Commentators note that the EPA, the United States Geological Survey, the United
States Forest Service, and the Army Corps of Engineers, as well as commercial passenger
aircraft, regularly fly over almost all areas of the country, to make maps, to monitor vegetation
changes, or to observe flood conditions. Russakoff, Privacy Cases' Unlikely Allies, Wash.
Post, Dec. 9, 1985, at Al.
451 Dow contended that the entire two thousand acre plant was entitled to the higher stan-
dard of reasonable expectation of privacy customarily accorded to the curtilage area immedi-
ately surrounding a dwelling. 476 U.S. at 235. The EPA argued, conversely, that only the
lesser protection of open fields was appropriate for such an expansive entity. Id. at 231-32.
The Supreme Court took the view that for purposes of ground observation, the area might fall
someplace between the two standards, but since this case concerned aerial observation, the
open fields measure was correct. Id. at 236-38.
452 Most prior decisions included examination of the details of the overflight, considering,
for example, the height, frequency, and duration of the surveillance, the frequency of other
aircraft activity in the area, the nature and size of the target, the technological capabilities of
the aircraft and its sensors, and the purposes of the search. See United States v. Allen, 675
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v. B3assford, 601 F. Supp.
1324 (D. Me. 1985), aft"d, 812 F.2d 16 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1909 (1987); State v.
Ryder, 315 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Iowa 1982); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 277 S.E.2d
923, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 585 (1973). But see People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973)
(helicopter overflight at only 20 to 25 feet over defendant's backyard was noisy, probably ille-
gal, and an unreasonable government intrusion). For a review of aerial surveillance cases and
the different approaches courts have adopted in finding no warrant requirement, see Schmalz,
Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 409, 409 (1982).
453 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-65 (1971); United States v. Pacheco-
Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1976); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir.
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tected area to obtain the evidence. 454
Similarly, real evidence of plain view conversations or events may be
recorded on tape or film as long as the technology is no more acute than
human senses. If the devices greatly enhance the investigation of private
spaces, then a warrant will be required. 455
A second category of inspections which have not been considered
searches under the fourth amendment, and which might be replicated by
future arms control inspectors, concerns garbage. In general, abandoned
real or personal property that the former owner has voluntarily signalled
an intent to relinquish is unprotected from government search and
seizure.456 The Supreme Court has recently held that there is no expecta-
tion of privacy in trash that has been positioned for disposal by refuse
collectors.45 7 Emissions such as smoke or pollutants that escape from a
protected source into public space may also be observed, and samples
may be taken, without a search having taken place.45 8 When the debris is
exposed to the public, or set loose into public waterways or air currents,
no expectation of privacy lingers.
A third category of inspections in which no search is conducted,
occurs when police survey an individual's public activities, such as travel,
telephone, and mail, or business records held by others. Police are ordi-
narily free to "tail" a person in public places where there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy.459 Police may also enhance their ability to per-
1974).
454 Emergency circumstances or effective consent may obviate the warrant requirement.
See text accompanying notes 533-48 infra.
455 In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Supreme Court held that there was
no constitutional difference between: (a) a police agent participating in a conversation and
writing down notes afterwards; (b) a police agent recording the conversation with concealed
electronic equipment; and (c) a police agent carrying radio equipment that automatically
transmits the conversation to other agents listening elsewhere. Id. at 757.
456 See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859 (1983); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
457 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
458 See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1984) (air pollu-
tion inspector did not conduct search by examining smoke plume from defendant's factory,
even while standing on defendant's property); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1966) (en bane) (no search in using scintillation detector in public hallway to record radiation
emitted from apartment); Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 292 Md. 392, 474 A.2d 191
(1974) (no search conducted when state auto emissions inspections require insertion of testing
probe into tailpipe of idling vehicle).
459 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); see INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)
(no search occurred when INS agents walked through factory questioning all employees about
their citizenship and work papers, because conversations were voluntary and any restrictions
upon workers' freedom of movement were due to workers' voluntary obligations to employer,
not to law enforcement compulsion).
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form this function by implanting electronic beepers 460 or by enlisting ca-
nine assistance.461
Analogously, practices and devices which enable government inves-
tigators to identify the sources-but not the contents--of telephone and
mail communications are held not to be searches. For example, the in-
stallation of a "pen register," which automatically records all the num-
bers dialed from a particular telephone, is not considered a fourth
amendment search.462 It is installed at a central telephone facility and
does not access the content of the conversations. Pen registers serve cer-
tain record-keeping purposes for the telephone company, but they also
have obvious law enforcement applications. Similarly, courts have deter-
mined that there is no expectation of privacy in the information con-
tained on the outside of a mailed envelope. A "mail cover," in which
police record all the external information on, but do not open, the writ-
ten communications mailed to a particular address, is therefore not a
search.463
Of even greater potential impact, courts have held that there is no
expectation of privacy in-and hence no fourth amendment protection
of-individual or corporate business records held by a third party.464
460 Beepers enable police to follow a target inconspicuously, but most do not provide any
information other than location. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (beeper
concealed in package without defendant's knowledge did not violate fourth amendment when
brought into defendant's home because it was used primarily to track defendant on public
streets and his home was open to visual inspection from public highway); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1981) (concealed beeper permissible to follow movements on public roads,
but warrant required when package containing it is brought inside protected area of house);
United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981)
(installation of beeper on defendant's van did not impermissibly violate his expectation of pri-
vacy when used to track him on public streets); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983) (beeper legally attached to package did not
violate fourth amendment when brought into defendant's home).
461 Most jurisdictions permit the admission into evidence of the behavior of trained blood-
hounds or other dogs experienced in trailing criminals or fugutives. See J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 177 (3d ed. 1983).
462 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). But see People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135
(Colo. 1983) (en banc) (warrantless use of pen registers violates state constitution); State v.
Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (same). A court order is required for the use of a pen
register under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985). See notes 629-30 and accompanying text infra.
Federal courts have not yet addressed the issue of the warrantless installation of "trac-
ers"--devices similar to pen registers except that a tracer records the origin of incoming,
rather than outgoing, calls. Project: Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-85, 74 Geo. L.J. 499, 584 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Project].
463 See Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d
165 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1979); see also State v. Gallant, 308 A.2d 274
(Me. 1973) (approving warrantless use of radiographic scanner to examine unopened mail to
determine whether it contained packets of a powdery substance).
464 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (when information is divulged
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Therefore, the voluntary sharing-a practical necessity in modem com-
merce-of this financial information with another person is sufficient to
destroy the expectation that it will be protected from warrantless govern-
ment inquiry.
Finally, some jurisdictions have experimented with "electronic
leashes" for convicts serving under house arrest or other limited release
programs. The device is an irremovable anklet containing an electronic
transmitter that signals police whenever the wearer moves outside of a
predetermined territory. 465 Although these remote sensors have not been
fully tested in constitutional litigation, courts have recognized a greatly
diminished expectation of privacy for prisoners.4
66
These three categories, plain view, trash, and public movements,
represent the nadir of constitutional protection against governmental in-
vestigation. In each of them, law enforcement officials are empowered to
observe and inspect private activities and records without a search war-
rant or other such hedge against arbitrary behavior. The extent to which
arms control inspectors implementing a future treaty would be interested
in replicating these inquiries is considered in the next Part. The next two
Sections describe other types of situations in which official inspection is
more closely monitored.
2. Administrative Searches
Governments have historically conducted a variety of inspections of
private businesses and residences for purposes of ensuring compliance
with public health and safety codes. These investigations, typically un-
dertaken pursuant to state police powers but performed by nonuniformed
officials, involve inspections of business records and on-site examinations
of physical details.467 The primary purpose of such an inspection scheme
is not to apprehend violators or to accumulate evidence for a prosecu-
to bank, "depositor takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed to the
Government").
465 Jackson, San Diego Tries Innovative Electronic Home Jail, U.S.L. News, Calif. Ed., Jan.
1987, at 3.
466 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (fourth amendment inapplicable to searches of
prison cells since no expectation of privacy exists there); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(prisoners generally are ceded much lower expectation of privacy than other people and may
constitutionally be searched much more thoroughly); see Marx, The New Surveillance, Tech.
Rev. May-June 1985, at 43, 45-47.
467 Administrative searches typically focus on such things as electrical wiring, plumbing,
the accumulation of debris, and rodent infestation. Administrative searches also include those
that aid in the enforcement of zoning ordinances, fire codes, occupancy limitations, job safety,
and air pollution regulations. For statistics emphasizing the frequency and diversity of admin-
istrative searches, see See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 550-51 (1967); see generally Kress & Ian-
nelli, Administrative Search and Seizure: Whither the Warrant?, 31 Vill. L. Rev. 705, 716
n.445 (1986) (survey of law of administrative searches).
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tion, but to produce improvements toward compliance. 468 These inquir-
ies differ from ordinary criminal investigations in that administrative
searches are typically area-wide, rather than selectively focused on a par-
ticular target. 469 For these reasons, the law of administrative searches
may provide a suitable framework for organizing many of the activities
of future arms control inspectors.
Early case law held that administrative searches were wholly outside
the scope of the fourth amendment, and of only peripheral importance to
constitutional concerns.470 In 1967, the watershed cases of Camara v.
Municipal Court471 and See v. City of Seattle472 established that adminis-
trative searches are regulated by the fourth amendment, albeit with sub-
stantially different standards and procedures for obtaining a warrant or
subpoena. 473
In reversing prior case law, the Camara Court rejected a variety of
rationales for endorsing warrantless administrative searches. First, while
conceding that these regulatory inspections were "less hostile"474 than
criminal investigations, the Court determined that the threat of prosecu-
tion still underlay the administrative scheme as a deterrent to noncompli-
ance with the safety code, and that whatever the avowed purpose of a
search, its threatened disruption of the protected interests in privacy and
security was unmitigated. Thus, the Court concluded that it was "anom-
alous to say that the individual and his private property are fully pro-
468 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). Uncorrected violations of
safety codes can give rise to criminal prosecution, as can failure to comply with a valid admin-
istrative search warrant or subpoena. Nevertheless, the underlying motive of the regulatory
scheme remains to deter and to correct-rather than to punish-violations. When the inspec-
tors turn from an interest in a regulatory purpose to an interest in investigating crime, then a
higher level of procedural protection is required. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287
(1984).
469 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967).
470 See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
471 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
472 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
473 Most administrative searches are conducted with the consent of the owner or occupant
of the premises. Therefore, a warrant is usually sought only after consent has been denied. It
may appear that this sequence would create the opportunity for a determined code violator to
undercut the inspection by correcting any defects in the interval between the denial of consent
and the service of the warrant. In fact, however, correction of defects, rather than proof of the
violation, is usually the primary purpose of the inspection scheme, and this sequence may
actually reinforce compliance behaviors. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39.
Regarding dwellings, the Supreme Court has suggested that "warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused .... Id. at 539. Regarding businesses, the Court has
recognized a greater weight for the possible value of surprise inspections, for which warrants
would have to be obtained prior to seeking consent. See id. at 546.
474 Id. at 530. Administrative searches are generally less intrusive than other governmental
searches, and do not carry the social stigma of police inquiry. W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra
note 413, at 189.
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tected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is supected of
criminal behavior." 475
Next, the Court rebutted the arguments that warrantless adminis-
trative searches were already constrained by statute to reasonable
searches and that no greater protection would be feasible for inspections
of this magnitude. 476 In rejecting these arguments, the Court found few
restrictions upon the investigators' discretion as to when and where to
inspect.477 Addressing the infeasibility argument, the Court determined
that a flexible, workable warrant procedure could be fashioned. Finally,
while acknowledging the importance of administrative searches in mod-
em society, the Court stated that public interest demanded only that the
investigations be permitted to proceed, not that they be initiated without
warrants. 47
8
The major creative act of Camara and See was the articulation of an
unprecedented apparatus for authorizing administrative search warrants
and subpoenas.479 The Court sought to balance "the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.1480 In doing so, it departed
significantly from the case-by-case exploration of probable cause de-
manded in most other search contexts. 4 1 For an administrative search,
the warrant must be issued by an impartial magistrate,482 but only upon
a showing of a special type of probable cause that merely requires the
inspecting agency to demonstrate that it has established rational stan-
dards guiding the sequence of inspection, and that the proposed subject
of the investigation fits into that scheme. 483 This pre-established legisla-
475 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
476 Id. at 532.
477 Id. at 531-33 (practical effect of warrantless search provisions was "to leave the occu-
pant subject to the discretion of the official in the field... to invade private property which we
have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need
to search.").
478 Id. at 533.
479 An administrative subpoena does not authorize entry onto the premises. Rather, it or-
ders the records custodian to produce specified documents for perusal by agency personnel.
The quantum of evidence necessary for the issuance of an administrative subpoena is compara-
ble to that required for an administrative search warrant-far below the usual standard of
probable cause. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959
(1978); United States v. Bell, 564 F.2d 953 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
480 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
481 See notes 505-50 and accompanying text infra. If there is a particularized complaint, an
administrative warrant may be sought for a particular target. This inquiry is more focused
than the area-wide routine sanctioned in Camara, but still requires a lesser showing of prob-
able cause than would a criminal investigation. See In re Cerro Copper Prods. Co., 752 F.2d
280 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert F. Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d
1335 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978).
482 A clerk may issue an administrative search warrant or subpoena. See note 510 infra.
483 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. Both elements are essential. If there is no satisfactory set of
objective criteria for guiding the administrative searches in an area, then the warrant will be
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tive or administrative inspection plan need not have any particular rea-
son for focusing on an individual structure, but must derive from an
orderly plan. For example, inspecting all buildings in a region based
upon the age of the structure, particular area-wide conditions, or the pas-
sage of time since the previous inspection would reflect orderly plans.484
In authorizing this departure from individuated probable cause
analyses to a generic neighborhood inspection pattern based on gross
physical or demographic characteristics, the Camara Court cited three
considerations: the "long history of judicial and public acceptance" of
administrative inspections; 48 5 the difliculty of adequately protecting the
public interest with less intrusive inspection systems; 486 and the fact that
administrative searches provoke a relatively limited invasion of privacy,
being neither personal nor criminal in focus. 487 As long as the inspectors
establish a routine, nonarbitrary methodology for selecting target sites,
the Court held, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.488
A special type of administrative search deals with investigations of
pervasively regulated industries. 4 9  These industries, such as liq-
defective. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 452 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aff'd, 592
F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Northwest Airlines, 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd,
387 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978). Similarly, if objective criteria exist but are not adhered to in
selecting a particular subject of inquiry, the search is improper. United States v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., 723 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.
N.J. 1978).
484 Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. The Supreme Court has not explicitly authorized the use of
"hazardous industry" or "worst-first" criteria, designed to prioritize investigations in order to
devote more resources to inspection of the most probable and most costly offenders, but noted
their use in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 n.17 (1978). Lower courts, however,
have allowed the use of these criteria. See Nechy v. United States, 655 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.
1981); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977).
485 Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959)).
486 Id.
487 Id. The Court extended the same analysis, on similar grounds, to require administrative
warrants in searches of business premises. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 451 (1967).
488 The scope of the search must be confined to those means necessary to attain the permis-
sible purposes. Donovon v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1068-70 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(inspection must bear relationship to Occupational Safety and Health Act violation alleged in
complaint); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 626 F.2d 320, 322-24 (3d Cir. 1980) (administra-
tive inspection prompted by employee's specific complaint may reflect search only for evidence
regarding specific complaint, and may not become full scale inspection of entire facility). But
see In re Cerro Copper Prods., 752 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1985) (granting wall-to-wall inspection
following specific complaint); In re Inspection of Workplace, 741 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1984)
(same).
489 See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (warrantless search of mine pursuant
to federal statute not unreasonable). Only commercial properties can fit into this category.
The Supreme Court has implied that business premises may reasonably be inspected in many
more situations than private homes. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1966). This
greater inspection power is not unlimited, however, because "the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes." Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
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uor 490 and firearms, 49 1 are defined by an unusual degree of government
regulation. This class of cases is a narrow exception to the warrant re-
quirement; the simple application of labor or safety regulations does not
constitute inclusion in this class. 492 The theoretical support for this cate-
gory of exceptions is grounded in the tradition of close governmental
supervision of the particular industry. This history is said by the
Supreme Court either to reflect an "implied consent" to warrantless in-
vestigations by participants in the industry,493 or to create a diminished
expectation of privacy known to all in the industry.494
Only a few industries have been deemed pervasively regulated, and
most of these are unlikely to be of special interest to arms control inspec-
tors.495 Even in these industries, some courts have frequently sought ad-
ditional justification for a warrantless search.496 In certain instances, the
courts have also imposed additional procedural safeguards circumscrib-
ing warrantless searches by confining the time, place, and scope of the
government's disruption of privacy.497
490 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 80 (1970).
491 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1972).
492 See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
In New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987), the Supreme Court identified the three ele-
ments necessary for a particular industry to be considered pervasively regulated: (1) there
must be a substantial government interest in the regulation; (2) inspections must be necessary
to the regulatory scheme; and (3) the inspection plan must be regular and certain. Id. at 2644.
493 See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313.
494 The dissent in Marshall argued that the "consent" to pervasive regulation was fictional
and unnecessary to the effective administration of an inspection scheme. It urged that Con-
gress could reasonably provide for pervasive regulation on a basis broader than industry-by-
industry and without a long history of regulation. See id. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
longevity of the regulation has come to be considered less important than the pervasiveness
and the regularity of the oversight scheme. See United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n v. Radia-
tion Tech., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.N.J. 1981) (although nuclear industry has been regu-
lated only since 1954, comprehensiveness of oversight plan sufficient to justify surprise,
warrantless inspection).
495 See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mines); Pollard v. Cockrell, 478 F.2d 1002
(5th Cir. 1978) (massage parlors); United States ex rel. Tarraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682
(2d Cir.) (pharmacies), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); People v. Firstenberg, 92 Cal. App.
3d 570, 155 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1979) (nursing homes), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
A mine might be a target of inquiry for arms control inspectors monitoring compliance
with a test ban accord who seek confirmation that a mining explosion was chemical, not nu-
clear. Courts have declined to consider the chemical industry as pervasively regulated. See
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d
307 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
496 See United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.) (warrantless boarding of fishing
vessel justified not only by implied consent generated from pervasive regulation, but also by
importance of conserving salmon and honoring United States treaty with Indian tribes), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980).
497 See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Even in
closely regulated industries, the inspection provisions still must be tailored to the state's proper
objectives, and they must minimize the dangers inherent in the unbridled exercise of adminis-
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When a business is considered to be pervasively regulated, a statute
may grant government inspectors extraordinary oversight authority.498
In addition to the right to require and to inspect detailed records, in
certain instances, officials may demand entry into the facility "at all
times, '499 without a warrant, and may even mandate continuous access
for observers. 50 Interference with these activities may be made a crimi-
nal offense, 50 1 and Congress may authorize inspectors to employ force as
necessary to gain access to the target business in order to fulfill their
mission.502
3. Fourth Amendment Searches
Most government searches require procedural protections far more
extensive than those outlined above. Although a comprehensive survey
of fourth amendment issues is beyond the scope of this Article, this Sec-
tion highlights some of the characteristics of fourth amendment law
which are of special relevance to arms control inspections.
The fourth amendment 50 3 permits two types of government searches
and seizures: those undertaken pursuant to a warrant, and those under-
trative discretion."); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. United Airlines, 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976)
(Civil Aeronautics Board not entitled to injunction against airline granting government agents
immediate access to airline's buildings, land, accounts and records, without specification of
investigatory purpose); State v. Williams, 168 N.J. Super. 359, 403 A.2d 31 (App. Div. 1979)
(police officers may not rely on alcoholic beverage regulations granting administrative search
papers when pursuing warrantless investigation on tavern premises); State ex rel. Envtl. Im-
provement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 91 N.M. 125, 571 P.2d 117 (1977) (where
company was not engaged in pervasively regulated business, state agency required to obtain
search warrant to inspect company's premises).
498 For example, the right to inspect firearms dealers, who engage in pervasively regulated
industry, is so compelling that it even authorizes police to violate the usual security of a home
that is used for the purpose of making gun sales. Police may enter without a warrant to inspect
and seize weapons and business records. United States v. Cern, 753 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1985).
A similar result has been achieved in the closely regulated day care business. See Rush v.
Obledo, 756 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1985).
499 Slaughterhouses, packing plants, and other meat preparation facilities are governed by
21 U.S.C. § 606 (1982), which provides that "inspectors shall have access at all times, by day
or night, whether the establishment be operated or not, to every part of said establishment."
Id.
500 Federal inspectors are given their own sets of keys to obtain access to distilleries at any
time. 26 U.S.C. § 5203(a) (1982).
501 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513
(1912).
502 Distillery inspectors are authorized to use force, at night or day, when denied entry, 26
U.S.C. § 5203(b) (1982), and are authorized to break up ground, walls, or pipes as necessary to
conduct their inspections. Id. § 5203(d).
503 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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taken without a warrant that are not "unreasonable. ' ' 5°4 The requirement
of probable cause applies with equal force to searches of persons or
places, and to seizures of persons or things. A variety of government
investigatory techniques that are valid under the current state of consti-
tutional law could be utilized by arms control inspectors.
a. Requirements of a Warrant. Underlying the law of searches
is the preference for a warrant issued by a judicial officer and the con-
comitant insistence upon a finding of probable cause. The warrant is
basic because it "interposes an orderly procedure" 50 5 involving impartial
judicial review, free from the pressures and the adversarial perspective of
law enforcement.50 6 The insistence upon a finding of probable cause fur-
ther protects against unjustified and arbitrary searches and seizures.
A "neutral and detached magistrate" 50 7 acts as a buffer between the
citizenry and the police investigatory power.508 The issuing authority
must be sufficiently detached from the functions of investigators and
prosecutors to ensure a critical and disinterested review of a warrant ap-
plication.50 9 A court clerk or other nonlawyer may issue warrants, so
long as he or she is appropriately neutral and capable of determining
whether probable cause exists.510
A warrant may be issued only if the investigating officer provides
sufficient facts for the magistrate to make an independent finding of prob-
able cause. Probable cause to conduct a search or seizure may be proved
504 Warrantless searches and seizures are "per se unreasonable," Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967), but numerous exceptions legitimate an inquiry into the general reasona-
bleness of a warrantless search, see O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987) (endors-
ing "standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances"). Although the Court states that
lawful warrantless searches are confined "only to a few specifically established and well-deline-
ated exceptions," Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, one recent survey of the law in this area identified no
fewer than I1 such categories. Project, supra note 462, at 510 n.58. Nonetheless, warrants are
preferred; "in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fall." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965).
505 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
506 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948).
507 Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
SO8 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971).
509 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 450.
510 See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 352 (1972) (municipal clerk may
issue warrants for violations of municipal ordinances); People v. Mack, 66 Cal. App. 3d 839,
846, 136 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289 (1977) (nonattorney judge may issue warrant); State v. Sachs, 264
S.C. 541, 552, 216 S.E.2d 501, 507 (1975) (ministerial recorder may issue warrants). But see
People v. Escamilla, 65 Cal. App. 3d 558, 563-64, 135 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1976) (lay judge not
qualified to evaluate complex legal issues necessary to determine probable cause); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41(a) (stating that "search warrant may be issued by a federal magistrate or a judge of
a state court of record within the district wherein the property or person sought is located").
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by the direct observation of the police officer who is applying for the
warrant511 or, in some cases, by hearsay information provided to the affi-
ant by an informant. 512 Although information supporting the applica-
tion need not be admissible in a trial,513 it must provide a reasonable
basis for further focused inquiry.5 14
In Illinois v. Gates,515 the Supreme Court partially overturned years
of precedent 516 by instituting a flexible "totality of the circumstances"
test for evaluating statements of informants in warrant applications for
their credibility and basis of knowledge.517 The previous reliance upon
the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas518 and Spinelli v. United
States519 was criticized by the Court as overly rigid,5 20 but both elements
of the old standard-the inquiry into the informant's "basis of knowl-
edge" 521 and the "veracity" or inherent credibility of the particular infor-
511 See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 570 F.2d 324, 325 (10th Cir. 1978) (FBI agent's
investigations following anonymous tip provided sufficient basis for issuance of warrant).
512 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
114 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
513 See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (narcotics agent entitled to
consider informer's hearsay in determining probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe
violation of narcotics law committed); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949)
('There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [probable cause and guilt] as
well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the
quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.").
514 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at
114-15. Courts have been unable to provide a precise definition of the quantum of evidence
necessary to constitute probable cause. It is "more than bare suspicion," Brinegar, 388 U.S. at
175, but "'less than evidence which would justify condemnation' or conviction," id. (quoting
Locke v. United States, 7 U.S. 339, 348 (1813)). Some Supreme Court decisions seem to imply
a "more probable than not" test is necessary to support an arrest warrant. See W. LaFave & J.
Israel, supra note 413, § 3.3, at 113 & n.37.
515 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
516 Id. at 238. "We conclude that it is [wise] to abandon the 'two-pronged' test [veracity
and basis of knowledge] of Aguilar and Spinelli." Id. The abandonment of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test has been criticized as "most unfortunate," W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 413, § 3.3, at
115, and as creating "confusion and controversy in the lower courts." 1 W. Ringel, supra note
413, § 4.3(a)(1), at 4-33. However, in Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984) (per
curiam), the Court emphatically stated that Gates "did not merely refine or qualify the 'two-
pronged test,' " id. at 732 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238), but rejected the test as hypertechni-
cal and adopted a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. Id.
517 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
518 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
519 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
520 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 231. The Court held that it was artificial to accord the two
elements independent status "as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly
exacted in every case" since the two factors are so closely connected. Id. at 230.
521 Under the "basis of knowledge" prong, the alfiant must reveal how the informant ac-
quired the information provided. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. Direct
personal observation would obviously be the strongest evidence, but hearsay, if associated with
other indicia of reliability, was sufficient. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114;
see also United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1984) (evaluating information
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mation supplied522 -remain "highly relevant. ' 523 A warrant may not be
issued if the application is supported only by insubstantial rumor; there
must be a reliable basis for the belief that the search will be fruitful.
The particularity requirements of the warrant clause are designed to
protect against authorization of general, indiscriminate searches. 524 As
the Court wrote in Marron v. United States:525
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.526
Particularity also informs the determination of probable cause for a
search. A request for an overbroad investigation is often an indication
that there is inadequate reason to believe that a particular item is associ-
ated with a crime, or will be found at a designated place.527 Conversely,
a search request grounded on more than "loose, vague or doubtful bases
of fact" 528 is more likely to be focused upon precise places and things. 529
Few warrants can be so punctilious as to leave nothing to the discre-
tion of the executing officer,530 but the operational standard of precision
remains exacting. Inconsequential errors in specifying a particular ad-
dress may be overlooked, 531 but courts will invalidate catch-all clauses
provided by anonymous and identified informants under Gates test).
522 Under the "veracity" prong, the informant's reliability or general truthfulness was eval-
uated. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. It was typically established by
reciting the informant's previous record of accuracy. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 303-04 (1967). The magistrate could also credit informants' statements that were against
penal interest and, therefore, unlikely to be fabricated. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,
583 (1971).
523 Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. The Gates Court ruled that a deficiency on one prong of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test could be compensated for by an especially strong showing on the other,
"or by some other indicia of reliability." Id. at 233. The Gates Court continued to insist upon
independent review of the assertion of probable cause. Id. at 239.
524 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59
(1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
525 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
526 Id. at 196.
527 United States v. Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356, 364 (D. Haw. 1973); People v. Mangialino,
75 Misc. 2d 698, 705-06, 348 N.Y.S.2d 327, 336 (Monroe County Ct. 1973); W. LaFave & J.
Israel, supra note 413, § 3.4, at 133; 1 W. Ringel, supra note 413, § 5.6, at 5-24.
528 Go-Bart, 282 U.S. at 357.
529 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (particularity and probable cause
requirements help to ensure that police cannot use justification for narrowly confined search as
pretext for broader search).
530 See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976); W. LaFave & J.
Israel, supra note 413, § 3.4, at 132-33; 1 W. Ringel, supra note 413, § 5.5, at 5-18.
531 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1018-19 (1987) (upholding search of
two apartments under warrant issued to police officers who reasonably believed entire floor of
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purporting to authorize miscellaneous or generic searches.5 32
In certain circumstances, the police may investigate without a war-
rant. The two exceptions to the warrant requirement most relevant to
arms control treaties are exigency and consent searches. The most com-
mon type of exigency justifying warrantless entry into private premises
occurs when police have probable cause to believe that a crime is being
perpetrated inside a building and that prompt intervention will prevent
the act,533 rescue a victim, 534 or apprehend a suspect.535 Usually only
very compelling circumstances, such as gunshots 536 or hot pursuit, 537 are
sufficient to obviate recourse to judicial scrutiny.
A related type of valid emergency is warrantless entry to prevent the
imminent destruction or removal of important evidence. The Supreme
Court has indicated that this justification applies only when the exigency
is absolutely compelling (for example, when police can hear the evidence
being destroyed), 538 but lower courts have approved warrantless entry
when there was somewhat less certainty about the danger to the evi-
dence.5 39 The Supreme Court has noted favorably the less intrusive pro-
building constituted one apartment); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) ("It is
enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended.").
532 United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (invalidating warrant as overbroad
when greater specificity was possible); Montilla Records, Inc. v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 326
(1st Cir. 1978) (same). Less specific descriptions are permissible for contraband. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morisse, 660 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Giresi, 488 F.
Supp. 445, 457 (D.N.J. 1980). Some commentators have discerned a trend "reflecting increas-
ing judicial tolerance of broadly drafted warrants" in cases of white collar crime, straining the
requirement that documents to be seized be particularly described. Spix & La Terza, Tales of
White Collar Warrants, Trial, Sept. 1986, at 20, 21.
Police searching pursuant to a valid warrant are authorized to seize additional items,
unnamed in the warrant, if they are connected to a crime and are present in "plain view"
during the lawful search. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). How-
ever, a warrant authorizing a search for a particular item does not permit police to open and
peruse containers where the item sought could not possibly be found. See United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
533 See, e.g., People v. Berow, 688 P.2d 1123 (Colo. 1984).
534 See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 179, 347 N.E.2d 607, 610, 383 N.Y.S.2d
246, 249, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
535 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 392 (1978) ("When the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a
prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the
premises.").
536 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1980); Commonwealth
v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 898, 385 N.E.2d 227, 236 (1978); State v. Max, 263 N.W.2d 685,
688 (S.D. 1978).
537 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1975); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
538 See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
539 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1981) (warrantless entry
valid when arrival of television news crew increased risk of detection of surveillance and escape
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cedure of securing the premises to prevent the removal of evidence while
a search warrant is obtained.54° Thus, the definition of a valid warrant-
less emergency search is shaped not only by the importance of the target,
but also by the importance of speed and the danger that delay would
defeat the purpose of the search.
The other exception to the warrant requirement relevant to arms
control is consent. The consent must be voluntary, although proof of
knowledge of the right to withhold consent is not required.5 41 There is
no bright-line rule to aid arms controllers in judging the voluntariness of
consent; voluntariness is determined by the "totality of all the circum-
stances. '542 Individuals are free to waive certain constitutional rights in
employment and contract relationships,5 43 provided that the scope, dura-
tion, and terms of the waiver are reasonable. 544 The government may,
for example, require employees to submit to elaborate screening proce-
dures prior to awarding security clearances. 545 Whether blanket volun-
tary assent to broad searches can be made a condition of government
employment or contracts has not yet been tested.
Potentially even more problematic for arms control searches is the
scope and effectiveness of third party consent. The general rule is that
consent by a third person is effective against a defendant when the third
party's relationship to the premises or property is sufficient to establish
common authority over it.546
An employer generally has the authority to permit police to search
of suspects with evidence), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912 (1982); United States v. Campbell, 581
F.2d 22, 26, 27 n.7 (2d Cir. 1978) (warrantless entry valid when time to obtain warrant would
increase risk of detection of surveillance); United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 844 (D.C.
Cir.) (warrantless search valid because narcotics easily destroyed), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977); United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (warrantless entry valid to
prevent disposal of cocaine), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Rubin, 474
F.2d 262, 269 (3d Cir.) (warrantless entry valid when agents reasonably believed their surveil-
lance had been discovered and narcotics might be destroyed), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833
(1973).
540 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
541 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Prior to Schneckloth, waiver of
fourth amendment rights required that the strict "intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right" test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), be satisfied.
542 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
543 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 972 (1982); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
544 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980); Zapp v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 628 (1946).
545 The government may also constrain ordinary first amendment rights by requiring life-
time prepublication review of materials that relate to the individual's access to classified infor-
mation. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 516.
546 See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S- 164, 171 (1974) (roommate consented to search
of shared bedroom); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (co-owner of shared duffel bag
consented to search).
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all areas of the business premises, except for designated spaces, such as
personal lockers, clearly reserved for private use by an employee.5 47 As
the employee's claim to an expectation of privacy in the set-aside area
increases, the employer's ability to give valid consent to a search becomes
more tenuous.548
A warrant to search for documents may raise special constitutional
concerns. Generally, the government is empowered to require the main-
tenance of a wide variety of extensive records by individuals and busi-
nesses.549 The format, dates, and content of records may be specified in
minute detail, and compliance may be exhaustive and expensive.5 0
b. Electronic Surveillance. Electronic surveillance by telephone
wiretaps or eavesdropping "bugs" is covered by the fourth amendment,
regardless of whether the process of interception and recording is accom-
plished via physical trespass or remote acquisition. 55 The field is now
closely governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968,552 which largely incorporates the fourth amendment
safeguards developed in Katz v. United States.5 53
For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that, absent special
547 United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 364 (3d Cir. 1977).
548 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502-03 (1987) (extent of government em-
ployee's reasonable expectation of privacy regarding office, desk drawers, and files depends
upon particular circumstances of the case; validity of government intrusions upon protected
areas for work-related purposes and for investigation of work-related misconduct should be
judged by a standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances).
549 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) ("[I]t is sufficient if the
inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the informa-
tion sought is reasonably relevant.").
550 For nuclear power generating facilities, for example, the accumulation and retention of
required records is already a massive undertaking, and the accounts and reports likely to be
demanded for arms control purposes would simply be a small increase over those mandated
pursuant to safety, pollution, and financial regulatory schemes. For a sense of the pervasive-
ness of these regulations, and their impact upon the workers at one nuclear facility, see P.
Loeb, Nuclear Culture: Living and Working in the World's Largest Atomic Complex (1986).
551 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (defendant's constitutionally pro-
tected "reasonable expectation of privacy" violated by an electronic listening device attached
to a public telephone booth). Katz reversed Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457-66
(1928), in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone wiretap, accomplished without
physical entry into the defendant's property, was outside the scope of the fourth amendment.
552 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Title III authorizes interceptions for
investigation of only certain kinds of crimes, including offenses such as treason, espionage, and
sabotage. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The list would have to be amended to
include arms control treaty violations, or else a special exception could be made from Title III
prohibitions. Cf. id. § 2511(2)(e)-(f) (creating exceptions for governmental foreign intelli-
gence activity). Title III explicitly differentiates between wire, oral, and electronic communi-
cations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
553 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 242, 248, 679 P.2d 197, 201,
205 (1984); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I. 1985).
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circumstances, 554 a search warrant, in accordance with all the procedural
formalities, 555 is a prerequisite for the use of electronic listening devices
by law enforcement officials.556 In addition, the law requires minimiza-
tion of the interception of communications not directly related to the
crime under investigation.5 57 The single conspicuous exception,558 the
use of wired informants, remains outside the coverage of the fourth
amendment on the grounds that a target's voluntary conversations-even
when misleading as to the identity or intentions of an interlocutor-are
exposed to plain view.559
The Supreme Court considers electronic surveillance an extraordi-
554 Warrantless searches are authorized in defined emergency situations involving imminent
danger. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (Supp. IV 1986). There has been virtually no use of this
provision. W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 413, § 3.5(e) at 223; see also text accompanying
notes 617-633 infra (discussing national security surveillances). Application for a Title III
electronic surveillance order for federal offenses may be made only by a senior law enforce-
ment official, such as the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or Associate Attorney
General, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), or by the principal prosecuting attorney
for a state or political subdivision, for state offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The
Attorney General's power may not be delegated. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505,
512-14 (1974).
555 The application for an electronic surveillance order must recite, with considerable speci-
ficity, the details of the particular offense being investigated, the facilities where the communi-
cations will be intercepted, and the identities of the persons being investigated. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1)(b) (Supp. IV 1986). It also requires "a full and complete statement as to whether or
not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to
be unlikely to succeed if tried or be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c) (1982); see also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 70 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (suggesting that, due to
unusually intrusive nature of wiretapping, quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable
cause for electronic surveillance should be greater than that demonstrated for other fourth
amendment searches).
556 Title III governs the use of any "electronic, mechanical or other device... which can be
used to intercept a wire or oral or electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (Supp. IV
1986).
557 See id. § 2518(5); see also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (minimization
requirement satisfied, even though 60% of intercepted conversations were noncriminal);
United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1115 (3d Cir. 1985) (minimization efforts were accept-
able, given scope and stealth of conspiracy, even though 482 non-pertinent calls intercepted).
558 Electronic visual surveillance, such as observation by hidden cameras, is also an area of
emerging technology not currently covered by statute, and the fourth amendment standards
are unclear. See United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 1987) (novel
use of television surveillance has no statutory basis, but was valid under fourth amendment
warrant standards); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 104 (1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1984) (same),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 648-52, 422 N.E.2d 506,
513-15, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 853-55 (1981) (in absence of statutory guidelines regarding covert
video electronic surveillance, fourth amendment requires probable cause, particularity, mini-
mization, and absence of less intrusive means).
559 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 438-39 (1963); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
Title III does not require a warrant when one of the parties to the conversation consents
to the interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
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nary measure, not to be "routinely employed" 56° or "resorted to in situa-
tions where traditional investigative techniques would suffice. ' 561 It has
proven, however, to be an effective law enforcement device in particular
circumstances, 562 and is utilized frequently.5 63 The value of electronic
surveillance in national security cases, however, is less evident. 564
c. Interrogations and Inspections of People. The general ability
of the government to compel citizens to respond to questions concerning
potential criminal matters is beyond the scope of this Article. We need
only note that the process is fettered by numerous constitutional limita-
tions, that the boundaries upon these inquiries vary substantially accord-
ing to the nature and context of the proceedings, and that few arms
control applications seem very sensitive to such protections.
In the criminal law milieu, even the most informal police interroga-
tion, an investigatory "stop"-in which police question a suspect on the
street without consent and without grounds for arrest-is controlled by
the fourth amendment. In Terry v. Ohio,5 65 the Supreme Court deter-
mined that even this modest, temporary deprivation of liberty was a
seizure of the suspect, albeit one that could be deemed reasonable if pre-
mised on a lower-than-usual quantum of evidence.5 66 A stop may be
560 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).
561 United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974). The finding of "necessity" for
issuance of a wiretap warrant does not require that the wiretap be a "last resort" after all
convceivable alternatives have been exhausted. See United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272,
1276 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1433-34 (2d Cir. 1985).
562 Telephone interception has been called "the single most valuable weapon in law enforce-
ment's fight against organized crime." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 310 n.9 (1972).
563 Federal judges granted 289 applications for wiretaps or eavesdropping microphones in
1984, and state judges allowed an additional 512. This represents a total increase of 23.6%
over 1983 figures. Authorized Wiretaps Jumped 40% Last Year, Report Says, Wash. Post,
May 2, 1985, at A10. In 1971, 800 wiretaps were approved by courts and none were denied.
Lyons, Drop in Domestic Wiretaps Is Reported, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1972, at 17.
564 Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified that foreign agents "do not talk about sensitive
material under tappable circumstances," J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance 104
(1977) (citing quotations in Joint Hearings on Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Sur-
veillance Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 305 (1974)), and Attorney Gen-
eral Elliot Richardson concluded that in national security electronic surveillance, "you get a
lot of stuff and a lot of it, most of it, is useless." Id. Others, however, have credited electronic
surveillance with breaking the Walker spy ring and other such intelligence successes. See
Brown & Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Ex-
ecutive Order 112,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 Cath. U.L. Rev. 97, 103 (1985).
565 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
566 Id. at 16 ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
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made to investigate suspicious or ambiguous behavior,567 and a limited
frisk for weapons may be conducted without triggering higher standards
of procedure.5 68
When an "arrest" is effected, based on a warrant or other probable
cause, police may search a defendant for weapons or evidence.5 69 At this
point, the full scope of criminal procedure protections apply: Miranda
warnings must be issued,5 70 the accused may have the right to legal rep-
resentation, 571 and all the due process rights of pretrial and trial events
must be respected.5 72
In the administrative rather than the criminal setting, different types
of constraints guide an agency's authority to compel the production of
documents and testimony from private parties. Statutes may empower
agencies to require individuals and corporations to maintain specified
records and logs in a particular format, to make these records available
for agency review, and to submit periodic reports. 573 Similarly, an
agency may issue subpoenas to compel testimony on subjects within its
jurisdiction, even without a probable cause premise.5 74 As long as the
required report or testimony bears some reasonable relationship to mat-
ters properly under administrative review-and the investigation is not
"a governmental fishing expedition into the papers of a private corpora-
tion, on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime" 575 -
567 United States v. Hensely, 469 U.S. 221, 233-36 (1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411,418-21 (1981).
568 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-49 (1972).
569 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227-29 (1973).
570 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
571 Id.; Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478 (1964).
572 Delineation of the constitutional standards for due process hearings is beyond the scope
of this Article. It suffices to note that arms control inspectors will be bound to adhere to them.
These procedures, however, should pose no special problems for arms control, because the
criminal trial mechanism will be a relatively unimportant part of the arms control verification
apparatus. Arms control inspectors may have a tangential interest in seeing violators punished
by the criminal process, but they will not rely much upon these types of police work or trial
activities for basic data gathering.
573 See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 55-57 (1968) (Internal Revenue Code
required gambler to keep records pertaining to tax on earnings); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-43 (1950) (Federal Trade Commission could require periodic reports
on compliance with cease and desist order in determining whether basis for contempt proceed-
ing).
For many years the Supreme Court ruled that private papers (such as a diary or other
personal notes) were immune from seizure, even pursuant to warrant or subpoena. See, e.g.,
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). However, in 1976, the Court abandoned that
broad rule against compulsory production of incriminating personal documents. See An-
dreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-
401 (1976).
574 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United States v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 778 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1986).
575 FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
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production may be required.5 76
The fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion5 77 applies to interrogations in both the criminal and administrative
processes.578 In the context of arms control, however, the potential im-
pact of this protection is limited in several respects.579 First, the fifth
amendment shields only statements that might generate personal crimi-
nal liability; other damaging disclosures, harming personal or national
reputation, involving civil liability, or contravening federal treaty obliga-
tions, may not be withheld.5 80 Second, the privilege is available only to
people, not to corporations, and a records custodian may not refuse to
produce corporate documents that are incriminating.5 81 Finally, a grant
of immunity from the prosecution suffices to displace fifth amendment
protection. That is, when investigators grant immunity from law en-
forcement use of the compelled testimony, a witness cannot withhold
information. 582
Another topic of special interest involves polygraph tests.583 The
"lie detector" has been a subject of great controversy, 584 largely because
576 See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 708-09 (1980).
577 See U.S. Const. amend. V.
578 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
579 See J. Mashaw & R. Merrill, Introduction to the American Public Law System 560
(1975).
580 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1968) (Court will consider "substan-
tiality of the risks of [self-]incrimination" which must "not [be] triffing or imaginary.").
581 George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-86 (1911).
582 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 474-76 (1972);
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 448-59; Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 429-31 (1956).
Government employees or contractors, like others, may not be required to waive fifth
amendment privileges against self-incrimination unless they are offered appropriate immunity.
Only if they are immunized and still persist in refusing to answer questions or produce docu-
ments may they be discharged, have contracts revoked, or be jailed for contempt. Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sani-
tation, 392 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496-500 (1967).
Government opening of first class mail raises both first and fourth amendment issues. Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), instituted the warrant requirement for first class mail
on fourth amendment grounds. However, the Court has approved overnight detention of mail
pending issuance of a warrant. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970). The
Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the first amendment implications of mail open-
ings, W. Ringel, supra note 413, at 19-12, and except in unusual situations, greater authority is
granted to open mail to or from prisoners, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974),
and coming across international borders, United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19
(1977). Mail sent at lower than first class rates is also accorded less protection against war-
rantless openings. United States v. Riley, 554 F.2d 1282, 1283 (4th Cir. 1977); Santana v.
United States, 329 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1964).
583 See generally Abrams, Polygraphy, in Scientific and Expert Evidence 762 (E. Im-
winkelried 2d ed. 1981) (discussing evidentiary uses of polygraph tests).
584 See Moskowitz, Senate to Hear Arguments on Use of Polygraphs in Private Sector,
Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1986, at Wash. Bus. 9; Walsh, House Votes to Ban Polygraph for Most of
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:229
ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION
of its suspect validity.585 Under current practice, employees of the CIA
who have access to classified information must submit to random poly-
graph examinations.5 86 The Reagan Administration has begun to extend
the provision to all federal employees and contractors with top-level se-
curity clearances in order to uncover espionage and financial or other
problems that might make employees vulnerable to blackmail.5 87 In the
criminal setting, however, use of polygraphs may not be compelled.
5 88
Inspection of people may also provide relevant information for arms
control inspectors. However, medical or other intrusive examinations of
individuals would be problematic, given the heightened expectation of
privacy in one's own person. Access to existing medical records poses no
unusual problems; they are obtainable through legal process. Any claims
that assert the statutory doctor-patient privilege would be defeated by the
arms control treaty itself, or by implementing legislation.5 89 A reporting
requirement could also be implemented, compelling doctors and hospi-
tals to inform inspectors of treatment of a victim of radiation poisoning,
biological toxins, or other controlled substances.5 90
An inspector's ability to compel the administering of additional
medical tests, however, is more complex.591 Some types of body searches
Private Sector, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1986, at AS.
585 Lardner, Agencies Get Green Light for Lie Tests, Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1983, at Al,
A14. The Director of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Dr. John H. Gib-
bons, has said that "there is no scientific evidence to establish the validity of polygraph test-
ing." Id. at A14. Studies of polygraph reliability in criminal investigations show correct
guilty detections ranging from 17% to 99%. For the view that polygraph evidence is reliable
enough to be used in courts if a judge scrutinizes the circumstances and the testing technique,
see Abrams, supra note 583, at 800-04; Laurendi, Opposition to the Admissibility of Lie Detec-
tor Tests in Criminal Cases, in Scientific and Expert Evidence 805, 823 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed.
1981).
586 Tyler, Wider Polygraph Testing Approved by President, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1985, at
A4.
587 Id. The order applies to the 4550 State Department employees and contractors and
170,000 Department of Defense employees and contractors who have access to "sensitive com-
partmented information." Id.
58s Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
589 The physician-patient privilege is a creation of statute, unknown to the common law and
not of constitutional dimensions. C. McCormick, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evi-
dence 212 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). Accordingly, the applicability and the limitations of the privi-
lege may be shaped by ordinary legislation. See People v. Lay, 167 Misc. 431, 3 N.Y.S.2d 251,
aff'd per curiam, 254 A.D. 372, 5 N.Y.S.2d 535 (2d Dept. 1938), aff'd mem., 279 N.Y. 737, 18
N.E.2d 686 (1939) (privilege is statutory, subject to restriction).
590 Similar provisions, requiring reports about gunshot wounds, already exist. See, e.g.,
D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1361 (1981).
591 When dealing with virulent communicable diseases, public health officials have the au-
thority to compel individuals to undergo medical examination, see Huffman v. District of Co-
lumbia, 39 A.2d 558, 560 (D.C. 1944); Irwin v. Arrendale, 117 Ga. App. 1, 5-6, 8-9, 159
S.E.2d 719, 724, 726 (1967), to determine whether further measures, such as quarantine, may
be necessary. This power is liberally construed to protect the general public from contagion,
but it is confined to situations in which further spread of infection is deemed reasonably possi-
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are relatively innocuous; for example, taking samples of hair or finger-
nails may be likened to providing fingerprints or a voice or handwriting
sample. All are fourth amendment searches and seizures; none is testi-
mony for fifth amendment purposes,5 92 and all may be compelled on less
than the standard probable cause, even for persons not in police cus-
tody.5 93 Thus, temporary detention orders may be issued to permit brief
compulsory field stops to obtain fingerprints, blood samples, and the like,
when there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.5 94
ble. Huffman, 39 A.2d at 60; Erwin, 117 Ga. App. at 5-6..
Exercise of this power might assist arms control inspectors who were searching for evi-
dence of a widespread violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. However, the limita-
tions on this power would make it less relevant to the task of seeking medical corroboration of
a suspected violation at a chemical weapons or nuclear weapons facility. There, a victim might
be left with characteristic illnesses that were entirely noncommunicable and thus presented no
immediate justification for the involvement of public health officials. See Huffman, 39 A.2d at
562.
592 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7, 14 (1973) (physical characteristics of voice
are not protected by fourth or fifth amendment because not testimonial and constantly exposed
to public); see also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 (1980) (handwriting samples not
protected by fourth or fifth amendment); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1973)
(handwriting not protected by fourth amendment).
Although "the distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and com-
munications or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases," South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561 (1983), many of the sorts of real evidence sought by arms control
inspectors would be obtainable despite the fifth amendment. See P. Giannelli & E. Im-
winkelried, Scientific Evidence 53 (1986).
593 See note 592 and accompanying text supra. A variety of identification searches may be
administered to suspects lawfully in custody without any additional legal process. United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807 (1974) (once accused was lawfully arrested, warrantless
search of his clothes was lawful); United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1969)
(clipping few strands of hair of accused in custody was such a minor intrusion that warrant not
required).
594 The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that appropriate judicial process could permit
brief field stops, as well as removal to a police station, for simple identification procedures such
as finger-printing. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813-14 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394
U.S. 721, 727-28 (1968). These minor inconveniences are less significant than a station house
detention or arrest, so less procedural protection is required. Several states have adopted the
temporary detention order procedure, with different criteria for issuance of orders and differ-
ent types of investigations being conducted. See, e.g., People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18 (Colo.
1981) (en banc) (establishing conditions under which intrusions into privacy with less than
probable cause is reconcilable with fourth amendment); Baker v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1085 (Ind.
1983) (upholding arrest warrant for purpose of photographing and fingerprinting); District
Attorney v. Angelo G., 48 A.D.2d 576, 579, 371 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1975) (upholding procedure
for obtaining handwriting sample); W. Ringel, supra note 413, § 18-7. State courts are divided
on the appropriate standards for conducting these detentions, and the Supreme Court has not
yet considered the matter in depth. See P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, supra note 592, at 64-
69.
Other relatively inoffensive methods for gathering physical evidence have been approved
even in the absence of warrants. See, e.g., State v. Ulrich, 187 Mont. 347, 352, 609 P.2d 1218,
1221-22 (1980) (approving "neutron activation test" for gunpowder on defendant's hands, in-
volving running cotton swabs over defendant's hands without warrant, as incident to lawful
arrest); State v. Carillo, 122 R.I. 392, 398-99. 407 A.2d 491, 496 (1979) (upholding benzene
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:229
ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION
Searches that intrude into the body are viewed more critically, and
some courts have ruled that the taking of blood samples, for example,
may be compelled only in emergencies595 or pursuant to a warrant based
upon probable cause. 596 Procedures that have the potential to humiliate
or to debase the subject are accorded even closer scrutiny. Strip searches
and internal probes are viewed critically,597 and compulsory urine tests,
designed to determine drug usage in federal or other employees, are
controversial.5 98
At the high end of this spectrum of cases are those medical proce-
dures that are most invasive in the quest for evidence.5 99 Nonconsensual
test for presence of victim's blood on defendant's arm, involving application of chemical to
defendant's skin); Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (upholding
nonconsensual seizure of nonincarcerated defendant's urine for alcohol test).
595 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-69, 770, 771 (1966). Due to the evanes-
cent character of blood-alcohol content, a test may be taken promptly, without a warrant,
when time is of the essence and the extraction is performed in a reasonable, medically sound
manner, even when the defendant is unconscious. Id.; see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,
496 (1973) (potential destruction of evidence may justify warrantless confiscation of fingernail
scrapings).
596 See Mills v. State, 28 Md. App. 300, 307, 345 A.2d 127, 131-32 (1975) (no "exigent-
circumstances exception" to warrant requirements of fourth amendment where test is to deter-
mine defendant's blood type), afl'd, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976); Smith v. State, 557
S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (rex. Crim. App. 1977) (search warrant required for testing blood type).
597 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (police attempts to seize capsules
from defendant's mouth and later to compel stomach pumping are "conduct that shocks the
conscience" and resulting evidence is inadmissible); Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th
Cir. 1977) (requiring warrant for "painful and humiliating" seizure of pubic hair); People v.
Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 287, 578 P.2d 123, 127, 45 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1978) (warrant for body
intrusion may issue only upon finding of probable cause that intrusion will yield evidence of
crime, and balancing of reliability of method of intrusion, seriousness of offense charged, im-
portance of evidence, availability of alternative means, and intensity, discomfort, safety, and
embarrassment of intrusion). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979) (upholding
visual body cavity search of prisoners after contact visits with nonprisoners without warrant or
individualized suspicion).
5)8 See Vaughn, Axelrod & Gorman, Examining Drug Testing Cases in the District of Co-
lumbia, Wash. Law., Mar.-Apr. 1988, ai 26; Garreau, Is Medical Testing Worth the Cost in
Our Freedoms?, Wash. Post, June 29, 1986, at Cl, C4; Marcus, Judge Temporarily Bars Pepeo
Drug-Test Plan, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1986, at DI, D7; Thornton, Advocate of Urinalysis
Gets Testy at Hill Session, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1986, at A17; see also National Fed. of
Federal Employees v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1988) (government's need to test
federal civilian employees for drugs outweighed by fourth amendment protection); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986) (upholding selec-
tive drug testing for customs service employees in sensitive positions), rev'd, 816 F.2d 170 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). About 20% of federal government agencies
and about 25% of the "Fortune 500" companies now reportedly conduct some type of drug-
screening program. Henderson, Drug-Testing Industry Flourishes, Wash. Post, June 30, 1986,
Wash. Bus., at 1.
5" Noninvasive medical imaging techniques, such as x-rays, which pose no appreciable
danger to the subject's health, have been utilized in cases where more powerful (and more
hazardous) procedures were impermissible. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
Advanced imaging systems, not yet admitted in courts, such as digital radiography, real-time
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surgery to remove a bullet lodged in the defendant's body, for example,
may be ordered only after a full-scale adversary hearing focusing on the
relevance of the evidence, the likelihood that surgery would produce it,
and the nature of the risk to the defendant. 6° Nonconsensual surgery
may perhaps never be ordered when the potential patient is a victim or
witness of a crime, rather than the accused, regardless of procedural pro-
tections or the minor nature of the contemplated operation.6° 1
An autopsy may be ordered under state law to ascertain the cause of
a mysterious or suspicious death.60 2 The examination may be as thor-
ough as necessary to yield the sought-after forensic evidence, and consti-
tutional issues are rarely raised. 6°3
d. National Security Cases. Most of the cases and principles ar-
ticulated above have arisen in the context of domestic administrative or
criminal procedures, and it might be imagined that the balance between
conflicting principles would be struck somewhat differently if foreign po1-
ultrasound, and magnetic resonance imaging, may gain acceptance in the near future. James,
Waddill, Feazell, Fleischer, Price, Rollo, Partain & Stephens, New Medical Imaging Technol-
ogies as Evidence, 11 J. Contemp. L. 105, 105-29 (1984).
600 See United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (approving sur-
gery to remove incriminating bullet from defendant's arm where bullet was necessary as evi-
dence and could have been retrieved only in this way; operation was minor and risk to
defendant was minimal; adversary hearing was conducted and appellate review was permit-
ted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972)
(approving surgical removal of bullet), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); State v. Over-
street, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) (en band) (finding reversible error in admission into evi-
dence of bullet surgically removed from defendant without prior adversary hearing).
In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected compulsory surgery
to recover a bullet from the defendant's chest, where the hazards of surgery were disputed, the
intrusion on defendant's privacy and bodily integrity were severe, and the government's asser-
tions of need to present the bullet were not persuasive. Id. at 758-63.
For the earlier view that nonconsensual surgery may never be ordered, see Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 779 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 668-
69, 299 N.E.2d 834, 837 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
601 See People v. Browning, 108 Cal. App. 3d 117, 166 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1980) (proposed
surgery to remove bullet from body of complaining witness would be unreasonable intrusion
proscribed by fourth amendment); State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978) (victim
of crime could not be constitutionally required to undergo surgery to remove bullet).
602 State statutes typically provide that certain categories of deaths are within the jurisdic-
tion of the medical examiner. See P. Gianelli & E. Imwinkelried, supra note 592, at 608.
603 Although the law recognizes a right to undisturbed repose in the grave, examination
(including disinterment, when necessary) can be compelled in order to produce important evi-
dence. Typical reported cases turn on the construction of state statutes authorizing the au-
topsy, rather than on any fundamental right to privacy. See Annotation, Liability for
Wrongful Autopsy, 18 A.L.R. 4th 858 (1982); Annotation, Disinterment in Criminal Cases, 63
A.L.R.3d 1294 (1975).
The state's interest in conducting an autopsy in circumstances of unexplained death has
been found superior to a survivor's claim that autopsy was inconsistent with the free exercise
of the family's religious beliefs. See Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d
334 (1976).
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icy considerations were involved.6 4
Foreign affairs in general, and national security matters in particu-
lar, are traditionally accorded special treatment in American courts. 60 5
Judges are reluctant to intrude upon the foreign policy-making peroga-
tives of the political branches, and are hesitant to intervene to reconcile
legislative/executive policy disputes where the potential external impact
is great.606 Courts have explicitly noted the sensitivity and importance of
the policy apparatus, and the imperatives of secrecy and speed,60 7 and
accordingly have been loath to restrain the conduct of foreign policy,
especially when the President and Congress are acting in concertA. s8
604 See Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds sub nom. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (up-
holding requirement for broad financial reports concerning international transactions but de-
claring similar requirements for domestic dealings unconstitutional).
605 L. Henkin, supra note 374, at 5-6. Foreign policy matters are generically different from
other constitutional litigation.
Because the constitutional allocations of power to conduct foreign affairs are differ-
ent from those for domestic matters, issues between the President and Congress in for-
eign affairs are not the same "separation-of-powers" controversies that have roiled the
governance of domestic affairs.... Even the modest role played by the courts in foreign
affairs is different, asserting different judicial authority, maintaining different relations
with the political branches, monitoring different limitations on the States.
Id.
Even a case such as United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the Court
rejected the President's assertion of executive privilege, contained dicta reflecting prevailing
notions of the limitations on judicial inquiry into the national security realm.
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest
in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by produc-
tion of such material for in camera inspection.
Id. at 706.
6 For judicial expressions of deference to executive foreign policy power generally, see
Chicago & S. Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("But even if courts
could require full disclosure [of national security secrets], the very nature of executive deci-
sions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.");
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936) (finding "marked
difference between foreign and domestic affairs" because President is "sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations").
The "political question" doctrine has served as a justification for courts refraining from
intervention in matters committed to the discretion of the other branches. Even more fre-
quently, however, in the foreign affairs area, courts have considered the merits of the execu-
tive's action and cursorily approved it. See L. Henkin, supra note 374, at 210-16.
607 Cf. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 608 (3d Cir.) ("The importance of the
President's responsibilities in the foreign affairs field requires the judicial branch to act with the
utmost care when asked to place limitations on the President's powers in that area."), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
608 Chicago & S. Airlines, 333 U.S. at 111. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952), categorized the results of execu-
tive/legislative competition and cooperation. When the President acts pursuant to express or
implied congressional authorization, "his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not ceded carte blanche
to the other branches, even in delicate foreign policy matters, when im-
portant individual rights are at stake.6°9 The Supreme Court has never
spoken directly to the issue of whether there exists a "national security
exception" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement,610 and few
lower courts have had the occasion to confront the issue.611 It is clear
that the freedoms of the Bill of Rights are not terminated merely because
the government is acting in the interest of national security, and courts
continue to apply the constitutional safeguards with exactitude. 612 As
noted above, an otherwise lawful treaty inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion will not be effectuated, and the domestic impact of other unconstitu-
tional foreign-related actions will be similarly voided.
613
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and
in these only may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty."
Id. at 635-36.
609 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). One of the most recent tests of execu-
tive foreign policy powers arose from President Carter's actions to nullify all non-Iranian inter-
ests in property of the Iranian government, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, as
part of the agreement between the two countries following Iran's release of American hostages.
The Dames & Moore Court commented:
We are obviously deciding only one more episode in the never-ending tension between
the President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some
new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live and
which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances.
Id. at 662.
610 In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
reserved the question "[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security." Id. at
358 n.23. Two concurring opinions differed sharply on this issue. Justice White was willing to
allow a warrantless wiretap where the President or Attorney General considered electronic
surveillance reasonable in a national security case. See id. at 362 (White, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Douglas, with whom Justice Brennan joined, concluded that the leaders of the executive
branch could not perform the function of a detached, neutral magistrate in a national security
matter. See id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart later noted that "the issue
remains open" regarding the existence of a national security exception to the warrant require-
ment for electronic surveillance. Giordana v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 315 (1969) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
611 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980) (warrant is not always
required for government foreign intelligence wiretapping, due to importance of national secur-
ity interests, special executive expertise in area of foreign intelligence, and constitutional au-
thority of executive branch over foreign affairs), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). But see
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (fourth amendment is applicable to execu-
tive's wiretapping of foreign government agent, but interception here was reasonable, even
without warrant or probable cause that criminal activity would be discovered, as valid exercise
of foreign intelligence gathering), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
612 Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("The Court has not
denied the reality of dangers from foreign or internal conflicts. Rather, it has recognized the
need to respect constitutional requirements even in troubled times."), aff'd in part, cert. dis-
missed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
613 See note 365 and accompanying text supra.
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The law of electronic surveillance provides an apt illustration of the
complexity and the somewhat greater, but still restrained, power exer-
cised by policy makers when national security matters are at stake.614
As noted above, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 closely regulates the standards and practices for con-
ducting wiretaps and other electronic surveillance in a wide variety of
circumstances and requires a judicial warrant in all but emergency situa-
tions.615 The Act does not, however, apply to certain foreign intelligence
activities conducted by the government.616 In fact, warrantless electronic
surveillance in national security cases has been undertaken upon the as-
sertion of inherent presidential power since at least 1940,617 with consid-
erable frequency and duration.618 The parameters of this authority were
largely unexamined until the 1970s, when two important cases which
carry implications for arms control inspectors were decided.
In United States v. United States District Court,619 the government
had conducted warrantless wiretapping of three United States citizens
later charged with conspiracy in the dynamite bombing of a CIA office in
Michigan. The Supreme Court, focusing on the fact that the case in-
volved a strictly domestic radical group with no connection to a foreign
power,620 held that "the Government's concerns do not justify departure
614 Similar issues are raised regarding the possibility of a "national security exception" to
the warrant requirement in cases of physical entry into a target's premises. See United States
v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
615 See notes 552-64 and accompanying text supra.
616 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. IV 1986). Title III defers to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), in circumstances
involving foreign intelligence activities. See notes 628-30 and accompanying text infra.
617 In 1940, President Roosevelt sanctioned the use of electronic surveillance in a limited
range of cases. J. Carr, supra note 564, at 101. In 1946, President Truman substantially ex-
panded the parameters of that authorization. Id. at 101-02. Electronic surveillance, including
trespassory entrance to install the devices, continued without judicial warrants and without
public knowledge, grounded solely in the presidential assertion of a national security interest,
despite a contrary statute. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
618 In 1969, there were 30 surveillance devices installed by federal officers pursuant to court
orders, averaging 15.4 days of use per device, compared to 94 installations without warrants
under executive orders, averaging between a minimum of 86.2 days and a maximum of 221.3
days. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 334 (1972) (appendix, Doug-
las, J., concurring). In 1970, the comparable figures were 180 court-sanctioned installations,
averaging 13.1 days, and 113 executive-ordered installations, averaging between a minimum of
71.1 days and a maximum of 200 days. Id.; see also Graham, Want to Bug? Tell It to the
Judge, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1972, § 4 at 4; (Attorney General ordered deactivation of all of
"less than 10" warrantless wiretaps on domestic organizations after Court's decision in District
Court). But see Lyons, supra note 563, at A17 (report by Deputy Assistant Attorney General
that fewer than three warrantless wiretaps were operating on domestic organizations and 27
were aimed at foreign agents).
619 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
620 See id. at 308-09 ("The Attorney General's affidavit in this case states that the surveil-
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in this case from the customary fourth amendment requirement of judi-
cial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance. '621
In requiring some form of warrant, the Court declared that domes-
tic security issues were not beyond judicial scrutiny and that procedures
could be fashioned to preserve the necessary confidentiality. 622 As im-
portant as the interest was in protecting the continuity of government
operations, the Court concluded that procedures could be devised to pro-
tect individual rights without unduly burdening legitimate
investigations. 623
In Zweibon v. Mitchell,624 the Jewish Defense League (JDL) was the
target of warrantless wiretapping. 625 Although the JDL was a domestic
United States organization, there was a foreign connection because illegal
JDL protests and demonstrations at Soviet facilities inside the United
States threatened to strain United States-Soviet Union relations and pro-
voke retaliatory action against United States embassy officials in Mos-
lances were 'deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to
attack and subvert the existing structure of Government.'" (emphasis added by Court)). The
Court expressly reserved opinion regarding warrantless wiretapping of foreign agents. See id.
at 321-22. The Court also concluded that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), had effectively avoided the
entire question of an inherent presidential wiretap power, so the statute was not relevant to the
case. See 407 U.S. at 301-08.
621 District Court, 407 U.S. at 321. The Court noted the necessity for national self-protec-
tion, but declined to overlook competing civil liberties concerns. "National security cases,
moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in
cases of 'ordinary' crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in
such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 313.
622 Id. at 320-21.
623 Id. at 321. The Court invited Congress to fashion a warrant procedure and criteria for
"probable cause" and "particularity" specifically tailored to the unique demands of domestic
security cases. Id. at 322-24; see also United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C.
1971) (warrantless interceptions of defendant's conversations were illegal and inadmissible
when conducted as part of domestic security operation, but were legal and admissible when
conducted for purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information); United States v. Sinclair,
321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-80 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (no fourth amendment exception for surveil-
lance of dissident domestic organizations); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.
Cal. 1971) ("In wholly domestic situations there is no national security exemption from the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.").
Conversely, in cases where electronic surveillance was initiated in pursuit of national se-
curity information related to the activities of other countries, no prior judicial approval was
required. See, e.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 171-72 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 403 U.S. '698 (1971).
624 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'g 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976).
625 JDL members had brought a damages action under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), for unlawful
electronic surveillance. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 938 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 516
F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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CoW.626 The circuit court concluded that this type of tension in foreign
affairs was insufficient to escape the constitutional and statutory insis-
tence upon prior judicial screening. Wiretaps directed at United States
persons who were not acting as agents or collaborators of a foreign power
require judicial approval. 627
A further statutory refinement is the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978 (FISA) 628 which established a special warrant mecha-
nism for national security wiretapping.629 Under FISA, a warrant may
be obtained only when there is probable cause to believe that "the target
of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power." 630
626 Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 608-09. JDL members engaged in a broad spectrum of activities
directed at opposing the Soviet government's restrictive policies on Jewish emigration. These
protests ranged from peaceful demonstrations to bombing of the American offices of Soviet
government organs. "Soviet officials vigorously and continuously protested these activities, for
which they held the United States Government responsible." Id. These actions gave rise to
the Attorney General's fears about international embarrassment of United States detente poli-
cies and Soviet retaliation against Americans inside the Soviet Union. Id.
627 Id. at 614. The court held that "a warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed
on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor acting in collaboration with a
foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed under Presidential directive in the name of
foreign intelligence gathering for protection of the national security." Id. In reaching its con-
clusion, the court considered and rejected a sequence of government arguments supporting
warrantless wiretapping: judicial incompetence to weigh the issues, loss of secrecy, delay, and
administrative burdens. See id. at 641-51. Similarly, in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld,
410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976), the court refused to ratify warrantless wiretapping by West
German police for the United States Department of Defense, where the targets were United
States citizens living in West Germany. Despite security concerns of United States forces
overseas and issues of foreign policy, the court ruled that Zweibon controlled, and that a war-
rant was required. Id. at 157.
628 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
629 Id. § 1803. Under the Act, a special court composed of seven federal district judges
from different circuits is established to receive warrent applications for electronic surveillance.
A judge may issue an ex parte order allowing surveillance of agents of foreign powers for up to
90 days. A three-judge review panel is also established to hear appeals of denied applications.
Id. The FISA also authorizes warrantless electronic surveillance upon written certification by
the Attorney General that the interception is "solely directed at" foreign powers and that there
is "no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communica-
tion to which a United States person is a party." Id. § 1802(a).
630 Id. § 1804(a). A foreign power or agent is defined as including foreign governments,
components, factions, and foreign-based political organizations not substantially composed of
United States citizens. Id. § 1801(a). The court has granted each of the government's 3195
requests for electronic surveillance warrants since the 1979 effective date of the FISA. Kurk-
jian, The Sanctum Sanctorum of Bugs and Wiretaps, Wash. Post, July 24, 1986, at A21. Ac-
cording to the chief counsel of the House Select Intelligence Committee, "very few" of these
surveillances involved Americans; most were targeted at foreign embassies and their staff. Id.
Regarding foreign intelligence electronic surveillance generally, see Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: The First Five Years, S. Rep.
No. 660, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5, 12-16 (1984); Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 976 (1974); Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1116
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In sum, the sparse case law and statutes in wiretapping and other
investigatory areas suggest a history of judicial sensitivity, but not unre-
strained deference, to executive assertions of foreign policy or national
security exceptions to the usual constraints upon government informa-
tion gathering. 631 The balance between federal needs and individual
rights may be struck differently when foreign policy considerations are
present, and national security will elicit the most careful judicial atten-
tion.632 But wholesale surrender to security considerations by the judici-
ary is unlikely, and a case-by-case elaboration of permissible actions and
procedures must be undertaken. 633
(1980).
631 Although there are few statutes and court interpretations of the Constitution in the area
of domestic surveillance, there is a substantial body of law provided by Executive Orders. See,
e.g., Exec. Order 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
632 For the view that warrantless wiretapping is permissible in national security situations,
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (White, J., concurring); United States v.
Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v.
Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 944 (1976).
For more recent judicial treatment of issues arising under the FISA, see United States v.
Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of FISA and adher-
ence to its procedures in investigation of Provisional Irish Republican Army firearms offenses);
United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding FISA procedure of ex
parte, in camera determination of legality of surveillance); United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (no warrant required for wiretapping foreign govern-
ment agents for foreign intelligence purposes if interests of executive are paramount), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
633 Professor Henkin's observation that "the Supreme Court has never invoked the political
question doctrine to dismiss an individual's claim that a foreign relations action deprived him
of constitutional rights," L. Henkin, supra note 374, at 486 n.6, remains unscathed. See Note,
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security
Surveillance, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1116, 1136 (1980).
There is an additional reason to anticipate that judicial scrutiny of national security cases
would be greater than in typical domestic crime cases. In domestic cases, judges, police, and
other actors are aware of the precedential aspects of their decisions. They know that the par-
ticular fact situation under litigation may well be repeated and they often intend to deal with
future as well as current practices. Moreover, courts may utilize the exclusionary rule as an
enforcement mechanism because police will generally have a strong incentive to refrain from
undertaking investigations that are known to produce only inadmissible evidence.
Arms control inspectors, on the other hand, will likely be conducting their activities only
episodically, and would expect to be before courts far less often. Consequently, learning
through case precedent will form a smaller part of their institutional memory. The threat of
excluding illegally obtained evidence from a court proceeding will have diminished impact
because the information might still be available to the audiences that matter most, such as
national leaderships and the public.
Finally, it is important to note that scrupulous adherence to the fourth amendment's pro-
tections of the individual against government intrusion is a frequent hallmark of the case law,
even when the police action seems well-motivated, relatively benign, and divested of many of
the possible aggravating factors. The Supreme Court has commented that
[i]t may be that [this search and seizure] is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of proce-
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B. Observations
The preceding pages have surveyed United States law regarding gov-
ernment information-gathering efforts in the contexts of criminal and ad-
ministrative law. This Section takes a step back from the category-by-
category review, and attempts to discern certain general principles un-
derlying those established standards and procedures as they might be ap-
plicable to future arms control treaty inspections. The general
conclusion is that the government's right to search in a particular context
will be defined by balancing a variety of often conflicting factors. While
it is difficult to predict how this balance will be struck in any particular
case, it is nevertheless possible to identify six elements circumscribing the
government's inspection power: (1) the intrusiveness of the inquiry; (2)
the purpose of the search; (3) the probability that the search will produce
evidence; (4) the character of places searched; (5) the importance of the
government's interest in the information; and (6) the costs and benefits of
providing fuller protections.634
The first restriction on the government's inspection power, intru-
siveness, 635 has two dimensions, both of which affect the legality of a
search. The first is the power or efficiency of the data-gathering method.
Courts will insist upon greater procedural protections where the govern-
ment is able to gain a great deal of information and has the capability to
observe the intimate details of people's lives. Thus, a pen register 636 is
more acceptable than a wiretap. Aerial observation by the naked eye is
more tolerable than is high-resolution infrared scanning by state-of-the-
art technology. Similarly, interception of public movements or state-
ments is less offensive than exposure of more intimate actions or words.
In short, as the government gets better at gathering minute details, the
need becomes greater for prophylactic care. 63
7
dure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions
for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and liberal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
634 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
635 At least one commentator has abandoned the effort to define "intrusive" and "nonintru-
sive" inspections, concluding that the distinction "is a strange one, which grew out of histori-
cal and political conditions rather than from a strict interpretation of the usual meanings of
these words." A. Krass, supra note 50, at 11. A more subtle analysis, offering "intrusiveness"
as a continuum of varying degrees, rather than as a binary variable, may be more satisfactory.
636 A pen register records the numbers dialed from a particular phone, but does not access
the content of conversations. See note 462 and accompanying text supra.
637 In Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), the Supreme Court noted that
the EPA's aerial observation was done by ordinary (albeit sophisticated) photography, not by
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The second element of intrusiveness is the visibility of the inspection
mechanism. When the government is a conspicuous presence, as with
permanent on-site inspectors in the meat-packing industry, there is a
daily reminder of the official supervision and an increased incentive to
constrain the regulators. Episodic or cursory inspections, especially
those undertaken at a time and place of the citizen's own choosing, such
as annual automobile safety inspections, are less troublesome. Oddly,
some of the least obvious inspection devices, such as remotely controlled
closed-circuit television cameras, are nevertheless relatively intrusive.
This means that assessing the degree of intrusiveness requires a more
careful perusal than simply a measurement of the physical size of the
inspecting mechanism. 638
It is noteworthy in this context that the focus is on the marginal
degree of intrusiveness of a particular inspection mechanism. A police
search inside a dwelling is ordinarily considered very intrusive, but if the
police are already lawfully inside the home pursuant to a valid arrest or
an invitation, then the major intrusion - the entry - has an independ-
ent legal basis and a subsequent "plain view" search of items immedi-
ately apparent to officers' ordinary perception is then considered
constitutional.639
some unique sensory device that could "penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record
confidential discussions." Id. at 239. The Court then suggested that "surveillance of private
property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the
public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."
Id. at 238; see text accompanying notes 431-41 supra.
638 In United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1974), police intercepted a mailed
package of cocaine, dusted it with invisible fluorescent powder, and returned it to the mail for
delivery to defendant. Later, pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of the apartment,
police used an ultraviolet lamp to detect traces of the powder on the defendant's hands. The
First Circuit held that this constituted a search. Id. at 183. But see United States v. Richard-
son, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968) (examination of hands under ultraviolet light is not search).
Similarly, while many consider surreptitious entry into a home, together with a secret
physical search for evidence, to be among the most intrusive law enforcement techniques,
others consider nontrespassory electronic surveillance, which provides unlimited access to all
conversations for an extended period of time, to be even more offensive than a one-time physi-
cal invasion. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 564, at 127.
639 See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (when police officer, subsequent to
arrest, was standing in doorway of arrestee's dormitory room, entry and seizure of marijuana
were valid under "plain view" doctrine); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(establishing authorization to search items in plain view); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238
(6th Cir.) (when defendant went to bedroom to change clothes after arrest, police could law-'
fully follow and seize weapons defendant reached for in bureau drawer), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
922 (1971); cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (even when lawfully present to effect
an arrest, police not authorized to conduct search of items not in plain view without warrant
or probable cause).
When a lawful arrest provides a justification for an initial intrusion upon a person, a
further search for physical evidence has been upheld as valid, because incident to the arrest,
without the usual warrant requirement. See United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179, 184 (7th
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Regarding this second element, the government's inspection power
is further limited depending upon the purpose of its search. The govern-
ment is most limited in criminal law enforcement where the data may be
utilized to deprive a person of liberty, and the utmost procedural protec-
tion is required. 64° It is here that the most rigid insistence upon protec-
tion of individual rights is found, with the fourth amendment playing a
central role.
In contrast, regulatory inspections of businesses or residential com-
pliance with zoning, health, and safety codes are generally considered
less crucial.641 Although deliberate, long-term noncompliance may re-
sult in fines or even jailing, the primary social interest is in amelioration
of adverse conditions, not in punishment of wrongdoers. The procedural
protections are accordingly reduced. 642
When the purpose of a particular government inquiry shifts from
general regulatory perusal to focused criminal detection, for example,
then the procedural safeguards must be upgraded accordingly.643 Courts
acknowledge that the government may have more than one purpose in
conducting a particular investigation - the pursuit of general "strategic
intelligence" as well as inquiry into a particular individual's criminal in-
volvement, for example-and it is the primary purpose that matters
most. 644
The third criterion limiting the government's power to search is the
probability that the search will produce important evidence. Courts are
more willing to authorize a particular search when there is a substantial
likelihood that identifiable evidence will be produced. This is partially a
reflection of the probable cause and particularity requirements.645
Courts are reluctant to sanction disruption of a citizen's peace and quiet
without grounds to believe that the incursion will promote a specific gov-
ernment interest. More generally, this criterion reflects a profound dis-
taste for "fishing expeditions" or for attempts to deter misdeeds through
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010 (1974).
W See notes 503-50 and accompanying text supra.
641 See notes 467-69 and accompanying text supra.
t642 See notes 479-88 and accompanying text supra.
643 See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1984) (Court, split 5-4, described
three levels of procedure applicable to fire fighters and inspectors, requiring criminal search
warrant for inquiries into arson, administrative warrant for thorough inquiries into cause, and
no warrant for entry to fight fire and determine origin).
644 See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980) (under
foreign intelligence exception to fourth amendment, government relieved of seeking warrant
only when interests of executive are paramount, when object of search is foreign power, its
agent, or collaborator, and when search is conducted primarily for foreign intelligence rea-
sons), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982).
645 See notes 503-50 and accompanying text supra.
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an in terrorem effectA46 In general, courts want investigators to do the
necessary legwork and develop substantial leads through sound, nonin-
trusive investigative procedures before they disturb people's privacy. As-
sociated with this criterion is the importance of "minimization"-
ensuring that police investigations are structured to reduce, as much as
possible, the collateral intrusions upon innocent bystanders.
The fourth restriction depends upon the character of those places to
be searched. Although the fourth amendment protects "people, not
places," 647 the degree of shielding is still ordinarily defined, at least in
part, by reference to a particular place.648 Thus, activities conducted
where the public can see, hear or smell them 649 will be accorded little
protection, and open fields may ordinarily be searched without a war-
rant.650 So, too, pervasively regulated industries are constructively
within the plain view, and benefit from little secrecy. 651
Ordinary businesses, however, receive more substantial protection
than closely regulated ones,652 and private dwellings receive a unique de-
gree of protection.653 The privacy interest in the integrity of one's own
body, and the highest standards of proof and procedure are required
before invasive body searches or surgery are permitted. 654 In short, the
more publicly exposed an activity is, the lower the degree of fourth
amendment protection. 655
646 See notes 524-32 and accompanying text supra.
647 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
648 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-81 (1984).
649 For example, the expectation of privacy in an automobile is low, and many routine
police examinations do not constitute searches. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
368, 372-76 (1976). See also Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (seeing); Hoffa v.
United States, 358 U.S. 293 (1966) (hearing); United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1978) (smelling).
650 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 (reaffirming distinction between open fields, where individual
may not legitimately demand or expect privacy, and area immediately surrounding house, into
which greater fourth amendment protection is extended). Even if police entry onto open fields
constitutes a trespass against defendant's property, it is still not a fourth amendment search.
Id. at 182-84.
651 See notes 489-92 and accompanying text supra.
652 See notes 470-88 and accompanying text supra.
653 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("Searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against
which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed.").
654 See notes 595-603 and accompanying text supra.
655 Certain environments such as schools, prisons, and military bases are regarded as consti-
tutionally special, due to the unique nature and purpose of the institution and the lower expec-
tations of privacy of its users. Although the fourth amendment applies to these settings, it may
not require the same procedural protections as ordinary police work. See, e.g., New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985) (upholding as reasonable school official's search of student's
purse); United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1975) (military not bound by
procedural rules imposed on civilian law enforcement agencies).
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The fifth restriction on the government's inspection power is the rel-
ative importance of its interest in the information. The government solic-
its information for a variety of purposes, not all of which are of
equivalent weight. Sometimes the relative importance of a given purpose
is difficult to assess. Crime prevention, along with the investigation and
prosecution of previous violations, is certainly important to society, but
so are the eradication of unsafe housing conditions and avoidance of
mass fires or epidemics. Sometimes a resurgence of perceived social in-
terest in the issue, such as pollution control, enhancement of safety in the
workplace, or combatting terrorism in public places and on common car-
riers, stimulates a commensurate increase in investigatory powers. 656
Government will probably always contend that the data it seeks in a par-
ticular inquiry are vital to national interests, but courts will weigh these
claims skeptically in fashioning procedural protections. The relevant
consideration is not simply the magnitude of the interests that the gov-
ernment purports to be serving, but the nexus between the particular po-
lice investigatory activity in question and the effective pursuit of that
overall objective.657
Finally, a court assesses the costs and benefits of providing fuller
procedural protections in determining the legitimacy of a governmental
search. Often, courts are faced with balancing competing concerns, such
656 See W. Ringel, supra note 413, § 16.1.
657 Courts are troubled when a government activity does not seem "to fit readily within any
of the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement, and yet [seems] reasonable in light of
the overwhelming public acceptance of the search and the necessity for it." United States v.
Abarado, 495 F.2d 799, 804 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport searches for weaponry are reasonable
under fourth amendment given degree of public interest involved). In such situations, courts
frequently rely on the "balancing test" of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court upheld a category of searches, on less than probable cause, by analyzing the
general reasonableness of the government's interest in intruding on personal privacy in this
fashion.
Some commentators have approved of this more flexible approach, noting that Terry,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and a few other cases could generate a
malleable reading of the fourth amendment, avoiding the strict bifurcation that results when
classifying all inquiries as either searches, triggering the full panoply of rights, or nonsearches,
with absolutely no constitutional protection. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 413,
§ 2.6(2), at 111. Others, however, have cautioned that this flexibility may dilute the fourth
amendment's effectiveness and produce such a multilevel hierarchy of police practices and
corresponding constitutional protections that police and courts would find it utterly unwork-
able. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349,
374-77, 393-95 (1974).
The Supreme Court, while reluctant to generate new categories of intrusions that may be
undertaken on less than probable cause, has underscored the need to focus on the extent of the
intrusion, the need for it, and the reasonableness of the manner in which the search or seizure
is conducted. "To determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[w]e must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the im-
portance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'" Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
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as the government's interest in speed, secrecy, and minimal administra-
tive burden versus the citizen's interest in being free from arbitrary, un-
necessary, or burdensome searches. In the areas of administrative
searches and the wiretapping of domestic United States organizations,
courts have found that searches are proper and can be conducted basi-
cally as the government wishes, but that they must be undertaken pursu-
ant to a warrant mechanism establishing an orderly routine and an
independent check on government discretion. The government must not
only have a reasonable basis for initiating an intrusion upon a citizen's
repose, it must ensure that the intrusion is conducted in a reasonable
fashion.6 58
V
ARMS CONTROL INSPECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
In this Part, the two major areas surveyed-the needs of effective
arms control inspection and the limits of the United States Constitu-
tion-are juxtaposed and compared.659 Before proceeding to a point-by-
point analysis, however, a brief summary of arms control inspectors'
needs is presented, followed by an overview of the nature of the funda-
mental conflict between the two areas.
A. What Arms Control Inspectors Seek
The goals of an arms control inspection scheme will be multiple and
658 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. The standard for judging a police intrusion is not whether
some less invasive alternative was available or could be imagined by a "creative judge engaged
in post hoe evaluation." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985). Rather, the test
is whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to identify or implement an alternative. See
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
659 This Article does not address all possible constitutional challenges to arms control. For
example, the second amendment's guaranty of the "right to bear arms" might be thought to
inhibit federal power to agree to, and to enforce, arms limitation accords. The better view,
however, is that the second amendment is irrelevant to arms control because: (a) the amend-
ment speaks only to the right to bear arms in a state militia, not individually, United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); (b) the federal government retains the right to limit and
regulate the armaments of state militias (now the National Guard), see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 16; and (c) the contemplated subjects of arms control treaties-nuclear weapons, chemical
armaments, and conventional arms deployed by the federal government-are irrelevant to
state militias and are already largely illegal for private citizens. See L. Henkin, supra note 36,
at 34-39.
Similarly, this Article does not address the contention that national possession and use of
nuclear weapons are per se illegal, as indiscriminate, under customary international law. See
Lawyers' Comm. on Nuclear Policy, Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Warfare (1984).
Customary international law is a part of domestic United States law. The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Restatement, supra note 361, § 111. However, it is subject to super-
session by treaty or statute. Id. § 115.
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complex, 660 but generally, the inspectors will be guided by five principles:
1. Deter Violations: Inspectors simply cannot be everywhere and
cannot check every possible lead. Accordingly, the solidity of a verifica-
tion regime-like the integrity of any other system of domestic law-
relies in large measure upon deterrence and voluntary compliance.
2. Detect Violations: A primary element in the deterrence func-
tion, of course, is raising the perceived probability of timely detection of
a violation.6 61 Inspectors will seek procedures giving them maximum
confidence in their ability to discover noncompliance. Punitive and/or
compensatory actions could then be undertaken to restore the status quo
ante.
3. Provide Evidence of Violations: Ideally, when they uncover a
violation, the inspectors will be able to provide sufficient evidence to sat-
isfy not only their own national leadership, but also a skeptical or unin-
formed public.6 62 However, the imperative of protecting the sources and
methods of sensitive intelligence operations may inhibit inspectors from
presenting their strongest case to the public.
4. Punish the Violators: This is likely to be a relatively low prior-
ity, especially if the violators are renegade individuals, not proceeding in
covert collaboration with national leadership. 663 The inspecting state
will be more interested in redressing the effects of a violation and in pre-
cluding its repetition than in punishing an aberrant outlaw. 64
660 T. Schelling & M. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control 91-94 (1961). This summary of
the goals of the inspecting party essentially adopts the perspective of a "model I, unitary ra-
tional actor." G. Allison, Essence of Decision 10-38 (1971).
661 Other inputs into the verification calculation, the perceived consequences of being appre-
hended in a violation, the advantages to successful evasion, and the costs of false alarms are
specific to particular treaty regimes, and are beyond the scope of this Article.
662 The quantum of proof necessary to pursuade the public is not fixed, but it is quite high,
especially since photo interpretation or other arcane data-manipulation will be required to
interpret the data gathered by the inspectors. However, to the extent world public opinion
matters, it will have to be educated by the inspectors' data. See, e.g., Brugioni, Satellite Images
on T.V.: The Camera Can Lie, Wash. Post, Dec. 14, 1986, at Hl. U-2 photographs of Soviet
missile sites in Cuba in 1962 were powerful evidence, but even they required substantial inter-
pretation and were not, of course, sufficient to convince all audiences.
663 The inspected state may wish to pursue criminal prosecution of violators, even if the
inspecting state is not especially concerned, as a means of proving its innocence and demon-
strating its good faith. Partan, Individual Responsibility Under a Disarmament Agreement in
American Law, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 889, 898 (1965).
664 A mens rea requirement in a statute criminalizing violations of an arms control treaty
would present difficult issues of culpability, especially when dealing with complex bureaucra-
cies. Communications uncertainties, inertia, and conflicting orders might produce uninten-
tional violations of an arms control agreement. Any such accidents, however, are unlikely to
be of military significance; the most dangerous violations will have to be intentional. See A.
Krass, supra note 50, at 204-05.
For an example of a bill designed to criminalize knowing individual behavior inconsistent
with an arms control agreement, see H.R. 7977, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), introduced by
Representative Rodino. The bill would have made it a federal offense for anyone under the
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5. Promote Confidence: Essential to sustaining the long-run viabil-
ity of an arms control regime is the establishment of a high level of confi-
dence-by both nations' elites and their politically-relevant publics-in
the system's ability to serve the above goals. Because it is so difficult to
establish that no violations have occurred, inspectors must rigorously
and repeatedly challenge the hypothesis of compliance. This is the only
way nations can be satisfied that their verification systems are functional.
Limited resources will require inspectors to focus their attention se-
lectively. Obvious targets will be government facilities overtly identified
with the production, testing, or deployment of controlled weapons. Simi-
larly, allied private industry--defense contractors or subcontractors-
will merit attention. But the number of facilities and people in the allied
industries of potential interest would strain inspectors' resources. Moni-
toring the proverbial "button factory" to ensure that it really produces
only buttons would be even more difficult. Moreover, inspectors may
fear that contraband may be secretly produced or stored in warehouses,
dwellings, and lands.
In all of this, the inspectors' task is made even more difficult than
that of police or federal law enforcement officers pursuing local or organ-
ized crime. Domestic police are on their home territory, they know the
community and its mores, they have a sense of the possibilities of the
environment, and they know what to expect from local courts and adver-
saries. For arms control inspectors, however, everything will be foreign,
every person and every institution will be confronted for the first time,
and the inspectors will have little idea of whom to trust and who might
be part of a giant conspiracy.
Moreover, the cultural and legal milieu is so different from society
to society that the United States doctrine of a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" may be interpreted by Soviet inspectors as a massive cover-up.
Conversely, the United States image of Soviet domestic authoritarianism
may lead American inspectors to suspect that any difficulties they en-
counter inside the Soviet Union are actually carefully orchestrated ha-
rassments designed to frustrate their mission. The great importance of
the inspectors' mission-as well as its sheer novelty-will reinforce these
apprehensions and misunderstandings. 665
jurisdiction or control of the United States to develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, acquire,
retain, or possess biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems in violation of the Biological
Weapons Convention. See text accompanying note 201 supra.
665 Education may provide a partial solution to the problem of misunderstanding. Inspec-
tors could be schooled in the legal and social traditions of the society in which they are going
to operate. This solution can be only partial, however, because the relevant law is complex and
because most inspectors will be selected for the inspection party based upon their skills as
scientists or technicians, not as attorneys.
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B. Conflicts with United States Law
Before delving into the analysis of the legality of each inspection
methodology, it is useful to pause at a somewhat higher level of abstrac-
tion to consider the types of conflicts inherent in the meshing of arms
control and the Constitution. Three illustrations, drawn from the war-
rant requirement of the fourth amendment, serve to highlight this
tension.
L Neutral Adjudication
The reasons why the insertion of a detached judicial determination
is so valuable in fourth amendment cases are precisely the reasons it
would cause difficulty for arms control inspectors. The function of the
judge is to make an independent decision, unfettered by the on-the-spot
pressures of law enforcement. The judge is to assess the evidence already
assembled by the police and make a de novo decision regarding the pro-
priety of a search warrant, arrest, or subpoena.
This is precisely the sort of second-guessing that arms control in-
spectors will not want to tolerate. They are, after all, representatives of a
different sovereign, accountable elsewhere, and they will want to have the
last word on the control of their own inspections. Deference to a local
authority figure, however styled, may seem inconsistent with the inspec-
tor's skepticism and autonomy. In addition, a foreign inspectorate will
be instinctively mistrustful of local courts, and the burden of going to
court might compromise the speed and suddenness of a planned inspec-
tion. How could United States inspectors inside the Soviet Union, or
Soviet inspectors in this country, be confident that the warrant mecha-
nism was not simply a ruse to penetrate the confidentiality of their in-
spection plans and tip off potential targets with sufficient warning to
rectify, remove, or conceal violations? 666
2. Probable Cause
The basis for a warrant--either the strict probable cause requisite of
criminal investigations667 or the more relaxed requirements of an "over-
all regulatory scheme" in administrative searches668-is designed to
666 One possibility for mitigating the tension between foreign inspectors and local courts
would be to vest the warrant function in some other, mutually acceptable tribunal. A treaty
could provide that the judicial officer who makes the probable cause determination be, for
example, the Secretary General of the United Nations, or one of a panel of predesignated chief
judges of neutral or nonaligned states. Although these arrangements would be constitutional
in the United States, they might be only marginally more acceptable to the inspecting party
and rather less palatable for the inspected party.
667 See notes 505-50 and accompanying text supra.
60 See notes 479-88 and accompanying text supra.
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guard against arbitrary or vindictive police actions. The Constitution re-
quires that government have a reason to disrupt a citizen's quietude, and
that it be a reason grounded in focused suspicions.
Arms control inspectors, conversely, might often prefer "fishing ex-
peditions" and might have no better basis for selecting targets of inspec-
tion. When there are so many potential hiding places, and the
probability for finding a violation is low, the best recourse may be osten-
tatious displays of random sampling inspections designed to deter
through pressure or fear.
Moreover, the inspectorate may be reluctant to disclose to a judge,
even in chambers with a sealed record, the procedures that led to their
focused suspicion and the evidentiary basis for their interest in a particu-
lar place. The potential cost of compromising intelligence sources and
methods may in the long term outweigh the benefits of obtaining a partic-
ular warrant. Foreign inspectors may not believe that local courts can be
relied upon to protect indefinitely sensitive foreign national security
secrets.
3. Particularity
Another vital aspect of the usual warrant requirement is the insis-
tence upon particularity and the resistance to general, indiscriminate
searches of several places for several things.669 Related to this is a strong
sentiment for minimization of the intrusion, seeking assurances that a
wiretap or other search will be as restricted as possible in scope and that
less offensive alternatives are not available. 670
Again, the differences between arms control and domestic inspec-
tions are manifest. Many of the most valuable tools in the arms control
arsenal are inherently "overbroad"-they collect all information present
to the sensors and cannot screen out material that is irrelevant, privi-
leged, or prejudicial. Some devices, to be sure, can be focused with preci-
sion, but seismometers and satellite cameras, for example, will inevitably
exceed their intended scope.
The obverse side of overbreadth is arms control inspectors' general
inability to specify, with a precision ordinarily demanded of police, what
sorts of evidence they expect to find in which locales. Occasionally, arms
treaty verifiers may "know" something to be true because of an intuitive,
subjective weighing of an unpredictable combination of facts. 67' This art
may not represent the highest development of the scientific method, but
it may be the best technique available and may make it impossible to
669 See notes 524-32 and accompanying text supra.
670 See note 658 and accompanying text supra.
671 See notes 357-60 and accompanying text supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:229
ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION
discern the marginal verification contributions made by current search
procedures.
C. Assessment of Inspection Techniques
Once one is familiar with the current and potential arms control
mechanisms, and the constitutional norms that would govern their use, it
is possible to assess which mechanisms would and would not be constitu-
tionally acceptable.
1. Remote Sensing
Many critical forms of remote surveillance of United States arms-
related activities will continue to be conducted unilaterally by the Soviet
Union, as they have been for years. Thus, Soviet NTM photoreconnais-
sance satellites, long-range seismometers, extraterrestrial particulate sen-
sors, and the like,672 will probably maintain current functions and
remain among the most important arms control verification
techniques. 673
Constitutional challenges to these activities are unlikely to prevail.
Despite the wealth of detailed information they can provide, NTM
should escape critical review for several reasons. First, United States
government participation is minimal in Soviet remote sensing. These
NTM activities would be conducted independently by the Soviet Union
as an intelligence-gathering operation, regardless of their additional
treaty-verification function, and the only role played by the United States
government may be to ensure against interference and deliberate
concealment.
Second, sensors operate from great distances and do not interfere
with activities on the ground. Indeed, even when a satellite is flying over
a particular spot, it is still generally at least 100 miles away, and it is
designed to be so unobtrusive that it is undetectable from earth without
sophisticated equipment. Third, sensors have access only to information
that is exposed to the public domain. For example, seismic waves from a
target's activities propagate in all directions and are susceptible to receipt
by any properly equipped and located analyst. Particulate sensing sys-
tems, too, merely obtain radioactive debris and ejecta that are cast, like
garbage or abandoned property, to the elements. 674 Even low-resolution
photoreconnaissance may be justified, under Dow Chemical Co. v. United
672 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
673 See notes 319-39 and accompanying text supra.
674 For an illustration of the extent to which useful arms control information can be gleaned
from even the smallest, most remote particles, see Bell, Fourier Transformer Spectroscopy
Measurements at Infrared and Millimeter Wavelengths, in Arms Control Verification 185
(1986).
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States675 and California v. Ciraolo,676 as simply observation of activities
that a target has not chosen to conceal by an opaque roof.
Fourth, the likely search methodology for NTM sensors will gener-
ally be to scan the entire United States with a broad brush, unfocused on
particular targets, and then use alternative, more intrusive means to hone
in on selected locales where ambiguous or suspicious events seem to be
occurring.677 The sheer magnitude of the area to be monitored guaran-
tees that most NTM sensing will be routine and nonspecific.
Some types of possible remote sensing, however, may not share all of
these characteristics. Once the Soviet inspection apparatus enters United
States territory-including airspace-the federal government is no longer
uninvolved. Authorization for the conduct of aerial overflights by Soviet
inspectors, for example, implicates some degree of United States respon-
sibility.678 The more actively the United States government voluntarily
participated in, or collaborated with, the Soviet inspection scheme, the
more involved it would become in any court challenge.
More important, courts may try to differentiate between "high tech-
nology" remote sensing and the more pedestrian variety. Specifically,
courts are unlikely to concede that all information susceptible to state-of-
the-art remote sensors is beyond constitutional protection under the
plain view rule. This potential bifurcation is most palpable in the area of
photoreconnaissance. Aerial overflight and observation by unaided eye,
ordinary cameras, or even commercially available specialized aircraft
cameras can be distinguished from inspection by high-resolution, night-
vision scanning devices available only to the national security communi-
675 476 U.S. 227 (1986); see notes 431-52 and accompanying text supra.
676 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
677 R. Scribner, T. Ralston & W. Metz, supra note 82, at 50.
678 Some types of less remote sensing-the creation of a regional seismic network or the
installation of particulate samplers near nuclear test sites--could probably be undertaken with-
out official United States involvement. The Natural Resources Defense Council, a private
United States environmental group, has concluded an agreement with the Academy of the
Sciences of the Soviet Union under which each organization installs and operates three modem
seismometers inside the territory of the other's nation. These provide a private, nongovern-
mental test of the principles of regional seismic monitoring in connection with a nuclear test
ban treaty.
Although this type of program does require some degree of official assistance because
United States government authorization is required for the export of seismic equipment to the
Soviet Union, and for the visas for Soviet experts who would install and maintain foreign
equipment in Nevada, there appear to be no legal barriers to the actual operation of a foreign-
owned seismic station inside the United States. The Soviet operators would be no more liable
to invasion-of-privacy suits than are United States operators of existing seismic stations
throughout the United States. See U.S. to Permit Soviets' Nuclear-Monitoring Visit, Wash.
Post, Sept. 25, 1986, at A30; Groups Agree on Nuclear Monitoring, Wash. Post, June 4, 1986,
at A18.
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ties in the two superpowers. 679 Courts would probably not be willing to
allow the warrantless government use of enhancement mechanisms of
that caliber against Americans, at least when it proceeds to the stage of
focusing attention on particular criminal activities at a specific locale.6 0
In addition, certain Soviet NTM activities may violate United States
law. Nonconsensual interception of telephone communications and elec-
tronic eavesdropping, for example, can give rise to civil as well as crimi-
nal liability. At present, the United States government knows that such
surveillance occurs but is largely unable or unwilling to interdict it.681 If
this practice were to expand under the aegis of future arms control verifi-
cation, it could be interpreted as a pattern of deliberate, selective nonen-
forcement of the law, implicating concerns about abuse of police or
prosecutorial discretion.682 If the United States-Soviet cooperation were
extended so far that the American officials actively assisted in the illegal
interceptions or aided the Soviet inspectors in avoiding detection, then
679 It is difficult to predict where courts might draw the line between ordinary technology
(exempted from the fourth amendment, as acquiring only data in "plain view") and advanced
technology (requiring additional protection, as invading private matters). The analysis in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), directs that inquiry be focused on whether a target's
expectation of privacy, under all the circumstances, is one that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable. Dow and Ciraolo suggest that the frequency and notoriety of aircraft overflight
make it unreasonable for anyone to expect to be unobserved from above by passing planes.
Dow, 476 U.S. 277 (1986); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see notes 448-52 and accompanying
text supra. The secretiveness of a satellite, however, prevents the public from understanding
its capabilities and flight path, and therefore does not undercut the public's sense of privacy. If
the government tried radically to alter the public's expectations-such as by conspicuously
advertising a satellite's remote observation capabilities and thereby defeating the sense of pri-
vacy that flows from sheer ignorance-a court might still maintain that the expectation of
privacy was nonetheless reasonable, if not in the sense of being factually accurate, then at least
in the sense of being socially tolerable. The same sort of line-drawing problem confronts
courts attempting to discern when "enhancement" of a police officer's ordinary sensory per-
ception has so augmented the observation power as to move the case from a plain view analysis
into the search category. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215-26 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting); Dow, 476 U.S. at 240-52 (1986) (Powell, J.,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
680 Thus, a court probably would not allow the FBI to use warrantless satellite photorecon-
naissance as a technique of ordinary criminal investigation. Evidence that was inadvertently
produced as a side effect of satellite imaging undertaken for other purposes, however, should
be admissible.
681 Sheldon, Soviet Military Space Systems, Nat'l Defense, Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 44, 46. The
United States has the constitutional authority to protect the citizenry against Soviet NTM, but
probably has no specific obligation to do so. Failure to prevent the Soviet inspection would not
be grounds for complaints that the United States had violated citizens' privacy rights.
682 Prosecutorial discretion is broad; courts will overturn it only if it is abused. Equal pro-
tection standards in this area require proof of discriminatory effect and purpose. See, e.g.,
Wayte v. United States, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984) (upholding Justice Department decision to pros-
ecute for failure to register for draft only those who were reported as violators, not all who
actually violated law).
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the United States government would share the liability.683
In sum, remote sensing is probably the verification activity most re-
moved from constitutional challenge, largely because it is the activity in
which the Soviets least need to enlist United States government participa-
tion. However, as the activity becomes more proximate, and as the offi-
cial United States role grows, so does the probability of a court rebuff.
The most powerful, high-technology data-gathering systems that extract
the most information from a particularized target are the most
problematic.
" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: Soviet NTM operat-
ing outside United States territory (e.g., moderate resolution satel-
lite photoreconnaissance, global seismometers, particulate samplers
on high seas); Soviet NTM operating inside the United States, but
without official United States participation (e.g., in-country re-
gional seismometers established by Soviet or private groups).
• Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: high-resolution imag-
ing obtained by joint United States-Soviet enterprise without a
search warrant or other authorization, when targeted against indi-
viduals for law enforcement reasons.
* Examples of borderline cases: joint United States-Soviet remote
sensing undertaken for ambiguous or mixed purposes (e.g., gather-
ing information for strategic intelligence purposes as well as law
enforcement); warrantless use of technology that is not necessarily
the most advanced, but is more capable than the public, or a partic-
ular target, realizes.
2. On-Site Mechanical Sensing
The installation of "black boxes" containing television cameras,
chemical sensors, motion detectors, and the like could greatly assist in
monitoring activities in a wide variety of facilities of interest to arms con-
trol inspectors.
In some instances, these devices may be installed with the consent of
the owner or operator of the premises. The key legal question is whether
the scope of this consent properly extends to authorize sensors through-
out an entire facility, or whether some portions of it (for example, locker
rooms or toilets) are so reserved for private activities that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is created. 684 This will necessarily be a case-by-
case inquiry, focusing on the degree of employee control over the as-
683 See notes 399-411 and accompanying text supra. Where foreign police conduct an ille-
gal wiretap without official United States participation, the fourth amendment is inapplicable if
such behavior does not "shock the conscience," and resulting evidence is admissible in United
States courts. United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981); Stowe v. Devoy, 588
F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978).
684 See notes 546-48 and accompanying text supra.
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serted private space, and should not prove especially troublesome for
arms control inspectors.
Where consent is denied, however, the Soviet inspectorate must en-
list the compulsion of United States law and tolerate its limitations.
Some categories of facilities-nuclear power plants, firearms manufactur-
ers, chemical weapons producers-will fall into the "pervasively regu-
lated industry" niche.685 As to these, congressional legislation, or
regulations promulgated thereunder, incident to a treaty could establish
a comprehensive oversight scheme including a mechanical sensing ele-
ment. 686 Black boxes could then constitutionally scan activities in the
facility, just as human inspectors might do in person.687 If it were neces-
sary for adequate monitoring of events, the sensors could be of the high-
est quality and variety, and could be permanently activated.
Observation in other than pervasively regulated industries, however,
is more problematic. Compulsory installation and operation of mechani-
cal sensors would be searches, and fourth amendment protections would
be required.
The most appropriate body of constitutional law for these searches
is that of "administrative searches." Except in instances of consent, in-
spectors would be obliged to follow the progeny of Camara v. Municipal
Court688 and See v. City of Seattle68 9 in fashioning their inspection rou-
tines.690 Since there are many more locations where mechanical sensors
might be emplaced than there are sensors or analysts to monitor them, a
high degree of selectivity would be required. Inspectors might opt to
place devices only in the largest manufacturing plants, or in plants that
produce items most similar to those regulated by treaty, or in plants that
had recently or regularly engaged in defense-related contracts.
Even in these cases, the administrative inspection could not be of
unlimited intensity or duration; the model is generally that of a "spot
685 See notes 489-502 and accompanying text supra.
686 To the extent that new law was promulgated in the effort to qualify new industries as
"pervasively regulated," they might fail to meet the standard of falling within a "long tradi-
tion" of close government supervision of an industry. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978); notes 489-502 and accompanying text supra. Some industries of greatest
interest to arms control inspectors, however, such as the nuclear power industry are already
the subject of intense government scrutiny and regulation, and little additional oversight au-
thority may be necessary.
687 There must be a connection between the purpose of the pervasive regulation and the
government's investigatory techniques. W. Ringel, supra note 413, § 14.3(b)(2). That is, even
though an industry might be pervasively regulated for health and safety reasons, this would
not necessarily authorize warrantless government inspections for other purposes, such as ver-
ification of arms control agreements.
683 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
689 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
690 See notes 471-88 and accompanying text supra.
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check," to determine relatively quickly whether particular requirements
are being met. A permanent inspecting presence is beyond the scope of
the usual administrative search. Thus, inspectors might be able to linger,
make frequent repeat visits, or install sensing devices for a limited period
of time when a particular facility is under construction or is undergoing a
transition from a newly prohibited activity to work that is legal but tech-
nologically similar. Permanent observation, however, could not be com-
pelled under the guise of administrative inspection.
In sum, mechanical sensing can be compelled most readily in situa-
tions in which there is a substantial reason for a focus upon a particular
industry or facility. The Constitution would not, however, permit the
unlimited deployment of sensing devices, to monitor large numbers of
otherwise unremarkable places for a sustained period of time.
" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: installing on-site
mechanical sensors in civilian nuclear power plants, chemical
weapons factories, and other pervasively-regulated industries.
" Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: permanent, non-con-
sensual installation of sensors in ordinary business places and
residences.
* Examples of borderline cases: mandatory installation of sensors in
factories where the purpose of pervasive regulation has little to do
with arms control; long-term, but not permanent, placement of sen-
sors in ordinary facilities.
3. Data Exchanges and Inspections of Records
This category of inspections can be analyzed in much the same way
as on-site mechanical sensing, with the following differences. First, a
great deal of the information about private activities that might be sought
by Soviet arms inspectors is already in the possession of the United States
government.6 91 Tax returns, employment records, government personnel
files, police reports, and the like contain a wealth of information that
could help a conscientious arms control inspector piece together a truth-
ful story. Statutory restrictions, grounded in the privacy interest in the
nondissemination of personal information, can be superseded by treaty or
subsequent statute. Similarly, concerns about the disclosure of private
trade secrets or other proprietary information held by the government
could be assuaged by limiting the disclosures or by paying compensation.
Second, an analogy to area-wide or neighborhood administrative
691 See Havemann, Data on Americans Rapidly Centralized, Wash. Post, July 1, 1986, at
A3 ("The federal government is rapidly creating a national data base of personal information
on most Americans through increased storage of records in computers and the routine cross-
checking of one list against another."). From 1980 to 1985, the number of computers used by
the federal government has increased from a few thousand to more than 100,000. Id.
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searches breaks down when the volume of records of potential interest is
so vast that only a small percentage can be singled out by Soviet inspec-
tors for the close scrutiny necessary to uncover possible violations.
Perusal of corporate or individual records will thus be inherently a fo-
cused search, taking more time and delving more deeply than typical
health and safety inquiries.
As previously noted, the government may mandate the compilation
and submission of a variety of exhaustive and detailed reports and
records. Requirements may be levied upon industries and individuals in-
dependent of a scheme of pervasive regulation, and almost any manner of
data may be reasonably tied to a legitimate government purpose. When
these documents are received, the government may be authorized to
share them, in any appropriate manner, with Soviet inspectors.
On the other hand, business or personal records or documents that
are not required by law may be examined by federal and Soviet officials
in only three scenarios. First, those records held by other parties, the
logs of a customer's transactions retained by a bank or supplier, for ex-
ample, are subject to official scrutiny without any judicial intervention;
because of the dissemination, the target retains no privacy right. 692 Sec-
ond, records of pervasively regulated businesses may be inspected at any
time, as an aspect of a reasonable regulatory scheme, again without any
warrant requirement.693 Third, and most problematic, records retained
by an ordinary individual or business are shielded by the fourth amend-
ment from arbitrary examination by United States or Soviet officials. 694
In this category, judicial scrutiny of a request for a subpoena duces te-
cum or search warrant can be required prior to compulsory official in-
spection. In some cases, this would require only the low administrative
search standards of locating this inquiry inside a larger, rational scheme.
In cases of more focused criminal investigation, the greater rigor of prob-
able cause and particularity must be satisfied. 695
In sum, arms control inspectors are likely to be authorized to obtain
a large quantity of written records of various sorts. The United States
government could compel the maintenance and production of all manner
of business records and could generally be successful in acquiring other
documents, too. Indeed, the principal problems of the inspecting party
are likely to involve the reliability of the documents and the difficulty of
focusing upon the truly valuable papers from the welter of those avail-
able, rather than problems of access.
692 See note 464 and accompanying text supra.
693 See notes 499-502 and accompanying text supra.
694 See notes 549-50 and accompanying text supra.
695 See notes 573-76 and accompanying text supra.
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" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: required maintenance
and submission of detailed financial reports and production data, in
any format desired; sharing with Soviet inspectors of data in re-
quired reports acquired from a particular individual, or data about
that individual acquired from other sources.
" Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: mandatory reporting
inconsistent with fifth amendment ban against compulsory self-in-
crimination; inspection of ordinary business or personal papers
without a warrant.
• Examples of borderline cases: required reports related to criminal-
ized behavior; warrantless demands for potentially inculpatory
business records.
4. Examination of Personnel
Soviet inspectors will have occasions to talk to Americans in many
settings. Frequent consultations or interviews, for example, will ordina-
rily be done with the consent and cooperation of citizens. Police actions,
such as Terry stops or arrests, 6 96 on the other hand, will be infrequent, as
arms control inspectors would usually be preceded at the scene of an
infraction by local law enforcement personnel. Any compulsory deten-
tions of people, even for brief periods, are closely governed by constitu-
tional norms, and the finely balanced procedures followed by police
would have to be mimicked by the inspectors. However, this should pose
no special problems in the performance of the verification mission. Con-
stitutionally, there would be no distinction between lawfully delegating
to Soviet inspectors certain police or administrative powers, such as the
right to make Terry stops or to issue administrative subpoenas for pro-
duction of documents at a hearing, and not giving the Soviets the right to
exercise these powers directly, but instructing local or federal law en-
forcement officials who accompany the inspectors to use their own pow-
ers to the maximum lawful extent whenever the Soviets request.697 The
second scenario is the more plausible, but under either arrangement, the
696 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see notes 565-68 and accompanying text supra.
697 Some courts have identified a three-tiered catalog of police encounters with the public.
See United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1495 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Meritt, 736
F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984). The least intrusive encounters are those noncoercive ap-
proaches when the citizen is free to ignore any questions or comments and simply walk away.
Here there is no detention and no fourth amendment issues are implicated. Willis, 759 F.2d at
1495; Meritt, 736 F.2d at 230. Next are brief "Terry stops," temporary seizures for the pur-
pose of compelled inquiry into a crime. These may be undertaken only if the police have a
reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity may be
underway. Willis, 759 F.2d at 1495; Meritt, 736 F.2d at 230. The most intrusive device is an
arrest, involving a major interference with the citizen's liberty, and constitutionally permissible
only upon probable cause. Willis, 759 F.2d at 1495; Meritt, 736 F.2d at 230. Regarding the
difficulty of establishing the boundary between a "stop" and an "arrest," see United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
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United States government would be constitutionally responsible for the
conduct.
Due process rights would also apply to any hearings conducted by
the inspectorate, whether they be judicial in nature or legislative events.
It is difficult to predict precisely which due process requirements would
be necessary, but the inspectors can probably perform their function ade-
quately without challenging those norms. The inspectors could exercise
the right to subpoena persons and documents, as well as the power to
grant immunity from subsequent prosecution, thereby disposing of fifth
amendment concerns.
The special area of medical examinations carries the potential both
to produce powerful real evidence of impropriety and to invade the most
private personal sphere. Courts would probably concede the unusually
great potential importance of the inquiry, acknowledge the foreign-policy
as well as the criminal-prosecution stakes, and then proceed to balance
the competing concerns. That is, if the sought-after evidence is very im-
portant and very likely to be retrieved by the medical or surgical process,
and if the patient's safety and comfort will not be greatly jeopardized,
approval should be forthcoming. On the other hand, the courts are likely
to frustrate investigators who propose invasive procedures when less bur-
densome alternatives might suffice or when the evidentiary value is
speculative.
In sum, Soviet inspectors' contacts with Americans will be rather
closely regulated by the constitutional safeguards fashioned in criminal
or administrative settings. These will not unduly hamper the investiga-
tion routine, but they will retard any instincts toward free-wheeling, un-
constrained interrogation in the absence of consent.
" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: formal hearings, with
witnesses under subpoena and oath; informal field stops for tempo-
rary on-scene interviews.
" Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: compelled surgery or
other invasive medical procedures, without an adversary hearing or
at least a warrant.
" Examples of borderline cases: non-consensual taking of blood sam-
ples without a warrant.
5. Electronic Surveillance
The parameters of law enforcement officers' constitutional rights to
install wiretaps or other electronic communications interceptors in na-
tional security situations have not been fully tested. Existing statutes
cover most contingencies, but a treaty or law might purport to extend
further the power of Soviet inspectors.
The most probable outcome would derive from United States v.
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United States District Court,698 with the conclusion that eavesdropping
upon American citizens requires a judicially issued warrant, at least
when the targets are not acting in collusion with a foreign nation. A
warrant would be required even when the citizen's activities are criminal
in nature, threatening to the domestic security of the United States, and
adverse to American foreign affairs interests. Obtaining a warrant would
require a showing of probable cause, with applications for electronic sur-
veillance receiving the strictest fourth amendment scrutiny, 99 and re-
quiring minimization of the scope and duration of the devices. 70°
These warrant requirements may pose a substantial impediment for
an arms control regime.70' Even though statistics reveal that a warrant
application will probably be approved, 70 2 and even though the courts'
record for preserving secrecy is good, Soviet inspectors are unlikely to be
complacent. They would be suspicious of any delays encountered in issu-
ing the warrant and skeptical about the secrecy.
The particularity requirement would be least problematic when the
Soviet inspectors have begun to focus their attention upon selected per-
sons and locations suggested to them by other verification sources and
methods. Conversely, widespread "fishing expeditions," involving the in-
stallation of covert listening devices in places of only potential or hypo-
thetical interest, are likely to be disapproved by United States courts.
In sum, arms control inspectors would find their lawful use of elec-
tronic surveillance devices closely regulated. Wiretaps and "bugs" can
be installed by the government only after judicial review of an applica-
tion, and only when there are valid reasons to believe that concerted ef-
fort of this sort will be productive and can be minimized. United States-
Soviet collaboration in the emplacement of electronic surveillance de-
vices for arms control treaty verification is therefore likely to be rare.
" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: electronic surveillance
pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause; other surveillance
directed against non-United States citizens or against United States
citizens acting as agents of a foreign government.
" Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: warrantless wiretap-
698 407 U.S. 297 (1972); see notes 619-23 and accompanying text supra.
699 See notes 554-56 and accompanying text supra.
70 See note 559 and accompanying text supra.
701 The Soviet Union would, of course, retain the capability to continue its current SIGINT
activities targeted against United States persons. Many of these activities would continue to be
illegal under United States law, but the United States government would probably continue the
practice of monitoring, but not preventing, the interceptions. See notes 336-37 and accompa-
nying text supra.
If the Soviet Union wanted to enlist the assistance of the United States government in
planning or conducting the wiretaps, however, (assistance that might be of considerable advan-
tage in certain technological applications), then the warrant requirement would apply.
702 See note 563 supra.
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ping of United States persons who are acting against United States
interests but without foreign connection, even when implicating do-
mestic security or foreign affairs.
Examples of borderline cases: warrantless surveillance of United
States citizens not acting on behalf of foreign power, where a possi-
ble "national security" exception to warrant requirement applies.
6. On-Site Inspections
In certain respects, the most intrusive inspection device, the OSI,
raises, in starkest form, many of the issues and apprehensions considered
above. Constitutional restrictions will govern both the process through
which targets for inspection may properly be selected and the range of
activities to be conducted once Soviet personnel are admitted. Some lo-
cales of the greatest interest may be scrutinized quickly and thoroughly.
Sites where arms are produced, stored, and tested are likely to be quite
open to inspectors: many are government owned, others are operated by
contractors closely tied to the government, and others are subject to ad
hoe examination as pervasively regulated industries.
The most challenging problems arise in the context of facilities that
are not presently engaged in weapons-related activities, and have never
been known to be so, but that nevertheless have the capability based on
size, configuration, infrastructure, and material supplies, to be adapted to
covert contraband purposes. Soviet inspectors will encounter substantial
difficulty in satisfying themselves that an American button factory, ware-
house, or ranch is not being secretly converted for treaty violation pur-
poses. They can remotely monitor the inputs and outputs, they can seek
voluntary clarification, and they can pursue the less direct inspection
techniques outlined above, but they cannot generally circumvent the con-
stitutional protections accorded the privacy and security of private
property.
The most appropriate legal regime for arms control OSIs, the doc-
trine of administrative searches, could provide a justification for entry
into all structures of interest. But these must be undertaken pursuant to
a logical plan for the orderly inspection of all properties of a particular
type. Administrative searches may not be planned arbitrarily, and while
there is some discretion in selecting the timing and sequence of the in-
spections, the probable cause criteria for administrative searches rests
upon the construction of a comprehensive plan for an entire area or sec-
tor, precisely to protect against the caprice of an inspector.
If Soviet inspectors do want to focus in on a particular facility, and
want to dispense with the elaboration of an administrative inspection
plan, then the even more daunting probable cause requirements of the
criminal law will come into play. A search warrant will ordinarily be
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required, and the judge will carefully scrutinize the basis for assertions of
probable cause to believe that particular evidence is to be found at that
place.703 Again, the insistence upon compelling reasons to disturb the
citizens' peace will serve to frustrate general fishing expeditions or
hunches.
If the inspectorate perceives an emergency, it need not endure the
time delay for judicial issuance of a warrant, but the standards for assess-
ing emergencies are stiff: imminent destruction of evidence or ongoing
commission of a crime.04 Entry on less than this degree of provocation,
where there exists a less-invasive alternative, is a violation of citizens'
constitutional rights.
Regarding the conduct of the inspection itself, arms control inspec-
tors, once lawfully admitted to the premises, will be privileged to search
as thoroughly as necessary to obtain the evidence they seek. They could
not, however, expand their activities to rummage through papers or
materials in a general search for items not indicated in the warrant.70 5
There is little law on the issue of the scope of an administrative search,
but if the use of advanced equipment were essential to the goals of the
search, then the warrant could go well beyond an authorization for ordi-
nary sensory perception.
Inspectors would, of course, be liable for damages or breakage, 70 6
703 See notes 505-50 and accompanying text supra. There is a substantial chance that Soviet
arms inspectors may never be able to produce the quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause in the criminal law sense. In part, this might be because violations of arms
control treaties will be quite rare. In part, it would be because local police would be expected
to get to the scene first, initiating an investigation before arms control inspectors ever hear
about the issue; in those cases, local police, not arms control inspectors, would file affidavits
and apply for the warrant. In large part, the absence of probable cause might be attributable to
the inherent elusiveness and ambivalence of the evidence of violation: almost always, despite
persistent, long-term efforts, the available proof of a violation is equivocal, and there is no
international analogy to the police legwork that produces a "smoking gun." In United States
v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974), the court differentiated
two types of intelligence-gathering wiretap operations. In the first-gathering foreign affairs
information-no inquiry into the government's "probable cause" or even "reasonable belief
that criminal activity would be unearthed" is appropriate. Id. at 666. In the second cate-
gory-gathering evidence of criminal activity as a primary goal-a stricter standard is used.
Id. Arms control inspectors might be interested in both types of intelligence gathering
operations.
704 See notes 533-40 and accompanying text supra.
705 See notes 527-32 and accompanying text supra.
706 The inspectors themselves would probably benefit from the usual diplomatic privileges
and immunities insulating them from suit. See, e.g., PNET, supra note 89, Protocol, art. VII,
§ 2, 15 I.L.M. at 900, ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 16, at 188. Similarly, the Soviet govern-
ment would probably be unreachable under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Depending
upon the degree of official United States involvement, and the fit between the precise cause of
action and the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), the United States government might be a proper defendant
to such a claim.
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and in an extraordinary case, such as a month-long search of a mining
area to determine that explosions were the result of lawful conventional
means rather than banned nuclear devices, the inspectors' sheer presence
might rise to the level of a temporary "taking," requiring due process
compensation. 70 7
In sum, Soviet arms control inspectors may lawfully conduct OSIs,
but they may not act arbitrarily in doing so. The elaboration-in cam-
era, if necessary-of an acceptable basis for entering a particular home or
business is an important element of the validity of the program. Even
where the target consents to the search, inspectors may not expand the
scope of their inquiry beyond that necessary to research its approved
objectives.
" Examples of activities likely to be permitted: searches of private
property pursuant to administrative warrant based upon an orderly
plan for sequential examination of all like properties; searches pur-
suant to criminal investigation warrants, based upon individualized
probable cause.
" Examples of activities likely to be prohibited: warrantless entry
into homes or ordinary businesses; entry in "fishing expeditions"
without administrative rationale or probable cause.
* Examples of borderline cases: administrative search plans where
random chance is made a component of the selection criteria for
planning the sequence of targets.
CONCLUSION
The effort to fashion substantial measures of arms control into an
integral component of United States national security policy is one of the
most urgent and controversial demands on the nation's agenda.708 It is
also one of the most frustrating-a characteristic that, historically, is
largely attributable to the unquenched controversy over the adequacy of
verification.709
707 Exercise of emergency eminent domain power might be a vehicle for avoiding net-
tlesome fourth amendment issues in particular searches. That is, the government could simply
condemn the piece of property in question, pay fair compensation to the former owner, allow
Soviet inspectors free rein over what is now government property, and then resell the land to
the highest bidder at completion of the inspection. An arms control treaty could, in fact,
require the inspected state to purchase the property to be searched, in order to allow the in-
spection to be rapid, thorough, and free from legal complexities.
70s The difficulty of persuading the national security community to embrace the objectives
of arms control is suggested by Paul Warnke's aphorism that arms control is "an unnatural
act" for mutually suspicious rivals. Gelb, Arms Agency: U.S. Battleground in Fights over
Disarmament, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at A10.
709 Numerous commentators have identified verification as the key controversy throughout
the history of arms control. See Potter, Introduction to Verification and SALT: The Challenge
of Strategic Deception I (V. Potter ed. 1980) ("Verification has long been the nemesis of arms
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Both the United States and the Soviet Union have accused the other
of undercutting negotiations through unreasonable insistence upon or de-
nials of inspection rights. The public record of the negotiating history is
littered with illustrations supporting both accusations that one side is un-
reasonable in rejecting essential assurances of compliance, and charges
that the other side is making excessive demands amounting to licensed
espionage. Commentators have criticized this elaborate blame-shifting
minuet about verification as tacitly promoting the superpowers' shared
intention to pursue the nuclear arms race essentially unfettered by legal
restraints or the force of world public opinion. 710
The validity of these accusations, and the foundation of the hope
that arms control can yet be summoned to help draw us back from the
precipice, are now being tested. Arms control efforts are entering an ex-
ceptionally challenging era, an era distinguished not fundamentally by
the political characteristics of the leadership in the White House or the
Kremlin, but by the technological characteristics of the weapons them-
selves, as well as their emerging control mechanisms. As the armaments
become smaller, more mobile, and multipurpose, the strains upon the
existing monitoring apparatus will multiply. As the technology for so-
phisticated remote and electronic surveillance advances, the strains upon
existing political and cultural aversion to openness will similarly multi-
ply. Americans and Soviets alike may have to realize that part of the
price of avoiding the manifest hazards of the arms race may be a compro-
mise in their accustomed privacy and freedom from foreign observation.
This Article has explored some of the most profound American in-
hibitions upon the operation of an arms control inspection system inside
this country.711 It has demonstrated that Soviet inspectors, acting in
control. Indeed, the history of negotiations to limit strategic arms, from the proposal of the
Baruch Plan in 1946 to the signing of the SALT II Treaty in 1979, is a record of intense and
nearly continuous controversy over political and technical verification issues.").
710 In this view, the absence of the requisite political will, in one or both capitals, rather
than the technical difficulty of verification, has been the key impediment to progress in arms
control. See J. Goldblat, supra note 48, at 90 ("Insistence on verification measures which are
obviously unacceptable to another party, or refusal to accept verification measures which are
obviously indispensable, have often been used as convenient excuses for blocking an arms con-
trol agreement when the real reason was inconvenient to admit."); A. Myrdal, supra note 24,
at 294 ("The Soviet government has often felt free to launch broad proposals for disarmament,
which serve to keep its masses and intellectuals convinced that it stands for peace, ending the
arms race, and general disarmament. It can safely rely on the United States to raise demands
for controls, which the Soviet Union can then decline to accept. Thus agreements are pre-
vented. And so the gaming and the arms race continue.").
711 There is a symmetry even here, as commentators have observed that on the Soviet side,
too, "there are, indeed, legal obstacles, and not only political obstacles, to any system of on-site
or aerial inspection of disarmament. It is not true, in other words, that all that is needed in
order to maintain a system of inspection on or over Soviet territory is for the Soviet leaders to
be persuaded that it is in their interests to permit it." H. Berman & P. Maggs, supra note 36,
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concert with American officials under a variety of hypothetical arms con-
trol agreements, could be empowered, consistent with the Constitution,
to undertake a multitude of intrusive inspections. They could, for exam-
ple, thoroughly explore virtually all government-owned facilities, and
could, via contract negotiation, obtain the right to examine contractor-
operated installations. Much of the information they desired could be
obtained voluntarily, through the express consent of the targets, or by
exercise of the established right to patrol pervasively regulated industries,
such as many defense-related businesses.
These inspection rights, however, are not unlimited, and the Consti-
tution forbids or starkly curtails some of the most far-reaching intrusions
that arms control inspectors may seek to undertake. No treaty, for ex-
ample, could permit inspectors to enter arbitrarily selected private homes
or businesses in order to search randomly for contraband or evidence.
No treaty could permit widespread wiretapping or other electronic fish-
ing expeditions without reason to suspect particular types of relevant
conversations will be obtained. No treaty could empower inspectors to
conduct random intrusive body searches for possible telltale evidence of
radiation or biological weapons.
More generally, the rights of Soviet inspectors in the United States
will parallel those of American government officials acting in other infor-
mation-gathering capacities, and they will be subject to similar safe-
guards. Inspectors may interrogate Americans, but only pursuant to the
rules governing stops, arrests, and hearings. Inspectors may conduct
compulsory on-site examinations of business premises and dwellings, but
only by adhering to the specialized probable cause criteria of administra-
tive searches. Inspectors may obtain business and financial records of a
subject, but only by adhering to the same standards of court review that
currently constrain official United States investigators.
What are the implications of this enhanced appreciation for the pos-
sible constitutional limitations upon Soviet inspectors' activities? How
do the requirements for an impartial magistrate, probable cause, and par-
ticularity impact upon national security considerations?
The response begins with reciprocity: the United States cannot plau-
sibly insist upon inspection rights inside the Soviet Union that are in any
measure greater than those we are prepared to grant to Soviet inspectors
in this country. If we do not wish to grant, or could not constitutionally
enforce, Soviet inspectors' freedom from our basic "reasonableness" and
search warrant law, then we cannot expect Soviet negotiators to permit
American inspectors an unconstrained random walk through Soviet
society.
at 45.
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Moreover, just as there surely must be reciprocal inspection rights,
one must anticipate reciprocity in the suspicion and hostility accompany-
ing the exercise of those rights. In each inspection exercise, some in the
inspecting state will suspect that delays, impediments, and red tape are
deliberate harassments or cover-ups of a violation. Conversely, some in
the inspected state will fear that the inspectors' zeal is motivated by hos-
tility and a willingness to trump up or even invent evidence of violations,
should that suit the aims of the political leadership back home.
Further, there is the irony of two such dissimilar societies creating,
from vastly different political and cultural imperatives, strikingly similar
kinds of impediments to arms control inspection. That is, the United
States-an "open" society, in which information is freely disseminated
and in which many people would probably consent voluntarily to
whatever inspections Soviet authorities desired-nevertheless also sus-
tains the fourth amendment limitations on searches and seizures and a
profound social concern for privacy and freedom from government.
These conflicting factors resolve into a set of constraints upon arbitrary
government action, and a set of court-dominated warrant procedures,
that inhibit government inspection activities.
At the same time, the Soviet Union, although rooted in a tradition
of secrecy and constricted flow of information, would be able to wield
government authoritarian power to pry out privately held secrets. Thus,
although far from being mirror images, the two superpowers both pres-
ent severe challenges to arms control inspection.
Finally, the cost of foregoing the most arbitrary inspection activities
is likely to be small. As attractive as contributing to deterrence through
the threat of sudden, random inspection may be, the fact is that there are
simply too many potential targets and too few inspectors. As a practical
matter, inspectors will be driven to focus their inquiries by reference to
the preliminary data delivered to them by NTM and other mechanisms.
When assembled evidence reaches the proportions appropriate to merit
further focused inquiry, it would ordinarily also be sufficient to satisfy an
appropriate probable cause standard. At that point, the intervention of a
judicial officer is something that Soviet inspectors in the United States,
and American inspectors in the Soviet Union, will simply have to toler-
ate, accepting the risk of collusion, delay, and malfeasance.
If United States negotiators were to pursue these principles, a small,
but appreciable, moderation in United States verification demands
should be forthcoming. 712 The United States should no longer insist
712 The final stages of the negotiation of the INF Treaty during the fall of 1987 provided
some glimpses into the tensions affecting important United States-Soviet arms control negotia-
tions. Everyone acknowledged that the provisions for verification of a pact of this sort would
have to be exhausting and tightly drawn, and the treaty that finally emerged was extraordinary
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upon intensive layers of verification rights without close scrutiny of their
reciprocal legality under the Constitution. More important, the United
States should make verification proposals more thoughtful and more re-
alistic, keyed to a determination of precisely what sorts of inspection
fights are truly essential to the adequate monitoring of compliance with
the treaty terms under negotiation, rather than what is simply nice to
have. Verification should no longer be a convenient smokescreen behind
which less palatable and less politically expedient reasons for opposition
to arms control efforts could lurk.713
The historical record provides an admittedly ambiguous basis for
prediction of the likely Soviet response to this enlightened negotiating
posture. There is, however, ample precedent for the conclusion that the
Soviet Union will find a way to tolerate even quite an intrusive inspection
regime when it is technically essential for verification and rationally con-
nected to a politically significant arms control accord. There are no
guarantees that negotiating verification arrangements in good faith will
result in sound agreements, but there is a substantial evidentiary basis for
the converse proposition, that failure to temper verification demands in
this way will suffice to preclude meaningful progress in arms control.
In short, the Constitution does pose certain limitations upon the ac-
tivities of Soviet arms control inspectors. These constraints are funda-
mental and cannot be bargained away. But they should not make arms
control impossible; they will merely guide and shape the implementation
of most inspection events.714 Sensitivity to these constitutional norms,
in the degree to which it opened hitherto-secret areas for foreign inspection. Nevertheless,
even during the "endgame," when most provisions of the treaty were already agreed to, the
United States negotiators were undecided about demanding additional provisions for even
greater inspection rights. When the United States, at that late stage, proposed to augment still
further the verification rights, the Soviets abruptly dismissed the idea, and the Americans
backed off. Gordon, supra note 35, at A8.
713 Without intimate knowledge of the operation of senior decisionmakers in the United
States and the Soviet Union, it is impossible, of course, to determine the extent of their sincer-
ity concerning the verification issue. A body of evidence, however, supplements observers'
skepticism that verification is, at least on occasion, used as a stalking horse to conceal opposi-
tion to arms control simpliciter. See A. Krass, supra note 50, at 115.
714 A similar conclusion was reached almost 30 years ago, despite the vastly different tech-
nological, political, and legal milieu:
The essentials of the inspection system-the reports from government and industry, in-
terrogations of officials and citizens, inspection of governmental installations and private
industrial establishments related to armaments, perhaps even of any industrial establish-
ment suspected-will not turn the litmus paper of the Constitution. It is the eccentric,
perhaps, the extreme suggestion-the improbable incursion into the home-which raises
serious warning signals, and this may prove to be only an imaginary dragon. It does not
appear necessary to effective investigation of arms control; it would raise major constitu-
tional questions if applied in the United States; it should not lightly materialize in nego-
tiations, in demands by or of other nations.
L. Henkin, supra note 36, at 154.
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and appreciation for the demands of superpower reciprocity, may
prompt both a more searching review of inspection proposals, and scru-
tiny of previous demands in order to ascertain exactly which verification
routines are truly necessary and tolerable. If that re-evaluation occurs,
the result should be the articulation of more rational and more negotiable
inspection provisions for arms control treaties.
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